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     This thesis contains three essays, each of which calls into question generally 
accepted empirical results through the use of more appropriate data or econometric 
techniques.  In doing so, I shed novel light on alre dy well established results.  
     In the first essay I address the issue of stock market integration from a new 
perspective. The hypothesis of stock market integraion assumes that information 
originating from one market should be important to other markets as well. The idea that 
with the relaxation of various types of economic barriers and with the developments in 
information technologies, stock markets should become integrated as opposed to 
fragmented has motivated broad empirical research on the transmission of information 
across equity markets. Studies that focus primarily on stock market integration 
investigate statistical relationships between the indices from different markets, typically 
using cointegration or Granger causality analysis with daily closing time data. 
     I substantially extend the existing research by performing cointegration and Granger 
causality tests with data of different frequencies. I use a unique dataset covering two 
years of high frequency data on the indices from the markets in the U.S., London, 
Frankfurt, Paris, Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. This allows me to vary the data 
frequency from five minutes to one day. My aim is to uncover the time structure of the 
reaction of prices on one market to the information revealed in prices on other markets. 
Particularly I am interested in the speed at which the information is transmitted between 
the markets. My results show a rich and interesting pattern of mutual reactions of the 
investigated stock market indices. The results suggest that the markets react very 
quickly to the information revealed in the prices on other markets. The decisive reaction 
occurs within 1 hour, while the first reaction is detected often after only 5 minutes. This 
is also in line with the findings of the research that investigates the effect of 
macroeconomic releases from different countries on st ck markets’ returns, volatility, 
and trading volumes and concludes that markets react to macroeconomic releases very 
quickly, faster than within one hour. In the light of these results the use of daily closing 
time data in the studies of stock market integration was clearly misleading. 
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    The other two essays focus on the curse of natural resources, a well known result 
obtained in cross-country growth regressions and various case studies. The curse of 
natural resources claims that countries with natural resources intensive economies grow 
more slowly than resource-free countries. It is a very robust result confirmed in 
numerous studies and based on broad empirical evidence with data from the last four 
decades. 
     In the second essay I introduce in detail the issue of the curse of natural resources as 
it is presented in the existing literature. Moreover, I focus on its proclaimed robustness 
and often stressed possibility to mitigate the curse with prudent economic policies and 
mature institutions. I study the robustness of the curse of natural resources with respect 
to variables measuring the quality of democracy and regime stability. I also use 
smoothed least trimmed squares, a robust estimation procedure to estimate the resource 
curse regressions. Overall my results confirm the repo ted robustness of the curse of 
natural resources. However, I find limited evidence suggesting that the intensity of the 
curse depends on the level of civil liberties. The power of the curse seems to decrease 
steadily with the level of civil liberties once a minimal level is achieved. Similarly as 
other authors, I employ variables that measure natural resource dependence or intensity 
rather than abundance or wealth in order to estimate the effect of natural resources on 
economic growth. The relationship between pure natural resource abundance and 
economic growth is investigated in the third essay. 
     In the third essay I challenge the prevailing terpretation of the resource curse 
result. I construct variables expressing per capita natural resource wealth and focus on 
the differences in results obtained with the measures of natural resource dependence and 
abundance. My results do not provide any statistical evidence that natural resources 
themselves are associated with or even cause slow ec nomic growth. This finding 
thoroughly questions the prevailing interpretation of the resource curse regressions.  
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Using a unique dataset covering two years of high frequency data on the indices from 
markets in the U.S., London, Frankfurt, Paris, Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest, I perform 
Cointegration and Granger causality tests with data of different frequencies (from 5 
minutes to 1 day). The aim is to describe the time structure in which markets react to the 
information revealed in prices on other markets. The results suggest that the speed of 
information transmission is very fast. In all cases the strongest reaction occurs within 1 
hour. Therefore, the use of daily data may be misleading when analyzing the issues of 




     Increasing globalization of the world economy should obviously have an impact on 
the behavior of national stock markets. The relaxation of all types of economic barriers 
and developments in information technologies are, among others, expected to induce 
stronger stock market integration as opposed to stock market fragmentation. With 
integrated stock markets, information originating from one market should be important 
to other markets. This assumption has motivated an inte sive area of empirical research 
on the transmission of information across equity markets. 
     Using a rough criterion, this research can be divided into two areas. The first area 
studies stock market integration and focuses on statistic l relationships between the 
indices from different markets, typically using cointegration or Granger causality 
analysis, e.g., Huang and Fok (2001), Seabra (2001), Dickinson (2000), Bracker et al. 
(1999), Chelley-Steeley et al. (1998), Richards (1996), Chou et al. (1994). The second 
area focuses on the effect of macroeconomic releases from different countries on 
different markets. It studies the impact of the releases on market returns, volatility, and 
trading volumes. Papers from this area include, for example, Andersen et al. (2003), 
Connolly and Wang (2003), Wongswan (2003), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002). 
     In this paper I address the same problem of stock market integration as the first area 
of research does, but employ high frequency data chara teristic for the second research 
area. So far, cointegration and Granger causality tests between stock market indices 
were performed with daily or even lower data frequenci s.1 The reason for this might be 
that historical high frequency data on indices from most stock markets are not easily 
available. Studies of the reaction of stock markets to macroeconomic releases employ 
typically high frequency index data only from the markets in the U.S. and London, 
using FTSE 100 futures as a proxy for the spot index. Nevertheless, these studies 
suggest that the markets react to macroeconomic releas s very quickly, faster than 
within one hour. Therefore, there are good reasons t  believe that also the reaction of 
                                                
1  The term frequency is actually used incorrectly in th s area of research. When I say daily frequency of 
the data, I mean, in fact, a daily period. With higher frequencies, like hourly or 30 minutes frequencies, I 
mean data collected hourly or at 30 minute intervals. 
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stock markets to the information revealed in prices on other stock markets should be 
very fast. The use of daily data in cointegration and Granger causality tests could then 
be misleading.2  
     If the reaction of prices on a market A to theinformation revealed in prices on a 
market B occurs faster than within one day, then we should not detect cointegration or 
Granger causality with daily data. With the use of daily data, the markets would appear 
informationally efficient. Informational efficiency means in this case that today’s 
expectation of tomorrow’s return on market A, conditional on the available information, 
equals today’s return on market A. However, cointegration and Granger causality would 
imply that we could improve the expectation of tomorrow’s return on market A using 
the information about today’s return on market B. On the other hand, we should detect 
cointegration and Granger causality among indices from two markets when using data 
of a frequency close to the speed of information tra smission between the two markets. 
When further increasing the data frequency, cointegration and Granger causality should 
disappear once the data are collected at intervals much lower than is the time needed for 
information transmission between the two markets. With such high frequency data, the 
markets would appear as completely independent. 
     The arguments presented above suggest that data frequency should play an important 
role for cointegration and Granger causality tests among indices from different stock 
markets. Therefore, I perform cointegration and Granger causality tests with data of 
different frequencies. I use a unique dataset covering two years of high frequency data 
on the indices from the markets in the U.S., London, Frankfurt, Paris, Warsaw, Prague, 
and Budapest. This allows me to vary the data frequency from five minutes to one day. 
My aim is to uncover the time structure of the reaction of prices on one market to the 
information revealed in prices on other markets. Particularly I am interested in the speed 
at which the information is transmitted between the markets.3 
                                                
2  In general, even if markets react relatively quickly to any specific information, analysis based on daily 
data can make sense, because information is coming throughout the day and the change in daily closing 
price can be viewed as its aggregation. However, Granger causality and cointegration analysis with daily 
data should not be used to decide about the presence or absence of stock market integration. 
3 Egert and Kočenda (2005) employ an identical dataset but investigate only the highest five minute 
frequency data using a wide range of econometric techniques. 
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     I am aware that I cannot directly address the nature of the information transmission. 
My tests cannot distinguish if the information revealed in the prices on one market is 
transmitted directly to the prices on another market or if the two markets react to some 
other relevant information about economic fundamentals (like macroeconomic releases 
could be) in a similar manner but at slightly different speeds. In other words, I do not 






     The data employed in this paper were provided fr e of charge by Bloomberg, Prague. 
I use five minute interval data on the following stock market indices: S&P 500 and Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (U.S.), FTSE 100 (London), DAX 30 (Frankfurt), CAC 40 
(Paris), WIG 20 (Warsaw), PX 50 (Prague), and BUX (Budapest). It is not possible to 
obtain historical five minute interval data on all these indices. The data are stored in the 
Bloomberg database only for the previous few months. Therefore, the data were 
downloaded 24 times during 24 months so that a timespan starting on June 2, 2003, at 




Table 1: Daily time periods of available data on individual indices. 
 Time period 
Index From To 
S&P 500 15:30 22:10 
DJIA 15:30 22:00 
FTSE 100 9:00 17:25 
DAX 30 9:00 20:10, from Nov. 2003 only to 17:40 
CAC 40 9:05 17:25 
WIG 20 10:05 15:55 
PX 50 9:30 15:55 
BUX 9:00 16:25 
Notes: Time is given in West and Central European Daylight Time. 
 
                                                
4 West and Central European Daylight Time is equal to GMT+1:00 but observes a daylight saving time 
period, during which it is equal to GMT+2:00.  
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     Table 1 shows the time periods for which the data are mostly available each trading 
day for each individual index. Table 2 shows basic summary statistics on the natural 
logarithms of the indices and on the associated logarithmic five minute returns (five 
minute logarithmic differences). 
 
Table 2: Statistics on logarithms of indices and five minute logarithmic returns. 
 Logarithms of indices Logarithmic 5 minute returns 
Index Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min.  Max. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
S&P 500 40007 7.01 0.063 6.87 7.11 39499 3.40E-6 7.22E-4 -0.010 0.008 
DJIA 39133 9.22 0.050 9.09 9.30 38590 3.15E-6 7.47E-4 -0.012 0.011 
FTSE 100 50484 8.42 0.060 8.28 8.53 49874 -2.94E-6 5.37E-4 -0.014 0.007 
DAX 30 55868 8.26 0.093 8.01 8.42 55363 3.60E-6 9.17E-4 -0.023 0.016 
CAC 40 50959 8.20 0.078 8.01 8.34 50441 2.17E-6 7.33E-4 -0.008 0.010 
WIG 20 35053 7.44 0.123 7.08 7.66 34546 7.80E-7 1.29E-3 -0.012 0.019 
PX 50 38296 6.70 0.244 6.27 7.15 37451 1.56E-5 7.41E-4 -0.020 0.019 






     To test for Granger causality and cointegration, I use the standard methodology 
proposed by Granger (1969, 1986) and Engle and Grange  (1987) as described, for 
example, in Enders (1995). All tests are performed on natural logarithms of the indices’ 
time series using simple OLS estimation procedures.5 
 
 
2.3.1 Granger Causality and Cointegration Tests 
 












lnlnln      (1) 
and perform an F test for joint insignificance of the coefficients βi, i=1…K. The null 
hypothesis claims that xt does not Granger cause yt. For each pair of stock market 
indices, I can perform two Granger causality tests so that I can decide whether xt 
Granger causes yt, or yt Granger causes xt, or both, or none. 
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     When testing for cointegration of a pair of stock market indices xt and yt, I have to 
first determine if the logarithms of both indices are integrated of the order 1, denoted as 
I(1).6 It means that the levels of the series’ logarithms must be non-stationary (contain a 
unit root) and the differences must already be station ry. To test for stationarity, I 
employ the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF test). For levels I estimate 
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I allow the levels to contain a constant term and a linear time trend, whereas for the 
differences I include only a constant term in the estimated equation. Under the null 
hypothesis of the presence of a unit root (non-station rity), the test statistic defined as 
the t-ratio of (δ-1) equals zero. To test this hypothesis, I compare the test statistic to the 
finite sample critical values tabulated by Cheung ad Lai (1995).  
     If the logarithms of both series xt and yt are found to be I(1), then I proceed to the test 
of cointegration. I estimate a simple linear relationship between the two time series 
defined by equations (4) or (5): 
,lnln ttt xcy εα ++=         (4) 
.lnln ttt ycx εα ++=         (5) 
Then I apply the ADF test to the estimated residuals et from each of the two equations 
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In this case I do not even allow for a constant in equation (6) because et is a series of 
regressions’ residuals. Further, I proceed as with the ADF test applied on levels and 
                                                                                                                                    
5 The results do not change significantly when OLS with a correction for heteroscedasticity is employed.  
6 It should be mentioned that a simple random walk like stochastic time series models of a stock price 
(and thus also of a stock market index) imply that the logarithms of the stock price contain a unit root and




differences of the logarithms of stock market indices, but employ the finite sample 
critical values tabulated by MacKinnon (1991). If the time series of the residuals et is 
tested as stationary, then I claim that the stock market indices xt and yt are cointegrated. 
     Cointegration between the indices xt and yt indicates the presence of a long run 
equilibrium relationship represented by the equation (4) or (5). If one index deviates 
from this relationship in a period t, then it tends to return back to it in the following 
periods. As a result none of the indices should depart too far from this equilibrium. This 
idea is mathematically expressed with an error correction model that can be estimated 






























−     (8) 
where et are the estimated residuals from equations (4) or (5).  If the indices xt and yt are 
found cointegrated, then at least one of the coeffici nts δ1 and δ2 should appear 
significant in the estimated equations (7) and (8) and its sign should be such that the 
deviation from the long run equilibrium in period t-1 (et-1 is used as a proxy for this 
deviation) will be corrected in the following period t. 
     In the tests described above, sums of lagged differences are included in the estimated 
equations (1), (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8). The lagged differences control for potential 
serial autocorrelation in residuals. To select the highest lag K, I use a modification of 
the non-parametric method presented by Campbell and Perron (1991), and Ng and 
Perron (1995). The number of lags K is initially set at the maximum value eight and the
statistical significance of the coefficient on the ighest lag is checked using a simple t-
test. If it is insignificant at the 10 per cent level, the number of lags is reduced by one 
and the procedure is repeated until statistical significance of the coefficient by the 
highest lag is achieved. If lagged differences for two variables are included (as in 
equations (1), (7), and (8), then I include the same number of lagged differences for 
both of them. Therefore, K is set when at least one of the coefficients on the highest lag 
is significant at the 10 per cent level of significan e. 
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2.3.2 Tests with Different Data Frequencies 
 
     The major goal of this paper is to compare the results of Granger causality and 
cointegration tests for different data frequencies. Namely, I perform the tests with the 
stock market index data of the following frequencies: 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 20 
minutes, 30 minutes, 40 minutes, 50 minutes, 1 hour, and 1 day. To assure 
comparability of the results with different data frequencies, I proceed in the following 
way. For each pair of the tested indices I choose one time and select the available daily 
observations only for this particular time. The chosen times are 21:50 for a pair of U.S. 
indices, 15:40 for a pair of European indices, and 17:15 for a pair consisting of one U.S. 
and one European index. All the times are expressed in West and Central European 
Daylight Time. With such ‘daily’ time series, I use different lags for the tests with 
different frequencies. For example, when performing Granger causality tests on 5 
minute interval data I employ 5 minute lags in equation (1), with 10 minute interval data 
I employ 10 minute lags, etc. With daily frequency data, I do not control for any 
potential Monday effects and take Friday as the preceding day. The times 21:50, 15:40, 
and 17:15 are chosen so that enough lags on all frequencies are available for both 
indices in the pair. Simultaneously, I avoid the closing times of any of the markets to 
prevent some potential special properties of the closing time index values from 
influencing the results. Nevertheless, the maximum number of lags allowed in the 
estimated equations is lower than eight as the frequencies approach one hour (see Table 
3 below in Results). 
     Depending on each individual pair of indices, the number of observations employed 
in the tests ranges between 408 and 498 for frequencies up to 1 hour, with a typical 
value around 470. For the tests with daily frequency the number of observations ranges 




     The results of all Granger causality tests, cointegration tests, and error correction 
model estimations are given in Tables A.1 to A.3 in Appendix A. I performed Granger 
causality and cointegration tests with different frequencies of the following twelve pairs 
of stock market indices: S&P 500 and DJIA, S&P 500 and FTSE 100, S&P 500 and 
DAX 30, FTSE 100 and DAX 30, FTSE 100 and CAC 40, DAX 30 and CAC 40, DAX 
30 and WIG 20, DAX 30 and PX 50, DAX 30 and BUX, WIG 20 and PX 50, WIG 20 
and BUX, and PX 50 and BUX. 
     DJIA and S&P 500 are two indices covering stock markets in the same country. 
Therefore, Granger causality or cointegration relationships should occur only at very 
high frequencies, because the transmission of information should be very fast. 
Unfortunately, the two indices do not measure the performance of two non-intersecting 
sets of stocks. In fact, the DJIA can be viewed as a ‘ ubset’ of the S&P 500. All 30 
DJIA index components are among the 500 stocks, whose prices are used to compute 
the value of the S&P 500 index (this held at least throughout the time span investigated 
in this paper). For example, in August 2004, the weight of the 30 DJIA index 
components in the S&P 500 index was around 35%. This weight can slightly change 
over time due to the S&P500 index weighting scheme. While the DJIA is calculated on 
a price-weighted basis, the S&P 500 components are weighted proportionally to the 
market capitalization of the corresponding companies. Therefore, it is not possible to 
compute that part of the S&P 500 index measuring the remaining 470 stocks not 
included in the DJIA, unless we know the exact market capitalization of all the S&P 
500 components at any point in time. The ‘overlap’ of the two indices could cause a 
slight bias in the results of this paper. The bias should lead towards not detecting any 
Granger causality, because any time series will never Granger cause itself. In the case of 
cointegration, the bias should lead towards finding a cointegration relationship because 
any time series is trivially cointegrated with itself, as the residuals from the regressions 
(4) or (5) equal zero. However, any of the two biases hould not be too serious, because 
about two thirds of the S&P 500 index is calculated using prices of the 470 stocks not 
included in the DJIA. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that any of the 470 
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companies whose stocks are not included in the DJIA index has a much lower market 
capitalization than any of the 30 companies whose stock  are included in both indices. 
Thus, when using DJIA and S&P 500 indices in Granger causality and cointegration 
analysis in this paper, we in fact investigate the transmission of information revealed in 
prices of large (represented by the DJIA) and relatively small U.S. companies 
(represented by S&P 500). 
     The second and third pair investigate the relationships between the U.S. S&P 500 
index and the two major European indices of the markets in London (FTSE 100) and 
Frankfurt (DAX 30). The next three pairs include three European indices: FTSE 100, 
DAX 30, and CAC 40 of the stock market in Paris. The next three pairs study the 
relationships between DAX 30 and three indices from relatively small and still 
emerging Eastern European markets in Warsaw (WIG 20), Prague (PX 50), and 
Budapest (BUX).  The last three pairs include the thr e emerging markets indices WIG 
20, PX 50, and BUX. 
 
Table 3: Maximum number of lags available in Granger causality and cointegration 
tests for each pair of indices and different data frequencies. 
Indices Frequency 
pair 5 min 10 min 20 min 30 min 40 min 50 min 1 hour 1 day 
DJIA and S&P 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 
S&P and FTSE 8 8 4 2 1 1 0 8 
S&P and DAX 8 8 4 2 1 1 0 8 
FTSE and DAX 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 
FTSE and CAC 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 
DAX and CAC 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 
DAX and WIG 8 8 8 8 7 5 4 8 
DAX and PX 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 
DAX and BUX 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 
WIG and PX 8 8 8 8 7 5 4 8 
WIG and BUX 8 8 8 8 7 5 4 8 
PX and BUX 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 8 
 
 
     If possible, I allow for a maximum of 8 lags of the logarithmic differences in all the 
performed tests. However, the number of available lags is lower for data frequencies 
close to 1 hour. The maximum number of available lags in Granger causality and 
cointegration tests for different frequencies with each pair of indices is given in Table 3. 
The problem of a low number of available lags becomes the most serious in the case of 
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the following two pairs: S&P 500 with FTSE 100 and S&P 500 with DAX 30. Here, the 
number of available lags drops to 2 for 30 minute frequencies and to 1 for 40 and 50 
minute frequencies. With hourly data the tests cannot be performed at all because zero 
lags are available. Therefore, the results of the tests for these two indices’ pairs cannot 
be viewed as fully comparable to the results with the other pairs. 
     I should be also careful when comparing the test r sults from daily data to the results 
from data of other frequencies. With daily data the number of available observations is 
lower than with other frequencies. Moreover, I do not control for any possible Monday 
effects and regard Fridays as directly preceding Mondays.7 
 
 
2.4.1 Granger Causality 
 
     The results of Granger causality tests are givn in Table A.1 in Appendix A. They 
show a rich structure of Granger causality relationships. Table 4 summarizes these 
results for each pair of indices and each data frequency. 
     First, let us consider Granger causality betwen the two U.S. stock market indices: 
S&P 500 and DJIA. This pair can serve as a benchmark because the two indices are 
from markets in the same country. In line with this fact I detect the strongest result only 
with the highest 5 minute frequency where the DJIA index Granger causes the S&P 500 
index at the 1 per cent significance level and vice ersa, S&P 500 Granger causes DJIA 
but only at the 10 per cent level of significance. It means that the two indices either 
react very quickly to each other, or react to information relevant for the U.S. stock 
markets almost equally fast and in a similar manner. Moreover, the direction of Granger 
causality goes from the DJIA index to the S&P 500 index. It suggests that the prices of 
stocks of relatively small U.S. companies (represented by the S&P 500 index) react very 
quickly to the price changes of stocks of large U.S. companies (represented by the DJIA 
index).  Additionally, my results also suggest that S&P 500 Granger causes DJIA with 
30 minute and 40 minute frequency data but only at the 10 per cent significance level. 
                                                
7 If Monday dummies are included in the regressions with daily data, the results of the tests do not 
change, even though the dummies are significant in most cases. 
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This result is, therefore, relatively unimportant compared to the result obtained with 5 
minute frequency data. 
 
Table 4: Results of Granger causality tests with different data frequencies. 
 Frequency 
GC → 5 min 10 min 20 min 30 min 40 min 50 min 1 hour 1 day 
S&P→DJIA ▒   ▒ ▒    
DJIA→S&P █        
S&P→FTSE █ ▒       
FTSE→S&P         
S&P→DAX ▓   ▓ ▒    
DAX→S&P  ▓       
FTSE→DAX   ▓ █ ▒  ▒  
DAX→FTSE █  █   █ ▒  
FTSE→CAC    █ ▓  ▒  
CAC→FTSE ▓  ▓ ▓  ▓ ▓ ▓ 
DAX→CAC  ▒  ▓ █ █ ▓ ▒ 
CAC→DAX  ▓  ▓  ▓ ▓ ▒ 
DAX→WIG █ ▓  ▓ █ █ █  
WIG→DAX ▓    ▒   ▒ 
DAX→PX     ▓ ▓ █  
PX→DAX         
DAX→BUX █    ▒ █ ▓  
BUX→DAX     ▒    
WIG→PX    ▓ ▒  ▓  
PX→WIG ▒   █ ▒  █ ▓ 
WIG→BUX ▒      ▒  
BUX→WIG  ▓    ▓ ▓  
PX→BUX     ▒   ▓ 
BUX→PX  ▒ █ █ █ █ █ ▒ 
Notes: The symbols stand for Granger causality at the ▒ 10%,  ▓ 5%, and █ 1% significance level. With 
hourly frequency and the pairs of the S&P 500 index with the FTSE 100 and DAX 30 indices, not enough 
lags are available to perform Granger causality tests. 
 
 
     Second, I consider Granger causality between th  S&P 500 index and the two major 
European indices FTSE 100 and DAX 30. Here, we see a slightly different pattern than 
with the two U.S. indices above. S&P 500 Granger causes FTSE 100 at the 1 per cent 
significance level with 5 minute frequency data and t the 10 per cent significance level 
also with 10 minute frequency data. With the DAX 30 index the pattern of Granger 
causality results is a bit richer. S&P 500 Granger causes DAX 30 at the 5 per cent 
significance level with 5 and 30 minute frequency data and additionally with 40 minute 
frequency data at the 10 per cent significance level. The opposite Granger causality 
relationship is detected only once. The DAX 30 index Granger causes S&P 500 with 10 
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minute frequency data at the 5 per cent significance level. Therefore, I conclude that the 
two major European stock markets react to the information from the stock markets in 
the U.S. approximately within 30 to 40 minutes after this information is reflected in the 
S&P 500 index. However, the first and strongest reaction occurs very quickly, 
approximately within the first 10 minutes. The evidence for an opposite reaction of the 
S&P 500 index to the information revealed in the European indices is weak. 
     Third, I analyze Granger causality results among the three European stock market 
indices, FTSE 100, DAX 30, and CAC 40. In this group a very rich Granger causality 
pattern is detected with frequencies ranging from 5 inute to 1 day. Numerous Granger 
causality relationships in both directions and among all the three pairs of indices are 
found with data frequencies between 20 minute and 1 hour. With the highest 5 minute 
data frequency only two Granger causality relationships are present: DAX 30 Granger 
causes FTSE 100 at the 1 per cent significance level and CAC 40 Granger causes FTSE 
100 at the 5 per cent significance level. With daily data frequency Granger causality 
relationships are detected only at the 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance. The CAC 
40 index Granger causes the FTSE 100 index at the 5per cent level of significance and 
both directions of Granger causality are found betwe n the DAX 30 and CAC 40 
indices but only at the 10 per cent significance level. I conclude that the three European 
markets react to the information revealed on these markets approximately within 1 hour, 
with the strongest reaction occurring after 20 minutes. The fastest is the reaction of the 
FTSE 100 index whose first reaction to the DAX 30 and CAC 40 indices seems to occur 
within 5 minutes.  
     Fourth, I look at the results of Granger causality between the Frankfurt index DAX 
30 and the three indices from the relatively small Eastern European stock markets in 
Warsaw (WIG 20), Prague (PX 50), and Budapest (BUX). I find evidence that the DAX 
30 index Granger causes all the three Eastern European stock market indices. There is 
little evidence of an opposite relationship. With 5 minute frequency data, the DAX 30 
index Granger causes the WIG 20 and BUX indices at the 1 per cent significance level. 
With this data frequency an opposite Granger causality relationship is also detected 
between the DAX 30 and WIG 20 indices but only at the 5 per cent level of 
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significance. Additionally the DAX 30 index Granger causes the WIG 20 index with 10 
minutes and 30 minutes data frequency at the 5 per cent significance level. With 40 
minute, 50 minute, and 1 hour data frequencies, the DAX 30 index Granger causes all 
the three Eastern European stock market indices at different levels of significance with 
the strongest result for the WIG 20 index, where Granger causality is detected at the 1 
per cent significance level with all the three data frequencies. Opposite Granger 
causality relationship is quite rare. WIG 20 and BUX Granger cause DAX 30 with 40 
minute data frequency but only at the 10 per cent significance level and the WIG 20 
index Granger causes the DAX 30 index also with daily data frequency but again only 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. As already mentioned the WIG 20 index also 
Granger causes the DAX 30 index with the highest 5 minute data frequency at the 5 
percent level of significance, while the opposite Granger causality relationship is 
detected at the 1 per cent significance level. I conclude that the three small markets react 
to the information revealed on the market in Frankfurt and not vice versa. The stock 
market in Prague seems to react more slowly than the markets in Warsaw and Budapest. 
However, in all three cases the information is predominantly transmitted after 40 
minutes to 1 hour. Thus, the speed of the reaction of these markets is slightly slower but 
comparable to that between the major European markets. This finding partly contradicts 
the results of various studies that investigate informational efficiency and various types 
of information transmission with the emerging Eastern European markets, e.g., 
Hanousek and Filer (2000) or Podpiera (2000 and 2001). These studies find typically 
little evidence for informational efficiency of thes  markets and are in this sense 
particularly skeptical about the stock market in Prague. 
     Finally, I consider Granger causality among the indices from the three markets in 
Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest (WIG 20, PX 50, and BUX).8 With the pair WIG 20 and 
PX 50 I detect Granger causality with 5, 30, 40 minute, 1 hour, and 1 day data 
frequencies. However, the result with the 5 minute data frequency is weak. The PX 50 
index Granger causes the WIG 20 index with 5 minute data frequency only at the 10 
                                                
8 An overview on the general developments and the specific features of Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest 
stock markets is available for example in Egert and Kočenda (2005). 
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percent significance level. With 30 minute and 1 hour data frequencies, the PX 50 index 
Granger causes the WIG 20 index at the 1 per cent sig ificance level, while the opposite 
Granger causality relationship is detected at the 5 p r cent level of significance. With 40 
minute data frequency both directions of Granger causality appear but only at the 10 per 
cent significance level. Additionally PX 50 is found to Granger cause WIG 20 with 
daily data at the 5 per cent significance level. Thus, the Granger causality pattern 
between the WIG 20 and PX 50 indices is somewhat chotic. Much more interesting are 
the results with the pair WIG 20 and BUX and particularly with the pair PX 50 and 
BUX. The BUX index is found to predominantly Granger cause the WIG 20 and PX 50 
indices and not vice versa. This result is notably strong with the pair of indices PX 50 
and BUX. With all the data frequencies ranging from 20 minute to 1 hour, the BUX 
index Granger causes the PX 50 index at the 1 per cent level of significance. 
Additionally, the same result is found with 10 minute and daily data frequencies, but 
only at the 10 per cent significance level. The opposite Granger causality relationship is 
detected only with 40 minute and daily data frequenci s and only at the 10 and 5 percent 
levels of significance, respectively. With the pair of indices WIG 20 and BUX the 
dominance of the BUX index is not so obvious. However, also here the BUX index 
Granger causes the WIG 20 index with 10 minute, 50 minute, and 1 hour data 
frequencies at the 5 per cent significance level, while the WIG 20 index Granger causes 
the BUX index only with 5 minute and 1 hour data frequencies and only at the 10 per 
cent level of significance. Therefore, I conclude that among the three Eastern European 
stock markets the market in Budapest is a clear leader. The markets in Warsaw and 






                                                
9 Admittedly, this conclusion is rather daring. It might be the case that the market in Prague reacts to the 
same information as the market in Budapest but with a del y, particularly as a slower reaction to changes 
in  the DAX index was detected with the Prague market. 
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2.4.2 Order of Integration 
 
     The results of the order of integration tests are presented in Table A.2 in Appendix 
A. Note that for different pairs of indices I use different observations. Therefore, the 
results for one index could differ depending on the other index included in the pair. In 
line with the previous empirical research and with the theoretical stochastic models of 
stock prices, most of the indices are found to be I(1) at any frequency and using any 
significance level in the tests. However, with some indices and some data frequencies 
(particularly with daily data frequency), I find systematic deviations from this rule. 
Namely, the FTSE 100, DAX 30, CAC 40, and WIG 20 indices are in some cases found 
to be stationary already in levels, i.e. I(0). The individual cases are listed below. 
     The FTSE 100 index appears to be I(0) with 40 minute and daily data frequencies at 
the 10 per cent significance level when used in a pair with other European indices (daily 
observations at 15:40). With daily frequency data,  he FTSE 100 is also found to be 
I(0) even at the 5 per cent significance level when used in a pair with the U.S. S&P 500 
index (daily observations at 17:15). The DAX 30 index with daily data frequency is 
found to be I(0) at the 5 per cent significance level when used in any pair with other 
indices. The CAC 40 index is tested as I(0) with daily data frequency at the 10 per cent 
significance level when used in a pair with other Eu opean indices. Finally, the WIG 20 
index is found to be I(0) with daily data frequency at the 5 per cent signifcance level 
when used in a pair with the DAX 30 index and the other Easter European indices. 
Here, I do not have any explanation for these surprising results other than the limitations 





     The results of cointegration tests for different pairs of indices and different data 
frequencies are given in Table A.2 and the results of the estimation of error correction 
models are presented in Table A.3 in Appendix A. Cointegration of two time series 
represents a strong relationship. It implies the exist nce of a long run equilibrium, 
towards which the two time series tend to converge. It also implies that the two time 
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series must share a common stochastic trend. Moreove , cointegration tests are based on 
the ADF test, which is known to have a low power. This means that even if the two time 
series are cointegrated in reality, the ADF test is quite likely to not detect this 
relationship. Therefore, it is not surprising that cointegration is detected only rarely in 
the data. Additionally, to test for cointegration the two time series must be I(1). Thus, 
the above mentioned indices’ time series that were t sted as I(0) can not be considered 
as cointegrated with any other index, even if the residuals from the cointegrating 
equation (4) or (5) were found stationary. Regarding this limitation, I detect 
cointegration only with two pairs of stock market indices, the FTSE 100 and CAC 40 
and the PX 50 and BUX. With these two pairs (particularly with the pair PX 50 and 
BUX), the pattern of detected Granger causality relationships was also very rich.  
     For the pair FTSE 100 and CAC 40, cointegration is detected with 30 minute, 50 
minute, and 1 hour data frequencies. The error corre tion models suggest that the CAC 
40 index reacts in all cases to the deviations from l ng run equilibrium. For the pair PX 
50 and BUX cointegration is detected with data frequencies ranging from 30 minutes to 
1 hour. In all these cases the error correction models show reaction of both indices to 
the deviations from long run equilibrium. However, the detected reaction of the PX 50 
index is stronger confirming the dominance of the BUX index already revealed in the 
Granger causality tests. 
     The rare appearance of cointegration relationships contrasts with the findings of 
other studies that often suggested the presence of ointegration with closing times daily 
data of various pairs of stock market indices.10 However, the use of closing time daily 
data in cointegration tests is quite misleading. Such data are not simultaneous as the 
closing times of different markets typically differ. 
                                                
10 E.g., Huang and Fok (2001), Seabra (2001), Dickinson (2000), Bracker et al. (1999), Chelley-Steeley et 
al. (1998), Richards (1996), or Chou et al. (1994) 
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
     Using a dataset covering two years of high frequency data, I investigate the issue of 
stock market integration from a novel perspective. I perform cointegration and Granger 
causality tests with data of different frequencies. My aim is to describe the time 
structure in which markets react to the information revealed in prices on other markets. 
Particularly, I want to detect the speed of information transmission between the 
different markets. I employ the indices from the U.S. stock markets (S&P 500 and Dow 
Jones Industrial Average), London (FTSE 100), Frankfurt (DAX 30), Paris (CAC 40), 
Warsaw (WIG 20), Prague (PX 50), and Budapest (BUX). The tests are performed for 
twelve different pairs of indices using data of 5, 10 20, 30, 40, 50 minute, 1 hour, and 
daily frequencies. 
     Presented results suggest that the markets react v ry quickly to the information 
revealed in the prices on other markets. In all cases the strongest reaction occurs within 
1 hour with the first reaction detected often after only 5 minutes. The U.S. markets seem 
to be an important source of information for the markets in London and Frankfurt; they 
react to it approximately within 30 to 40 minutes, with the strongest reaction occurring 
within the first 10 minutes. The three major European markets in London, Frankfurt, 
and Paris react to the information revealed on these markets within 1 hour, while the 
strongest reaction is detected after 20 minutes. The fastest is the reaction of the FTSE 
100 index. The three small Eastern European markets in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest 
react to the information revealed on the market in Frankfurt predominantly after 40 
minutes to 1 hour. The slowest seems to be the reaction of the stock market in Prague. 
The stock market in Budapest appears to be a clear leader among the three Eastern 
European markets. The markets in Warsaw and Prague react to it within 1 hour, while 
the reaction of the stock market in Prague is particularly strong. 
     I am aware that when interpreting the results, I have neglected the differences in 
institutional arrangements of each of the stock markets. On the other hand, the aim of 
each stock market is to have a fast, efficient, and transparent trading system that helps to 
quickly reveal undistorted stock prices. Thus, when investigating information 
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transmission, slight differences in institutional arrangements on the different markets 
should not matter too much.11  
                                                
11 To get a detailed description of the trading systems on each of the markets and for each of the stocks 
included in the investigated indices would be almost impossible. Some of the indices might contain stocks 
that are traded using different systems on the same market. Moreover, the U.S. indices S&P 500 and 
DJIA contain stocks that are traded on different markets. 
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2.6 Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Results of Granger causality tests. 
Data lnxt  GC  lnyt lnyt  GC  lnxt 
frequency Obs. K R2 P-value Obs. K R2 P-value 
xt = S&P 500; yt = DJIA 
5 minute 488 3 0.028 0.090 487 3 0.040 0.005 
10 minute 488 8 0.055 0.517 487 8 0.058 0.468 
20 minute 487 6 0.036 0.361 486 6 0.036 0.267 
30 minute 488 7 0.057 0.085 486 6 0.055 0.587 
40 minute 488 4 0.040 0.088 487 4 0.042 0.375 
50 minute 486 3 0.021 0.302 485 3 0.023 0.276 
1 hour 488 4 0.020 0.309 486 4 0.022 0.649 
1 day 428 2 0.008 0.263 427 2 0.010 0.208 
xt = S&P 500; yt = FTSE 100 
5 minute 474 1 0.031 0.001 473 6 0.029 0.519 
10 minute 473 3 0.016 0.097 470 8 0.029 0.303 
20 minute 474 1 0.005 0.114 474 1 0.001 0.663 
30 minute 471 2 0.019 0.522 471 1 0.014 0.988 
40 minute 470 1 0.000 0.763 471 1 0.009 0.721 
50 minute 470 1 0.001 0.628 475 1 0.008 0.831 
1 hour         
1 day 430 1 0.009 0.549 432 1 0.013 0.739 
xt = S&P 500; yt = DAX 30 
5 minute 480 1 0.023 0.013 480 1 0.009 0.406 
10 minute 476 8 0.038 0.567 476 8 0.043 0.034 
20 minute 480 1 0.004 0.216 480 1 0.001 0.855 
30 minute 477 1 0.014 0.035 477 1 0.013 0.840 
40 minute 476 1 0.006 0.099 481 1 0.009 0.521 
50 minute 476 1 0.001 0.598 481 1 0.006 0.977 
1 hour         
1 day 332 8 0.048 0.451 323 8 0.070 0.173 
xt = FTSE 100; yt = DAX 30 
5 minute 488 4 0.040 0.489 488 5 0.064 0.007 
10 minute 488 7 0.059 0.266 488 2 0.037 0.116 
20 minute 485 7 0.068 0.044 485 7 0.073 0.002 
30 minute 487 8 0.079 0.002 487 8 0.061 0.107 
40 minute 486 6 0.052 0.057 486 6 0.035 0.598 
50 minute 487 1 0.005 0.154 486 3 0.028 0.004 
1 hour 487 4 0.045 0.094 487 4 0.033 0.100 
1 day 404 6 0.029 0.485 397 6 0.038 0.106 
xt = FTSE 100; yt = CAC 40 
5 minute 490 4 0.051 0.233 490 5 0.057 0.028 
10 minute 489 8 0.059 0.162 490 4 0.049 0.235 
20 minute 488 7 0.054 0.203 488 7 0.062 0.030 
30 minute 485 8 0.067 0.006 485 8 0.076 0.011 
40 minute 485 6 0.049 0.016 485 6 0.047 0.128 
50 minute 488 3 0.010 0.397 485 6 0.049 0.010 
1 hour 486 4 0.034 0.079 486 4 0.037 0.040 
1 day 455 2 0.021 0.139 447 2 0.029 0.030 
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Table A.1: Continued. 
Data lnxt  GC  lnyt lnyt  GC  lnxt 
frequency Obs. K R2 P-value Obs. K R2 P-value 
xt = DAX 30; yt = CAC 40 
5 minute 497 8 0.076 0.151 497 7 0.051 0.326 
10 minute 498 6 0.055 0.060 498 6 0.061 0.048 
20 minute 493 7 0.055 0.122 496 4 0.047 0.122 
30 minute 492 8 0.055 0.045 492 8 0.069 0.013 
40 minute 497 1 0.029 0.006 491 7 0.054 0.157 
50 minute 494 4 0.036 0.004 494 4 0.030 0.018 
1 hour 494 3 0.034 0.039 493 4 0.053 0.023 
1 day 465 4 0.013 0.076 440 8 0.048 0.052 
xt = DAX 30; yt = WIG 20 
5 minute 483 7 0.120 0.003 483 6 0.068 0.019 
10 minute 482 6 0.045 0.013 482 5 0.042 0.631 
20 minute 478 6 0.038 0.595 482 2 0.030 0.617 
30 minute 481 2 0.024 0.014 480 8 0.046 0.545 
40 minute 481 2 0.038 0.002 479 7 0.061 0.085 
50 minute 481 1 0.034 0.000 485 5 0.020 0.694 
1 hour 481 1 0.029 0.001 485 4 0.033 0.974 
1 day 395 4 0.034 0.128 391 5 0.039 0.055 
xt = DAX 30; yt = PX 50 
5 minute 465 7 0.061 0.501 465 8 0.052 0.804 
10 minute 464 8 0.064 0.532 469 7 0.047 0.931 
20 minute 469 6 0.068 0.593 478 2 0.031 0.616 
30 minute 463 8 0.054 0.180 467 8 0.039 0.884 
40 minute 454 8 0.059 0.034 458 7 0.051 0.689 
50 minute 471 4 0.036 0.042 417 6 0.027 0.657 
1 hour 464 5 0.070 0.004 472 4 0.044 0.299 
1 day 347 8 0.047 0.530 369 7 0.023 0.485 
xt = DAX 30; yt = BUX 
5 minute 481 1 0.015 0.008 481 4 0.046 0.362 
10 minute 481 7 0.028 0.465 481 5 0.045 0.389 
20 minute 481 1 0.026 0.368 486 2 0.026 0.646 
30 minute 481 1 0.019 0.148 484 8 0.042 0.680 
40 minute 478 8 0.039 0.096 486 1 0.025 0.077 
50 minute 471 7 0.083 0.001 476 7 0.044 0.105 
1 hour 479 4 0.044 0.020 484 4 0.045 0.250 
1 day 344 8 0.054 0.198 456 1 0.004 0.609 
xt = WIG 20; yt = PX 50 
5 minute 458 7 0.059 0.649 458 8 0.074 0.073 
10 minute 455 8 0.064 0.525 461 7 0.031 0.441 
20 minute 460 6 0.071 0.371 466 5 0.031 0.293 
30 minute 454 8 0.064 0.047 467 3 0.036 0.007 
40 minute 448 7 0.049 0.097 472 2 0.025 0.065 
50 minute 456 5 0.029 0.251 468 4 0.019 0.229 
1 hour 457 4 0.046 0.040 470 3 0.036 0.009 





Table A.1: Continued. 
Data lnxt  GC  lnyt lnyt  GC  lnxt 
frequency Obs. K R2 P-value Obs. K R2 P-value 
xt = WIG 20; yt = BUX 
5 minute 474 7 0.042 0.052 474 7 0.090 0.713 
10 minute 474 2 0.013 0.432 474 3 0.027 0.025 
20 minute 470 8 0.044 0.428 471 5 0.021 0.887 
30 minute 470 8 0.050 0.481 473 1 0.006 0.214 
40 minute 470 6 0.026 0.220 472 2 0.015 0.514 
50 minute 471 5 0.050 0.127 473 1 0.014 0.014 
1 hour 470 4 0.043 0.053 472 1 0.015 0.034 
1 day 431 1 0.001 0.522 428 1 0.005 0.480 
xt = PX 50; yt = BUX 
5 minute 475 1 0.002 0.316 460 7 0.059 0.906 
10 minute 469 2 0.016 0.179 459 8 0.081 0.061 
20 minute 474 1 0.025 0.579 461 8 0.171 0.000 
30 minute 464 7 0.036 0.756 456 8 0.114 0.000 
40 minute 452 7 0.033 0.075 449 8 0.082 0.002 
50 minute 458 5 0.025 0.891 408 6 0.085 0.000 
1 hour 460 4 0.018 0.881 457 5 0.092 0.000 
1 day 313 7 0.063 0.045 313 7 0.089 0.052 
Notes: Obs. stand for the number of observations and K for the number of lagged differences used in the 
Granger causality tests. The R2 stands for that of the unrestricted equations. The report d P-values 
indicate the F-tests’ significance levels at which the null hypothesis of no Granger causality can be 
rejected. 
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Table A.2: Results of cointegration and the order of integration tests. 
 ADF tests on residuals from ADF tests on levels and differences 
Data ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  lnxt ∆lnxt lnyt ∆lnyt 
Frequency Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
xt = S&P 500; yt = DJIA 
5 minute 487 7 0.802 487 7 0.941 0.982 0.000 0.841 0.000 
10 minute 487 4 0.824 487 4 0.945 0.977 0.000 0.858 0.000 
20 minute 486 6 0.961 486 6 0.993 0.985 0.000 0.970 0.000 
30 minute 487 4 0.865 487 4 0.971 0.958 0.000 0.864 0.000 
40 minute 487 5 0.836 487 5 0.974 0.938 0.000 0.725 0.000 
50 minute 485 3 0.978 485 3 0.993 0.995 0.000 0.986 0.000 
1 hour 487 0 0.998 487 0 0.999 0.995 0.000 0.993 0.000 
1 day 467 0 0.784 467 0 0.954 0.256 0.000 0.361 0.000 
xt = S&P 500; yt = FTSE 100 
5 minute 474 3 0.999 474 3 0.996 0.994 0.000 0.999 0.000 
10 minute 470 6 0.980 473 3 0.991 0.998 0.000 0.999 0.000 
20 minute 475 0 0.896 475 0 0.883 0.976 0.000 0.999 0.000 
30 minute 475 0 0.803 475 0 0.787 0.755 0.000 0.951 0.000 
40 minute 474 0 0.906 474 0 0.693 0.702 0.000 0.888 0.028 
50 minute 471 0 0.965 471 0 0.858 0.564 0.000 0.823 0.000 
1 hour           
1 day 317 6 0.993 317 6 0.979 0.419 0.000 0.037 0.000 
xt = S&P 500; yt = DAX 30 
5 minute 480 4 0.990 480 4 0.973 0.994 0.000 0.998 0.000 
10 minute 476 7 0.944 476 7 0.939 0.998 0.000 0.997 0.000 
20 minute 476 3 0.954 481 0 0.872 0.976 0.000 1.000 0.000 
30 minute 477 1 0.857 481 0 0.743 0.755 0.000 0.992 0.000 
40 minute 480 0 0.897 480 0 0.684 0.702 0.000 0.977 0.000 
50 minute 477 0 0.371 476 1 0.285 0.564 0.000 0.959 0.003 
1 hour           
1 day 384 4 0.056 384 4 0.181 0.419 0.000 0.044 0.000 
xt = FTSE 100; yt = DAX 30 
5 minute 488 7 0.997 488 7 0.898 0.997 0.000 1.000 0.000 
10 minute 488 1 0.989 488 2 0.827 0.642 0.000 1.000 0.000 
20 minute 487 4 0.937 487 4 0.659 0.220 0.000 0.990 0.000 
30 minute 488 1 0.915 488 1 0.515 0.217 0.000 0.977 0.000 
40 minute 488 1 0.642 488 1 0.363 0.096 0.000 0.977 0.000 
50 minute 487 1 0.410 487 1 0.156 0.225 0.000 0.996 0.000 
1 hour 488 0 0.427 488 0 0.281 0.906 0.000 0.998 0.000 
1 day 460 1 0.014 460 1 0.127 0.087 0.000 0.043 0.000 
xt = FTSE 100; yt = CAC 40 
5 minute 490 5 0.970 490 5 0.778 0.997 0.000 1.000 0.000 
10 minute 490 2 0.872 490 5 0.415 0.642 0.000 1.000 0.000 
20 minute 489 4 0.910 489 4 0.364 0.220 0.000 0.998 0.000 
30 minute 489 3 0.587 489 3 0.075 0.217 0.000 0.972 0.000 
40 minute 489 2 0.030 489 2 0.005 0.096 0.000 0.941 0.000 
50 minute 489 1 0.006 489 1 0.001 0.225 0.000 0.981 0.000 
1 hour 484 5 0.009 484 5 0.003 0.906 0.000 0.992 0.000 




Table A.2: Continued. 
 ADF tests on residuals from ADF tests on levels and differences 
Data ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  lnxt ∆lnxt lnyt ∆lnyt 
frequency Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
xt = DAX 30; yt = CAC 40 
5 minute 498 5 1.000 498 5 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
10 minute 497 8 1.000 497 8 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
20 minute 493 8 0.995 493 8 0.987 0.990 0.000 0.998 0.000 
30 minute 498 0 1.000 494 7 0.999 0.977 0.000 0.972 0.000 
40 minute 497 1 1.000 491 7 0.999 0.977 0.000 0.941 0.000 
50 minute 496 1 1.000 498 0 0.999 0.996 0.000 0.981 0.000 
1 hour 498 0 0.998 494 3 0.997 0.998 0.000 0.992 0.000 
1 day 483 1 0.254 483 1 0.084 0.043 0.000 0.060 0.000 
xt = DAX 30; yt = WIG 20 
5 minute 483 2 0.999 483 3 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 
10 minute 482 6 1.000 482 6 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.998 0.000 
20 minute 481 3 0.653 481 3 0.842 0.990 0.000 0.605 0.000 
30 minute 481 2 0.893 481 2 0.875 0.977 0.000 0.866 0.000 
40 minute 482 1 0.852 479 7 0.941 0.977 0.000 0.347 0.000 
50 minute 481 1 0.885 481 1 0.908 0.996 0.000 0.483 0.000 
1 hour 480 3 0.840 480 3 0.891 0.998 0.000 0.402 0.000 
1 day 365 6 0.239 365 6 0.346 0.043 0.000 0.033 0.000 
xt = DAX 30; yt = PX 50 
5 minute 462 8 0.999 462 8 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 
10 minute 466 7 0.999 466 7 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.997 0.000 
20 minute 472 4 0.997 472 4 0.999 0.990 0.000 0.974 0.002 
30 minute 463 8 0.985 463 8 0.986 0.977 0.000 0.855 0.000 
40 minute 455 7 0.960 455 7 0.846 0.977 0.000 0.864 0.000 
50 minute 412 6 0.988 412 6 0.872 0.996 0.000 0.740 0.000 
1 hour 464 5 0.999 479 0 0.998 0.998 0.000 0.580 0.000 
1 day 463 0 0.175 463 0 0.019 0.043 0.000 0.577 0.000 
xt = DAX 30; yt = BUX 
5 minute 481 5 0.998 481 5 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.561 0.000 
10 minute 481 7 0.989 481 7 0.999 1.000 0.000 0.932 0.000 
20 minute 481 3 0.822 481 3 0.969 0.990 0.000 0.935 0.000 
30 minute 479 8 0.791 478 8 0.936 0.977 0.000 0.520 0.000 
40 minute 481 1 0.945 478 7 0.965 0.977 0.000 0.932 0.000 
50 minute 480 1 0.961 478 5 0.978 0.996 0.000 0.767 0.000 
1 hour 479 4 0.972 479 4 0.985 0.998 0.000 0.859 0.000 
1 day 463 0 0.427 463 0 0.046 0.043 0.000 0.692 0.000 
xt = WIG 20; yt = PX 50 
5 minute 458 7 0.998 458 7 0.997 0.999 0.000 0.999 0.000 
10 minute 460 6 0.992 460 6 0.995 0.998 0.000 0.997 0.000 
20 minute 472 0 0.668 463 5 0.577 0.605 0.000 0.974 0.002 
30 minute 470 0 0.834 470 0 0.901 0.866 0.000 0.855 0.000 
40 minute 472 0 0.468 472 0 0.446 0.347 0.000 0.864 0.000 
50 minute 475 0 0.399 475 0 0.474 0.483 0.000 0.740 0.000 
1 hour 471 0 0.512 471 0 0.510 0.402 0.000 0.580 0.000 




Table A.2: Continued. 
 ADF tests on residuals from ADF tests on levels and differences 
Data ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  lnxt ∆lnxt lnyt ∆lnyt 
frequency Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
xt = WIG 20; yt = BUX 
5 minute 474 7 0.994 474 7 0.996 0.999 0.000 0.561 0.000 
10 minute 474 0 0.986 474 0 0.993 0.998 0.000 0.932 0.000 
20 minute 471 5 0.246 471 5 0.316 0.605 0.000 0.935 0.000 
30 minute 471 5 0.604 471 5 0.865 0.866 0.000 0.520 0.000 
40 minute 472 2 0.216 472 2 0.335 0.347 0.000 0.932 0.000 
50 minute 474 0 0.339 474 0 0.515 0.483 0.000 0.767 0.000 
1 hour 473 0 0.562 473 0 0.619 0.402 0.000 0.859 0.000 
1 day 447 0 0.142 447 0 0.007 0.033 0.000 0.692 0.000 
xt = PX 50; yt = BUX  
5 minute 461 6 0.987 461 6 0.989 0.999 0.000 0.561 0.000 
10 minute 474 0 0.904 474 0 0.897 0.997 0.000 0.932 0.000 
20 minute 465 6 0.321 465 6 0.319 0.974 0.002 0.935 0.000 
30 minute 456 8 0.099 456 8 0.098 0.855 0.000 0.520 0.000 
40 minute 462 6 0.023 462 6 0.025 0.864 0.000 0.932 0.000 
50 minute 457 5 0.003 457 5 0.003 0.740 0.000 0.767 0.000 
1 hour 459 4 0.002 459 4 0.001 0.580 0.000 0.859 0.000 
1 day 325 6 0.347 325 6 0.333 0.577 0.000 0.692 0.000 
Notes: Obs. stand for the number of observations and K for the number of lagged differences used in the 
ADF tests. The reported P-values indicate the ADF tests’ significance levels at which the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity can be rejected. Finite sample critical values are from Cheung and Lai (1995) for the
ADF tests with the levels and differences of indices’ logarithms and from MacKinnon (1991) for the ADF 
tests with the residuals. P-values other than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 are computed using a logistic 
interpolation. Such P-values are fine for testing at the common significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
but rather speculative outside this range. 
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Table A.3: Results of the estimation of error correction models. 


































 Residuals et from the equation Residuals et from the equation 
Data ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  
frequency Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value 
xt = S&P 500; yt = DJIA  
5 minute 488 3 0.144 488 3 0.360 487 3 0.257 487 3 0.529 
10 minute 488 8 0.219 488 8 0.516 487 8 0.339 487 8 0.685 
20 minute 487 6 0.317 487 6 0.442 486 6 0.395 486 6 0.469 
30 minute 488 7 0.159 488 7 0.307 486 6 0.242 486 6 0.396 
40 minute 488 4 0.291 488 4 0.602 487 4 0.426 487 4 0.730 
50 minute 486 3 0.888 486 3 0.629 485 3 0.623 485 3 0.449 
1 hour 488 4 0.570 488 4 0.349 486 4 0.445 486 4 0.286 
1 day 428 2 0.094 428 2 0.238 427 2 0.242 427 2 0.407 
xt = S&P 500; yt = FTSE 100 
5 minute 474 1 0.957 474 1 0.846 473 6 0.778 473 6 0.862 
10 minute 473 3 0.554 473 3 0.351 470 8 0.938 470 8 0.598 
20 minute 475 0 0.333 475 0 0.588 475 0 0.051 475 0 0.146 
30 minute 471 2 0.413 471 2 0.348 475 0 0.062 475 0 0.066 
40 minute 474 0 0.535 474 0 0.477 475 0 0.115 475 0 0.054 
50 minute 471 0 0.176 471 0 0.249 476 0 0.083 476 0 0.078 
1 hour             
1 day 433 1 0.853 433 1 0.935 458 0 0.491 458 0 0.220 
xt = S&P 500; yt = DAX 30 
5 minute 480 1 0.401 480 1 0.437 481 0 0.539 481 0 0.736 
10 minute 476 8 0.160 476 8 0.061 476 8 0.414 476 8 0.240 
20 minute 481 0 0.255 481 0 0.467 481 0 0.066 481 0 0.120 
30 minute 477 1 0.956 477 1 0.813 481 0 0.457 481 0 0.431 
40 minute 480 0 0.507 480 0 0.542 485 0 0.163 485 0 0.106 
50 minute 477 0 0.917 477 0 0.806 482 0 0.186 482 0 0.174 
1 hour             
1 day 332 8 0.336 332 8 0.572 323 8 0.940 323 8 0.809 
xt = FTSE 100; yt = DAX 30 
5 minute 488 4 0.003 488 4 0.034 488 8 0.000 488 8 0.001 
10 minute 488 7 0.005 488 7 0.039 488 4 0.000 488 4 0.001 
20 minute 485 7 0.259 485 7 0.479 485 7 0.017 485 7 0.029 
30 minute 487 8 0.238 487 8 0.349 487 8 0.011 487 8 0.008 
40 minute 486 6 0.176 486 6 0.214 486 6 0.001 486 6 0.002 
50 minute 486 5 0.067 486 5 0.083 486 5 0.000 486 5 0.000 
1 hour 487 4 0.322 487 4 0.329 487 4 0.001 487 4 0.003 
1 day 404 6 0.174 404 6 0.350 397 6 0.598 397 6 0.454 
xt = FTSE 100; yt = CAC 40 
5 minute 490 4 0.117 490 4 0.328 490 5 0.021 490 5 0.024 
10 minute 489 8 0.073 489 8 0.346 490 4 0.004 490 4 0.007 
20 minute 488 7 0.106 488 7 0.319 488 7 0.005 488 7 0.007 
30 minute 485 8 0.225 485 8 0.480 485 8 0.007 485 8 0.005 
40 minute 485 6 0.510 485 6 0.759 485 6 0.001 485 6 0.001 
50 minute 488 3 0.798 488 3 0.962 485 6 0.001 485 6 0.001 
1 hour 486 4 0.628 486 4 0.493 486 4 0.015 486 4 0.020 
1 day 381 8 0.254 381 8 0.328 447 2 0.862 447 2 0.862 
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Table A.3: Continued. 


































 Residuals et from the equation Residuals et from the equation 
Data ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  
frequency Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value 
xt = DAX 30; yt = CAC 40 
5 minute 497 8 0.248 497 8 0.083 497 7 0.151 497 7 0.046 
10 minute 498 6 0.536 498 6 0.206 498 6 0.205 498 6 0.080 
20 minute 493 7 0.214 493 7 0.441 496 4 0.387 496 4 0.554 
30 minute 492 8 0.310 492 8 0.526 492 8 0.766 492 8 0.906 
40 minute 497 1 0.756 497 1 0.979 491 7 0.896 491 7 0.825 
50 minute 494 4 0.496 494 4 0.319 494 4 0.297 494 4 0.217 
1 hour 494 3 0.595 494 3 0.450 493 4 0.464 493 4 0.413 
1 day 465 4 0.933 465 4 0.849 440 8 0.910 440 8 0.635 
xt = DAX 30; yt = WIG 20 
5 minute 483 7 0.255 483 7 0.298 483 6 0.882 483 6 0.188 
10 minute 482 6 0.509 482 6 0.640 482 5 0.488 482 5 0.116 
20 minute 478 6 0.085 478 6 0.067 482 2 0.597 482 2 0.997 
30 minute 481 2 0.202 481 2 0.083 480 8 0.857 480 8 0.867 
40 minute 481 2 0.106 481 2 0.093 479 7 0.826 479 7 0.681 
50 minute 481 1 0.090 481 1 0.055 485 5 0.750 485 5 0.594 
1 hour 481 1 0.074 481 1 0.059 485 4 0.866 485 4 0.745 
1 day 395 4 0.047 395 4 0.257 391 5 0.759 391 5 0.267 
xt = DAX 30; yt = PX 50 
5 minute 465 7 0.569 465 7 0.617 465 8 0.578 465 8 0.137 
10 minute 464 8 0.874 464 8 0.631 469 7 0.704 469 7 0.246 
20 minute 469 6 0.051 469 6 0.102 478 2 0.544 478 2 0.954 
30 minute 463 8 0.131 463 8 0.125 467 8 0.238 467 8 0.358 
40 minute 454 8 0.237 454 8 0.254 458 7 0.123 458 7 0.059 
50 minute 471 4 0.295 471 4 0.304 417 6 0.298 417 6 0.056 
1 hour 464 5 0.254 464 5 0.221 472 4 0.990 472 4 0.703 
1 day 347 8 0.086 347 8 0.120 474 0 0.038 474 0 0.002 
xt = DAX 30; yt = BUX 
5 minute 481 1 0.137 481 1 0.011 481 4 0.282 481 8 0.020 
10 minute 481 7 0.013 481 7 0.000 481 5 0.446 481 5 0.066 
20 minute 481 3 0.010 481 3 0.001 486 2 0.666 485 4 0.764 
30 minute 480 6 0.048 480 6 0.013 484 8 0.528 484 8 0.927 
40 minute 481 1 0.108 481 1 0.040 486 1 0.800 486 1 0.839 
50 minute 478 5 0.057 478 5 0.014 476 7 0.737 476 7 0.969 
1 hour 479 4 0.042 479 4 0.010 484 4 0.721 484 4 0.586 
1 day 344 8 0.748 344 8 0.870 473 0 0.028 473 0 0.004 
xt = WIG 20; yt = PX 50 
5 minute 458 7 0.295 458 7 0.751 458 8 0.748 458 8 0.723 
10 minute 455 8 0.495 455 8 0.909 461 7 0.634 461 7 0.940 
20 minute 460 6 0.166 460 6 0.360 466 5 0.017 466 5 0.033 
30 minute 454 8 0.733 454 8 0.905 467 3 0.135 467 3 0.291 
40 minute 448 7 0.388 448 7 0.650 472 2 0.015 472 2 0.026 
50 minute 456 5 0.798 456 5 0.993 477 2 0.015 477 2 0.044 
1 hour 457 4 0.952 457 4 0.849 474 1 0.014 474 1 0.030 
1 day 318 7 0.029 318 7 0.009 315 7 0.069 315 7 0.004 
 36
Table A.3: Continued. 


































 Residuals et from the equation Residuals et from the equation 
Data ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  ttt xcy εα ++= lnln  ttt ycx εα ++= lnln  
frequency Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value Obs. K P-value 
xt =WIG 20; yt = BUX 
5 minute 474 7 0.837 474 7 0.375 474 7 0.995 474 7 0.749 
10 minute 474 2 0.123 474 2 0.033 474 3 0.927 474 3 0.743 
20 minute 470 8 0.007 470 8 0.001 470 6 0.078 470 6 0.118 
30 minute 470 8 0.077 470 8 0.039 474 0 0.169 474 0 0.396 
40 minute 470 6 0.163 470 6 0.074 472 2 0.028 472 2 0.053 
50 minute 471 5 0.072 471 5 0.024 473 1 0.072 473 1 0.138 
1 hour 470 4 0.081 470 4 0.028 472 1 0.158 472 1 0.192 
1 day 458 0 0.468 458 0 0.310 455 0 0.025 455 0 0.001 
xt = PX 50; yt = BUX 
5 minute 477 0 0.347 477 0 0.249 460 7 0.998 460 7 0.752 
10 minute 469 2 0.269 469 2 0.217 459 8 0.805 459 8 0.704 
20 minute 474 1 0.124 474 1 0.101 461 8 0.041 461 8 0.067 
30 minute 473 1 0.107 473 1 0.093 456 8 0.007 456 8 0.011 
40 minute 452 7 0.056 452 7 0.049 450 7 0.001 450 7 0.002 
50 minute 458 5 0.005 458 5 0.003 466 4 0.001 466 4 0.001 
1 hour 460 4 0.003 460 4 0.002 457 5 0.001 457 5 0.001 
1 day 313 7 0.409 313 7 0.478 313 7 0.372 331 6 0.126 
Notes: Obs. stand for the number of observations and K for the number of lagged differences used in the 
error correction models. The reported P-values are those for the estimated coefficient δ. 
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The curse of natural resources is a robust result based on broad empirical evidence with 
data from the last four decades. It claims that countries with natural resource intensive 
economies tend to grow slower than resource-free countries. Political, institutional, and 
economic environments play an important role in theexplanations of the curse. 
Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that the quality of democracy and regime 
stability could interact with the curse. I test the robustness of the curse of natural 
resources with respect to various measures of the quality of democracy and regime 
stability. I also employ smoothed least trimmed squares, a robust estimation procedure, 
to estimate the curse. Overall, the curse of natural resources is found to be robust when I 
control for the quality of democracy and regime stability in growth regressions that 
estimate it. It also survives the application of the smoothed least trimmed squares 
procedure. The evidence presented indicates that the in ensity of the curse depends on 
the level of civil liberties. Once a minimal level of democracy is achieved, the intensity 




     "Why do some economies grow faster than others?" No doubt this is one of the 
fundamental questions of economics. Together with theoretical efforts to explain cross-
country growth differences, this question has motivated wide-ranging empirical 
research. Particularly, since the influential work f Barro (1991), estimation of cross-
country growth regression has experienced a boom. As a result we have a long list of 
growth determinants that appear as significant explanatory variables in various growth 
regressions. 
    In this empirical paper I focus on one of the growth determinants that I believe 
deserves special attention: the dependence on natural resources. Numerous studies such 
as those of Auty (1997 and 2001), Gylfason (2001a and 2001b), Gylfason and Zoega 
(2002) and Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999, and 2001) have shown that countries with 
natural resources intensive economies grow more slowly than resource-free countries. 
This rather counterintuitive observation, based mainly on data starting in the 1960s, is 
commonly called the curse of natural resources. Natural resource dependence with its 
negative effect on growth was even classified by Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Doppelhofer 
et al. (2000) as one of the most robust variables in empirical studies of economic growth 
determinants. At the same time, most of the authors agree that the curse of natural 
resources is, if not directly mediated, then at least magnified by poor economic policies. 
    This paper was motivated by the reported robustness of the natural resource curse and 
the proclaimed possibility to mitigate it with prudent economic policies. I will study the 
robustness of the curse of natural resources from a perspective that is, to my knowledge, 
novel. In cross-country growth regressions that estimate the curse, I will control for 
variables measuring the quality of democracy and regim  stability. Further, I will 
investigate if the magnitude of the curse varies in different groups of countries sorted 
with respect to these democracy and stability measur s. Finally, I will use smoothed 
least trimmed squares, a robust estimation procedure proposed by Cizek and Visek 
(2000) and Cizek (2001), to estimate the resource curse regressions. In my analysis I 
will employ two different data samples covering theaverage growth over the periods 
1965-1998 with 85 countries and 1980-2000 with 117 countries and using different 
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measures of natural resource dependence. With the use of democracy and stability 
measures, I assume that countries with different levels of democracy and stability could 
have different chances to implement economic policies that can mitigate the dangers of 
slow growth induced by natural resources. Previous re earch has used different 
measures of natural resource dependence and controlled f r numerous variables in the 
growth regressions in order to test the robustness of the result. However, as far as I 
know, measures of the quality of democracy and regim  stability were rarely used in 
this context. Also the hypothesis that the curse could have different magnitude among 
countries with democratic and authoritarian regimes ha  not been empirically tested. In 
general, the quality of macro data used in growth regressions is very questionable. Such 
data are very likely to be highly contaminated with errors. In spite of this, I am not 
aware of research that would employ robust procedures to systematically estimate the 
curse. 
     I am aware of the many problems associated with cross-country growth regressions. 
As shown for example by Hanousek et al. (2004), the results of these regressions are 
sensitive to the choice of data from which growth rates are calculated. Also, with the 
lack of generally accepted growth theory, the growth regressions typically suffer from 
unclear causality links and related troubles with possible endogeneity of explanatory 
variables. In spite of all these problems, I believe that the curse of natural resources with 
its robustness and potential relation to the quality of economic policies deserves further 
empirical attention. After all, the issue of cross-country growth differences is so 
complex and probably even exceeds the scope of economics so that we can hardly 
expect any general economic theory to fully explain it. This is also the reason why the 
search for growth determinants through the estimation of cross-country growth 
regressions can still provide a useful insight. 
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3.2 Natural Resources, Democracy, and Growth 
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Figure 1: Economic growth and natural resource dependence in the samples 1965-1998 
and 1980-2000. 
Note: Triangles represent the most resource-dependent cou tries, which are the Central African Republic, 
Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Zambia in the sample 1965-1998 and 
Bahrain, Brunei, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Kuwait, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore in the 
sample 1980-2000. 
Source: Gylfason (2001a,b) or Gylfason and Zoega (2002) for the sample 1965-1998 and World Bank 
(2003) for the sample 1980-2000. 
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     Figure 1 shows the relationship between economic growth and natural resource 
dependence. It plots the average per capita GDP growth ver the period 1965-1998 for 
85 countries as a function of the 1994 share of natural capital in total capital (see 
Gylfason, 2001a,b and Gylfason and Zoega, 2002) and the average growth of per capita 
GDP over the period 1980-2000 for 117 countries as a function of the average share of 
exports of primary products in GNP over the years 1980-1985 (source: World Bank, 
2003). The slopes of the regression lines are -0.09 in the sample 1965-1998 and -0.04 in 
the sample 1980-2000. It indicates a surprisingly strong negative relationship between 
growth and natural resources. If the measure of natural resource dependence is 
increased by one standard deviation, then the average per capita growth decreases by 
almost 1.0 per cent in the first sample and by almost 0.7 per cent in the second sample. 
This is a serious issue with the average growth being 1.36 per cent and 0.96 per cent in 
the two samples respectively. If extremely resource dependent countries are excluded, 
the curse becomes even stronger.12 
     Is the negative relationship presented in Figure 1 just a spurious one or is the 
dependence on natural resources indeed a cause for slow economic growth? Further 
empirical evidence suggests that the second is mostpr bably true. It was shown in 
many studies that the curse of natural resources survives control for most relevant 
variables. For example, in their 1995 paper Sachs and Warner control for initial per 
capita income, trade policy variables, investment rates, inequality measures, various 
monetary variables, quality and intensity of schooling, for index measuring bureaucratic 
efficiency, and in their 2001 paper also for previous growth rate and an index 
approximating the rule of law in each country. They also use various measures of 
resource dependence and experiment with different data samples, when replicating 
previous influential empirical studies on economic growth. With all this empirical 
exercise, the coefficient for the variable measuring natural resource dependence remains 
significant and negative in their growth regression. This finding is confirmed also by 
other studies. Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Doppelhofer et al. (2000) ran their "millions" of 
                                                
12 As will be discussed later, this might be due to a non-linearity present in the statistical relationship 
between growth and natural resource dependence. 
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growth regressions while controlling for various sub ets of 32 potential growth 
determinants and concluded that the dependence on natural resources belongs among 
the most robust of them. Thus, so far there is overwh lming evidence that the curse of 
natural resources is a robust finding that cannot be easily explained by other variables. 
     The only opposing view I traced in the literature is presented by Davis (1995). He 
argues that the natural resource curse is mainly a result of "the unhappy economic 
experience of certain minerals based economies in the 1970s and early 1980s." At the 
same time he claims that in his sample of 79 countries there is no evidence for a 
systematic curse over the period 1970-1991. However, in his analysis he works only 
with averages of selected development indicators measur d from 1970 to 1991 in two 
sub-samples of what he classifies as mineral and never-mineral economies. He avoids 
any regression analysis and uses a methodology that radically differs from the approach 
of the other mentioned papers. Therefore, it is hard to judge to what extent he really 
questions their results. Nevertheless, the objection that the curse is valid only for the last 
three or four decades makes sense. Most of the mention d papers work with data sets 
starting in the 1960s or 1970s. Also, a widespread belief exists that many countries rich 
in the present time once ignited their growth with the aid of natural resources. Due to 
the lack of reliable data it is hard to test this hypothesis empirically, but even if it were 
true, it would not degrade the empirical evidence for the curse in recent-day economies. 
Moreover, Sachs and Warner (1999) present evidence that in seven Latin American 
countries, natural resource booms did not serve as catalysts for future long-term growth. 
With showing this, they claim that in today's world the resource booms can not help to 
overcome the fixed costs of industrialization as the so called big-push reasoning would 
suggest. 
     In spite of the reported robustness of the curse, the causality question remains open. 
Is the dependence on natural resources really an exogenous cause for slow economic 
growth or, vice versa, is it a result of slow growth? I believe that the answer to this 
question is not so clear and both causal links apper in the empirical results. If cross-
country investment and growth differences were caused by some unobserved exogenous 
variable constant over time and if countries were initially endowed randomly with 
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natural resources, then after some period slow-growing countries would appear resource 
dependent. This possible bias is also discussed in Sachs and Warner (1995). To exclude 
it, they control for previous growth rates in their regressions and find the resource curse 
still significant. Nevertheless, it is probably not sufficient to conclude that the 
dependence on natural resources measured relatively to any variables related to 
economic activity is a purely exogenous cause for slow growth. 
 
 
3.2.2 Possible Explanations of the Curse 
 
     Sachs and Warner (2001) write: "Just as we lack a universally accepted theory of 
economic growth in general, we lack a universally accepted theory of the curse of 
natural resources." Indeed, rather than a general theory, the existing literature offers a 
list of possible explanations for the curse. Here, I will mention only the most prevalent 
ones. As again Sachs and Warner (2001) point out, most of the explanations are based 
on crowding-out logic. In this logic natural resources crowd out an activity that has a 
positive effect on growth and consequently natural resources have a negative effect on 
growth.13 First, natural resource abundance can lead to whatis called rather morbidly 
the "Dutch disease." The name comes from the difficulties the Netherlands experienced 
with the shrinking manufacturing sector in the 1970s, after the boom in natural gas 
production. The crowded-out growth-inducing activity is represented by the tradable 
manufacturing sector here. A boom in a natural resource sector can lead to its reduction. 
The manufacturing sector can become uncompetitive for several reasons. The export of 
massive primary products can drive up the real exchange rate of the national currency; 
shocks to the primary production or to world prices of the exported primary commodity 
can increase exchange rate volatility; or the boom in the primary sector can attract labor 
from other industries or increase the overall wage rat in the economy. So far, there is 
nothing wrong about such structural adjustment of the economy. However, if 
manufacturing has a positive innovation and technology spillover effect on the whole 
economy, then its reduction can indeed lead to a slowdown of growth. Moreover, once 
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the resource boom ends, the "devastated" manufacturing sector can have serious 
problems to recover and adapt the in-between missed technological innovations. 
     Second, natural resources can crowd out human capital. Gylfason (2001) shows that 
natural resource dependence is associated with lower public expenditures on education, 
expected years of schooling and secondary school enr llment rate. He claims that 
people and governments in countries with resource intensive economies can have lower 
incentives to invest in human capital being blinded by their natural wealth. 
     Third, natural resources can crowd out social and institutional capital. Governments 
of resource rich countries can feel secure enough wit  their natural resource rents to 
neglect the need of growth-oriented economic policies. More seriously, large and 
concentrated natural resource rents can lead to ren-se king behavior. Governments can 
be tempted to back up favored groups with protection or privileged access to the natural 
resources. This behavior can seed corruption and intransparency in political and 
economic institutions. In an extreme case, it can le d to fights of various interest groups 
for the resource rents, sometimes resulting even in civil wars, like in many African 
countries. In this context, Auty (2001) concludes, "most resource abundant countries 
engender a political state that is factional or predatory and whose government distorts 
the economy in the pursuit of rents...." 
 
 
3.2.3 Focus of this Paper 
 
     When looking at the possible explanations for the curse of natural resources, it is 
apparent that most of them combine natural resources with bad government policies or 
at least with the lack of good ones. McMahon (1997) writes, "The curse is not a result of 
fate or bad luck, but rather is induced by poor economic policies in general or an 
erroneous or inadequate policy response to a shock to the resource sector." Similarly, 
Gylfason (2001) stresses: "It needs to be emphasized that it is not the existence of 
natural resources as such that seems to be the problem, ut rather the failure of public 
authorities to avert the dangers that accompany the gifts of nature." 
                                                                                                                                    
13 Of course, the already mentioned question of causality is again relevant here, and I am aware that some 
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     This relationship of the resource curse to the political and institutional environment 
and to the choice of appropriate policies together with its remarkable empirical 
robustness are the two major motifs for this paper. I will investigate the robustness of 
the curse with respect to several variables that measur  the quality of democracy and 
regime stability.14 To do so, I will simply control for these variables when estimating 
the curse regressions. Even if the curse remains present, it can still be the case that its 
power at least varies with the quality of democracy nd regime stability. To test this 
hypothesis, I will estimate the basic curse regression  for different groups of countries 
sorted with respect to the democracy and stability measures. Obviously, with such tests 
I assume that countries with different levels of democracy and stability could have 
different chances to employ the correct policies needed to "avert the dangers that 
accompany the gifts of nature." 
     A finding that the empirical evidence for the curse is significantly stronger among 
authoritarian countries than among democratic countries would be clearly an optimistic 
result. It would support the idea that democracy is good for growth, at least in the 
context of the course of natural resources. So far the attempts to identify the positive 
effect of democracy on growth have given only mixed r sults. The relationship between 
democracy and economic performance in general was studied, for example, by 
Helliwell (1992) and Barro (1997, 1999). Both authors find a positive and significant 
effect of economic performance on the quality of democracy. However, the evidence for 
the opposite causality is mixed. Helliwell (1992) does not detect any direct effect of 
democracy on subsequent growth and indicates only an indirect positive effect through 
the positive effect of democracy on education and investment. Barro (1997) claims that 
the effect of democracy on growth is non-linear with an effect that is initially positive 
but turns negative once a moderate level of democracy is achieved. 
                                                                                                                                    
of these explanations can be speculative. 
14 Surprisingly, measures of the quality of democracy and regime stability were used in a very limited 
way in the empirical research on the curse. To my knowledge, only Sachs and Warner (2001) controlled 
for the index measuring the rule of law in their regressions. Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Doppelhofer et al. 
(2000) included the rule of law index to their set of 32 potential growth determinants as well. They also 
included the indices of political rights and civil liberties later used in this paper. However, they did not 
focus on the natural resource curse particularly, but rather searched for robust growth determinants in 
general. 
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     Finally, I will use the smoothed least trimmed squares (SLTS) method to test the 
robustness of the curse. SLTS is a robust estimation pr cedure proposed by Cizek and 
Visek (2000) and Cizek (2001). I find the application of robust estimation methods to be 
particularly suitable for growth regressions, where th  data are expectably very noisy 
and prone to suffer from various kinds of contamination. In spite of this, I am not aware 
of any previous research that would apply the latest robust procedures to estimate the 
curse of natural resources. 
 
 
3.3 Smoothed Least Trimmed Squares 
 
     The SLTS estimation procedure extends robust estimation methods applicable to 
models with discrete and categorical explanatory vaiables, e.g., Hubert and Rousseeuw 
(1997). It is based on the least trimmed squares estimator proposed by Rousseeuw 
(1985), but with less drastic trimming. Instead of excluding the observations beyond the 
trimming point completely, it assigns decreasing weights to observations ordered with 
respect to their squared residuals when minimizing the sum of squares of these 
residuals. Formally the SLTS estimator of the coefficient β in a linear regression model 
yi = xi
T













where r [i](β), i = 1,...,n, is the ordered sample of squared residuals r i(β) = (yi - xi
T
β)² for 
all possible β coefficients; and ω = (ω1,ω2,...,ωn) is the vector of weights with 






The weight parameter w and the trimming parameter t determine the shape of the 
weighting function that decreases in i. The higher is the weight parameter w, the faster 
the weights decline to values close to zero for i > t. The weight and trimming 
parameters w and t have to satisfy the conditions w ≥ 0 and nnt ,2/∈ . They are 
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chosen during the estimation procedure according to an algorithm that optimizes the 
trade off between the robustness and noisiness of the SLTS estimator. For more details 
on the estimation algorithm and for properties of the SLTS estimator, see for example 
Cizek (2001). 
     The advantage of SLTS over least trimmed squares is that it uses (even though 
down-weighs) the information from the whole sample. Thus, it cannot happen that some 
observations would be completely excluded, which might be a serious problem in 
regression models containing discrete and categorical explanatory variables. Also the 
choice of the weight parameter w and the trimming parameter t gives more degrees of 
freedom in the search for "optimal robustness" of a SLTS estimator. Moreover, in the 
context of cross-country growth regressions, we can further investigate what the causes 





     Data used in this paper and definitions of all v riables are given in Appendix A. I use 
two different data samples. Tables 1 to 4 provide basic statistics and mutual correlations 
of the variables in both samples. The first sample covers 85 countries and the period 
1965-1998.15 The second sample includes 117 countries and measures average 
economic indicators over the period 1980-2000.16  
     In the sample 1965-1998, I use the same variables as Gylfason in his 2001 papers. 
Natural resource dependence is measured with the share of natural capital in total 
capital in 1994 (natural capital) as estimated by the World Bank (1997). Total capital 
comprises estimates of physical, human, and natural capital. Unfortunately, 1994 is the 
only year for which this estimate is available. Other economic indicators include per 
capita GDP growth (economic growth), the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP 
                                                
15 The core variables of the sample 1965-1998 were kindly provided by Thorvaldur Gylfason, who 
previously used them in his research; see Gylfason (2001a,b) and Gylfason and Zoega (2002). The data 
are also available in Gylfason and Zoega (2002). Themain original source of the data is the World 
Development Indicators 2000 CD. Only the estimates of natural capital are taken from World Bank 
(1997). 
16 The core variables of the sample 1980-2000 were computed using the World Development Indicators 
2003 data set provided by the World Bank (2003). 
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(investment ratio), and gross secondary school enrollment rate (enrollment rate), all 
averaged over the period 1965-1998. The logarithm of initial per capita income (log 
initial income) is computed from the purchasing power parity adjusted per capita GNP 
in 1998 by dividing it with the appropriate growth factor for the period 1965-1998 and 
taking the natural logarithm.  
 
 
Table 1: Statistics on variables used in the sample 1965-1998. 
     Standard  
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. deviation Obs. 
Economic growth 1.36 1.30 7.70 -3.30 1.92 85 
Enrollment rate 43.8 36.8 101.9 3.30 30.2 85 
Log initial income 7.85 7.67 9.81 5.85 1.06 85 
Investment ratio 20.2 20.6 31.7 7.36 5.27 85 
Natural capital 11.8 8.21 54.2 0.00 10.8 85 
Autocracy 0.31 0.28 0.83 0.00 0.28 85 
Democracy 0.47 0.39 1.00 0.00 0.38 85 
Civil liberties 0.56 0.52 1.00 0.08 0.28 85 
Political rights 0.57 0.54 1.00 0.03 0.32 85 
Regime instability 0.07 0.05 0.31 0.00 0.08 85 
 
 
Table 2: Correlations of variables used in the sample 1965-1998. 
 Economic Enrollment Log initial Natural Investment 
Variable growth rate income capital ratio 
Economic growth 1.00     
Enrollment rate 0.39 1.00    
Log initial income -0.02 0.82 1.00   
Natural capital -0.53 -0.57 -0.45 1.00  
Investment ratio 0.61 0.48 0.21 -0.41 1.00 
Autocracy -0.32 -0.66 -0.65 0.41 -0.28 
Democracy 0.31 0.76 0.73 -0.43 0.33 
Civil liberties 0.29 0.81 0.81 -0.47 0.35 
Political rights 0.35 0.78 0.76 -0.48 0.37 
Regime instability -0.26 -0.42 -0.31 0.18 -0.38 
     Regime 
 Autocracy Democracy Civil liberties Political rights instability 
Economic growth      
Enrollment rate      
Log initial income      
Natural capital      
Investment ratio      
Autocracy 1.00     
Democracy -0.94 1.00    
Civil liberties -0.88 0.92 1.00   
Political rights -0.92 0.95 0.97 1.00  
Regime instability 0.33 -0.45 -0.45 -0.44 1.00 
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Table 3: Statistics on variables used in the sample 1980-2000. 
     Standard  
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. deviation Obs. 
Economic growth 0.96 0.92 8.32 -7.05 2.27 117 
Log initial income 7.61 7.46 10.6 5.00 1.54 117 
Primary exports 10.9 4.15 95.1 0.08 16.8 117 
Autocracy 0.30 0.23 1.00 0.00 0.29 104 
Democracy 0.48 0.45 1.00 0.00 0.38 104 
Civil liberties 0.56 0.55 1.00 0.02 0.28 117 
Political rights 0.58 0.58 1.00 0.06 0.32 117 
Regime instability 0.07 0.03 0.40 0.00 0.09 104 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations of variables used in the sample 1980-2000. 
Variable Economic growth Log initial income Primary exports Autocracy 
Economic growth 1.00    
Log initial income 0.16 1.00   
Primary exports -0.33 0.19 1.00  
Autocracy -0.39 -0.43 0.46 1.00 
Democracy 0.37 0.63 -0.35 -0.92 
Civil liberties 0.41 0.65 -0.33 -0.86 
Political rights 0.46 0.60 -0.38 -0.91 
Regime instability -0.52 -0.47 -0.01 0.31 
 Democracy Civil liberties Political rights Regime instability 
Economic growth     
Log initial income     
Primary exports     
Autocracy     
Democracy 1.00    
Civil liberties 0.93 1.00   
Political rights 0.96 0.97 1.00  
Regime instability -0.43 -0.46 -0.47 1.00 
 
 
    In the sample 1980-2000, natural resource dependence is measured differently. I use 
the average ratio of primary products exports to GDP over the years 1980-1985 
(primary exports), where primary products exports comprise ores and metals, fuel, and 
agricultural raw materials exports. Further, I employ only two basic economic indicators 
in this sample, average per capita GDP growth over th  period 1980-2000 (economic 
growth) and natural logarithm of per capita GDP in 1980 (log initial income). 
     Variables measuring the quality of democracy are t ken from two distinct sources. 
The indices of democracy and autocracy are from the Polity IV 2001 data set.17 They 
correspond to the variables DEMOC and AUTOC from the original data set. These sort 
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countries into eleven groups each year. The value 0 of autocracy and democracy indices 
corresponds to the lowest level of democracy and autocracy respectively. The value 10 
indicates the highest level of democracy for the democracy index and the toughest 
autocratic regime in the case of the autocracy index. In this paper the indices are 
divided by 10, which transform them to the range betwe n 0 and 1. In the samples 
1965-1998 and 1980-2000, democracy and autocracy indices stand for averages of the 
individual yearly values over the respective time periods.18 
     The indices of civil liberties and political rights come from the Freedom House 
country ratings.19 Freedom House ranks countries in each year into seven categories 
according to these indices. The value 1 corresponds to the highest and the value 7 to the 
lowest level of political rights or civil liberties. For the purposes of this paper both 
indices are converted to the scale from 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to the lowest and 1 
to the highest level of rights. The Freedom House indices are available only from the 
year 1973. Therefore, in the sample 1965-1998, I take the average over the period 
1973-1998. In the second sample I can take the average over the whole relevant period 
1980-2000. 
     To get an idea of how countries are rated with the different measures of democracy 
consider the following examples. The "best" countries n the sample 1980-2000 are 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United states. They receive the maxi um average value 1 for 
democracy, civil liberties, and political rights indices and the minimum average value 0 
for the autocracy index. France and Germany receive the maximum value 1 for 
democracy and political rights indices and the minimum value 0 for the autocracy index 
but only the values 0.83 and 0.84 for the index of civil liberties. Algeria receives 0.04 
for the democracy index, 0.64 for the autocracy index, 0.22 for the civil liberties index, 
and 0.18 for the political rights index. Finally, Saudi Arabia "boasts" the following 
                                                                                                                                    
17 A detailed methodology used to assign these indices is described in Polity IV Project (2001) and 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
18 In the sample 1980-2000, these indices are available only for 104 countries out of the total 117. 
19 For a detailed description of the methodology used to assign each index, see Freedom House (2002). 
Freedom House indices are quite popular in economic research and were previously used for example by 
Helliwell (1992), Barro (1999), and Easterly (2001). 
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values: 0 democracy index, 1 autocracy index, 0.06 civil liberties index, and 0.08 
political rights index. Not surprisingly, Tables 2 and 4 show high correlations among 
the four measures of the quality of democracy in both samples. When measured with 
these correlations, the two indices that differ the most are autocracy and civil liberties 
indices. Their correlation coefficient is -0.88 in the sample 1965-1998 and -0.86 in the 
sample 1980-2000. 
     The index of regime instability is a variable quite distinct from the democracy 
indicators described above, and it is not strongly correlated with them. The correlation 
coefficients in absolute value ranges only between 0.31 and 0.48. I computed the regime 
instability index from the variable DURABLE available in the Polity IV 2001 data set. 
The variable DURABLE gives for each country and each year the duration of the 
current regime in power. If a regime change occurs, then its value drops to zero and 
from that point it starts to count the duration of the new regime. The index of regime 
instability is the maximum likelihood estimator of regime change probability in each 
country for the corresponding periods 1965-1998 and 1980-2000 in the two samples. It 
is estimated in the framework of duration analysis. For details see Appendix A. The 
distribution of the instability index is very asymmetrical, because 27 countries out of 85 
in the sample 1965-1998 and 43 countries out of 104 in the sample 1980-2000 have the 
estimated probability of regime change equal to 0. The highest probabilities of regime 
change were estimated for Thailand, Chad, Ghana, Philippines, Burundi, Pakistan, and 
El Salvador in the sample 1965-1980 and for the Congo Democratic Republic, Haiti, 
Liberia, Chad, Mexico, Sierra Leone, and Ghana in the sample 1980-2000. All these 
countries have the estimated probability of regime change higher than 0.2 in the 
respective samples, with the highest value 0.31 for Thailand in the first and 0.40 for the 
Congo Democratic Republic in the second sample. 
     The major difference between the samples 1965-1998 and 1980-2000 lies in the 
different measures of natural resource dependence. Table 5 shows selected correlations 
of corresponding economic variables between the two samples, when reduced to 82 
countries contained in both of them. Correlation betwe n the variables that measure 
economic growth is 0.88. The variables measuring logarithms of initial income in 1965 
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and 1980 are correlated even stronger, with a coeffi ient 0.93. The correlation among 
the democracy and stability measures between the two samples is not reported in Table 
5 but is comparably high. However, the correlation c efficient between atural capital 
and primary exports is only 0.18. It will be shown later that even if I reduce both 
samples to 82 overlapping countries and estimate basic resource curse regressions of 
economic growth on a constant, log initial income, and natural capital or primary 
exports, the results differ radically for the two data samples. Table 5 clearly suggests 
that it is due to the different measures of natural resource dependence. 
 
 
Table 5: Correlations of selected variables between th  samples 1965-1998 and 
1980-2000. 
Sample 1980-2000 Sample 1965-1998 
82 observations Economic growth Log initial income Natural capital 
Economic growth 0.88   
Log initial income  0.93  
Primary exports   0.18 
Note: Only 82 overlapping country observations can be used in both samples. 
 
 
     Finally, let me consider the two measures of resource dependence with respect to 
their possible endogeneity. The 1994 share of natural capital in total capital has the 
advantage of using an estimate of the total value of a country's resource endowment, 
which is exogenous and independent of any economic act vity. However, the resource 
endowment is related relative to total capital, which already depends on the investment 
history of each country. Past investment is typically positively correlated with current 
growth. Therefore, the share of natural capital in total capital can be negatively 
correlated with current growth without any direct causal effect from the pure resource 
abundance. Moreover, the only year for which this measure is available is 1994, which 
is close to the end of the sample period 1965-1998. Thus, the 1994 share of natural 
capital in total capital also depends on investment during the sample period, again 
typically positively correlated with economic growth during this period. The second 
problem can be partially eliminated by showing that the curse remains present even 
after controlling for average investment relative to GDP in the period 1965-1998. The 
average ratio of primary products exports to GDP over the years 1980-1985 is probably 
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an even more problematic measure. It has only the advantage of being measured in the 
beginning of the sample period 1980-2000. On the other hand, the use of primary 
exports relative to GDP is a clear disadvantage because both primary exports and GDP 
are related to endogenous economic activity. As a result the ratio will again depend on 
the history of investment into different sectors of the economy. Moreover, the average 
ratio of primary products exports to GDP can be expected to be noisier than the 1994 
share of natural capital in total capital. The averg  is taken only over five years. During 
these years primary exports could have encountered various types of fluctuations 
unrelated to the actual resource wealth or even to the real resource dependence of the 
country. Thus, I would conclude that the 1994 share of natural capital in total capital is 
probably a better variable to be used to estimate the effect of natural resources on 
economic growth. Nevertheless, both measures clearly indicate endogenous resource 
dependence rather than exogenous resource abundance. 
 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
 
3.5.1 Robustness of the Curse 
 
     First, I investigate if the curse of natural resources remains present in growth 
regressions, when controlling for democracy indices and for the index of regime 
instability and when using the robust SLTS estimation procedure. 
     Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of the curse in the sample 1965-1998. For 
comparison purposes I reestimate two regressions already presented in Gylfason (2001). 
First, I regress the average per capita economic growth over the period 1965-1998 on 
the 1994 share of natural capital in total capital, logarithm of initial income, average 
gross domestic investment ratio over the relevant period, and the average secondary 
school enrollment rate over the same period. Second, I estimate the same regression just 
with the enrollment rate excluded. Additionally, I also include the basic regression of 
economic growth on natural capital and log initial income and the simplest regression 
of economic growth on natural capital only. The coefficient estimates in the first two 
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equations are very close to those reported in Gylfason (2001).20 The coefficient for 
natural capital is significant and negative in all the four estimated equations. It remains 
almost unchanged, when four different measures of the quality of democracy and the 
index of regime instability are included. These results are in line with the repo ted 
empirical robustness of the curse of natural resources. The four different indices of the 
quality of democracy appear significant in most of the estimated equations, with the 
expected sign supporting the idea that democracy and growth are correlated. Of course, 
without any possibility to decide what is the causality direction of the relationship in 
this case. The index of regime instability has the expected negative sign in all equations. 
However, it is significant only in the regression that includes just natural capital and 
log initial income, which is quite surprising.  
     Table 7 contains the results of the robust SLT estimation of the same four equations 
with the same sample 1965-1998. Again the coefficient for natural capital remains 
negative and significant. However, in three out of the four equations it decreases 
slightly in absolute value (the difference is not stati tically significant). The coefficient 
estimates by investment ratio and enrollment rate remain completely unchanged 
compared to OLS. The estimated coefficient for log initial income remains negative but 
decreases significantly in absolute value compared to OLS and even becomes 
insignificant in two out of the three equations where it is included. Thus, unlike the 
curse of natural resources, the convergence result is not found to be robust here. In fact, 
also Gylfason (2001) mentions that there is no sign of absolute convergence in his 
sample as the logarithm of initial income is uncorrelated with growth (the correlation 
coefficient is only -0.02; see Table 2). Similar changes in the value of estimated 
coefficients between OLS and SLTS were found also when SLTS were applied to 
estimate the equations with the four indices of democracy and the regime instability 
index included. Therefore, I do not report these results here. Important is that also in 
this case the coefficient for natural capital remains significant and negative.  
 
                                                
20 A small difference is present due to the fact that Gylfason estimated the equations in a seemingly 
unrelated regressions system. 
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Table 6: OLS estimates of the natural resource curse with the sample 1965-1998.  
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 85 
 Natural Log initial Investment Enrollment   
Constant capital income ratio rate X R² 
10.1(5.79) -0.07(4.60) -1.54(7.05) 0.10(3.43) 0.05(5.36)  0.67 
a3.51(2.45) -0.08(5.30) -0.60(3.97) 0.18(5.92)   0.55 
7.29(4.77) -0.12(6.74) -0.58(3.20)    0.36 
2.47(9.29) -0.09(5.63)     0.28 
X = Autocracy 
12.5(7.01) -0.06(4.66) -1.73(8.13) 0.10(3.57) 0.04(4.89) -1.98(3.43) 0.71 
7.59(4.55) -0.08(5.26) -0.99(5.83) 0.16(5.84)  -2.56(3.99) 0.63 
11.8(6.61) -0.11(6.52) -1.05(5.20)   -3.07(4.07) 0.47 
2.62(8.87) -0.09(4.66)    c-0.82(1.16) 0.29 
X = Democracy 
11.5(6.69) -0.07(4.85) -1.74(8.03) 0.10(3.42) 0.04(4.40) 1.56(3.15) 0.71 
7.14(4.59) -0.08(5.49) -1.14(6.11) 0.14(5.37)  2.24(4.28) 0.63 
11.2(7.13) -0.11(6.68) -1.27(5.95)   2.88(4.88) 0.50 
2.12(4.88) -0.09(4.64)    c0.54(1.03) 0.29 
X = Civil liberties 
11.9(6.92) -0.06(4.85) -1.88(8.27) 0.09(3.33) 0.04(4.33) 2.72(3.46) 0.71 
7.78(4.91) -0.08(5.45) -1.34(6.38) 0.14(5.18)  3.79(4.60) 0.65 
11.9(7.56) -0.10(6.58) -1.54(6.49)   4.91(5.38) 0.53 
2.16(3.73) -0.09(4.68)    c0.44(0.60) 0.28 
X = Political rights 
11.8(7.06) -0.06(4.67) -1.85(8.52) 0.09(3.20) 0.04(4.60) 2.38(3.86) 0.72 
7.26(4.82) -0.08(5.22) -1.23(6.46) 0.14(5.12)  3.11(4.69) 0.65 
11.2(7.51) -0.10(6.25) -1.40(6.51)   4.04(5.52) 0.53 
       
X = Regime instability 
10.4 (5.76) -0.07(4.63) -1.55(7.04) 0.10(3.18) 0.05(5.09) c-1.52(0.81) 0.67 
4.69(2.90) -0.09(5.47) -0.68(4.28) 0.16(5.07)  c-3.20(1.52) 0.56 
9.08(5.79) -0.12(6.96) -0.74(4.13)   -6.91(3.07) 0.42 
2.69(9.21) -0.09(5.26)    b-4.06(1.73) 0.30 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 




Table 7: SLTS estimates of the natural resource curse with the sample 1965-1998.  
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
SLTS method; Obs. 85 
 Natural Log initial Investment Enrollment   
Constant capital income ratio rate Trimming Weight 
7.79(5.50) -0.04(3.88) -1.28(24.0) 0.10(4.37) 0.05(6.19) 44 10.5 
c-0.31(0.22) -0.06(4.55) c-0.16(1.19) 0.18(7.21)  52 10.5 
c1.69(0.70) -0.09(3.49) c0.07(0.25)   43 50.0 
2.35(5.92) -0.10(3.24)    43 50.0 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 1% significance level. Exceptions: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
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     In Table 8, I present the result of OLS and SLT  estimates in the sample 1980-2000. 
I focus only on the basic regression of the average per capita economic growth over the 
period 1980-2000 on the average ratio of primary products exports to GDP over the 
years 1980-1985 and on the logarithm of initial income. I also include the simplest 
regression of economic growth on primary exports. The coefficient for primary exports 
is again significant and negative in the two estimaed equations. Its absolute value is 
lower than in the case of the sample 1965-1998. However, this does not mean that the 
power of the curse would be lower here. First, we us a different measure of resource 
dependence in the two samples. The sample variance of the natural capital share in the 
sample 1965-1998 is lower than the sample variance of primary exports ratio in the 
sample 1980-2000. Second, the sample average of economic growth is higher in the first 
sample than in the second. Thus, in both samples an increase of the respective measure 
of resource dependence by one standard deviation leads to a similar decrease in 
economic growth relative to its sample mean. Similarly as in the sample 1965-1998, the 
coefficient for primary exports survives the application of SLTS. It remains significant 
and negative; only it decreases significantly in absolute value in the equation that 
contains the log initial income. Similarly as in the sample 1965-1998, there is little 
evidence for convergence here. The coefficient for log initial income is either 
insignificant in the regressions or if significant, then even slightly positive, rather than 
negative (the simple correlation coefficient between log initial income and economic 
growth is 0.16). Also in line with results in the sample 1965-1998, the coefficients for 
the indices measuring the quality of democracy and regime instability have the expected 
signs and are significant in all the estimated equations.  
     Nevertheless, the remaining results here are rdically different from those in the 
sample 1965-1998. The coefficient for p imary exports loses significance when I 
control for the four different measures of democracy quality in the regressions. It either 
becomes completely insignificant or at least moves from 1 per cent to 10 or 5 per cent 
significance levels. It survives only the control fr regime instability. Therefore, unlike 
the sample 1965-1998, the conclusion here is that the curse of natural resources is not 
robust when controlling for the quality of democracy in the basic curse regressions. 
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However, I would not assign a particularly high importance to this result. First, the 
overall significance of the regressions here is much lower than of those with the sample 
1965-1998. Second, as I have already suggested in the previous section, the average 
ratio of primary products exports to GDP over the years 1980-1985 is probably a worse 
measure of natural resource dependence than the 1994 share of natural capital in total 
capital. Moreover, if SLTS are applied to the equations that control also for the 
democracy measures and the regime instability index (the results are not reported in the 
table), then the coefficient for primary exports regains its significance in most cases. 
This could be limited evidence for the noisiness and contamination of the primary 




Table 8: OLS and SLTS estimates of the natural resource curse with the sample 
1980-2000. Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method 
 Primary Log initial    
Constant exports income X Obs. R² 
c-1.08(1.10) -0.05(4.31) 0.35(2.69)  117 0.16 
1.48(6.25) -0.04(3.76)   117 0.11 
X = Autocracy  
c0.79(0.60) c-0.02(1.23) c0.12(0.77) -2.22(2.30) 104 0.17 
1.77(6.02) c-0.01(1.00)  -2.64(3.37) 104 0.16 
X = Democracy 
c-0.06(0.05) c-0.02(1.39) c0.04(0.20) 1.75(2.06) 104 0.16 
c0.15(0.38) c0.02(1.51)  1.87(3.29) 104 0.16 
X = Civil liberties 
c0.01(0.01) b-0.03(1.91) c-0.05(0.26) 2.99(2.67) 117 0.21 
c-0.23(0.46) a-0.03(2.50)  2.76(3.85) 117 0.21 
X = Political rights 
c0.21(0.20) c-0.02(1.36) c-0.11(0.60) 3.18(3.36) 117 0.24 
c-0.33(0.71) a-0.02(2.08)  2.76(4.35) 117 0.24 
X = Regime instability 
a2.28(2.12) -0.04(3.14) c-0.02 (0.16) -13.0(5.60) 104 0.33 
2.11(8.10) -0.04(3.23)  -12.8(6.32) 104 0.33 
SLTS method   Obs. Trimming Weight 
-2.38(4.21) -0.02(2.87) 0.43(5.69) 117 59 13.1 
1.44(5.78) -0.05(4.79)  117 59 8.39 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 





Table 9: OLS and SLTS estimates of the natural resource curse with the samples 
1965-1998 and 1980-2000 for 82 overlapping country observations. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 82 
  Natural capital Log initial   
 Constant (Primary exports) income X R² 
Sample 6.18(4.06) -0.11(6.49) a-0.45(2.53)  0.35 
1965-1998 2.37(9.43) -0.09(5.80)   0.30 
Sample c-0.82(0.79) c-0.03(0.98) a0.28(2.08)  0.06 
1980-2000 1.26(4.39) c-0.03(0.97)   0.01 
X = Autocracy 
Sample 10.3(5.45) -0.10(6.36) -0.89(4.18) -2.61(3.35) 0.43 
1965-1998 2.49(8.80) -0.08(4.93)  c-0.63(0.92) 0.30 
Sample c1.24(0.78) c-0.02(0.66) c0.06(0.33) b-2.07(1.72) 0.10 
1980-2000 1.75(5.30) c-0.02(0.62)  -2.34(2.71) 0.10 
X = Civil liberties 
Sample 10.7(6.31) -0.10(6.42) -1.34(5.28) 4.30(4.51) 0.48 
1965-1998 2.09(3.82) -0.09(4.87)  c0.39(0.57) 0.30 
Sample c0.54(0.41) c-0.02(0.68) c-0.12(0.46) b2.76(1.69) 0.10 
1980-2000 c-0.00(0.01) c-0.02(0.76)  2.11(2.67) 0.09 
X = Regime instability 
Sample 7.54(4.87) -0.11(6.67) -0.58(3.25) -6.16(2.72) 0.41 
1965-1998 2.58(9.45) -0.09(5.52)  b-4.25(1.84) 0.32 
Sample c1.65(1.43) c-0.03(1.28) c0.04(0.26) -11.4(3.86) 0.21 
1980-2000 1.94(6.50) c-0.03(1.29)  -11.7(4.49) 0.21 
SLTS method; Obs. 82 Trimming Weight 
Sample c1.34(0.54) -0.09(3.24) c0.11(0.38) 42 50.0 
1965-1998 2.39(5.44) -0.10(2.94)  42 50.0 
Sample -3.04(5.61) c-0.00(0.26) 0.49(6.84) 42 20.5 
1980-2000 1.17(3.61) c-0.03(1.17)  62 13.1 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 1% significance level. Exceptions: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
 
 
     As shown in Table 9 the differences between th results with the samples 1965-1998 
and 1980-2000 can be fully attributed to the different measures of natural resource 
dependence. There is little evidence that the differences could be due to the different 
sizes of both samples. Table 9 shows OLS and SLTS results of the basic curse 
regressions in both samples when reduced to 82 overlapping country observations 
(included in both samples). The results with the reduced sample 1965-1998 remain 
almost unchanged from those when all 85 observations are used (compare to Tables 6 
and 7) and the curse of natural resources remains significant in all the estimated 
equations. However, it is insignificant in all equations with the reduced sample 
1980-2000. As I have shown in Table 5, both economic growth and log initial income 
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are highly correlated between the two samples (correlation coefficients are 0.88 and 
0.93) but the correlation coefficient between the natural capital share and primary 
exports ratio is only 0.18. Thus, the only cause for such dramatic differences between 
the estimates in the two samples can lie only in the different measures of natural 
resource dependence.  
     Finally, let us consider if there is some regularity in the way the SLTS procedure 
assigns the weights to different observations. Note that in most cases the choice of the 
trimming parameter is very close to its lower bound n/2. It means that in most cases a 
maximum trimming is needed in order to achieve the required robustness of the SLTS 
estimator. This can support the idea that the data are highly noisy and contaminated. 
Such conclusion is really not surprising in the context of growth regressions. In Table 
10, I report basic statistics of variables employed in the sample 1965-1998 for two 
groups of countries – those that were assigned low weights and those that were assigned 
high weights with the SLTS procedure. The first group comprises only those countries 
that were assigned weights below the trimming point when estimating both basic 
regressions, of economic growth on natural capital and log initial income and of 
economic growth on natural capital only. Obviously, the opposite rule was used to 
select the countries into the second group. Table 11 shows the same information for the 
sample 1980-2000. 
     In the sample 1965-1998, the only variable that significantly differs between the two 
groups is investment ratio. The highest weighted countries seem to have a significantly 
lower ratio of investment to GDP than least weighted countries (at 5% level of 
significance). It might have the following, rather speculative, explanation. The 
dependence on natural resources is measured as the 1994 ratio of natural capital to total 
capital. It is measured relatively close to the endof the studied period. Investment over 
the studied period increases the total capital, and therefore contaminates the measure of 
resource dependence with endogeneity. This contamination would be higher by 
countries that invested more over the studied period, which could be the reason why 
they were assigned lower weights with the robust SLTS procedure. Consider also the 
possible resulting bias present in the results withthe sample 1965-1998. When using the 
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1994 natural capital share, countries that invested more over the period 1965-1998 
would seem to be less dependent on natural resources than they actually were at the 
beginning of the investigated period. At the same time, investment is positively 
correlated with growth in general and also in this sample. Thus, countries that invested 
more and grew more rapidly over the period 1965-1998 would appear less resource 
dependent than they should. This would clearly magnify the power of the curse. This 
might also be the reason why the estimated coefficints for natural capital decreased in 




Table 10: Statistics on variables used in the sample 1965-1998 divided into two sub-
samples that were assigned low and high weights with the SLTS procedure respectively. 
Sample 1965-1998     Standard z-statistic for 
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. deviation difference in means 
42 Observations with low weights in the SLTS procedure 
Economic growth 1.65 1.25 7.70 -3.30 2.42 c1.37 
Enrollment rate 40.3 34.0 93.8 6.42 23.8 c-1.07 
Log initial income 7.68 7.62 9.81 5.85 0.94 c-1.50 
Investment ratio 21.4 21.2 30.8 7.36 5.71 a1.96 
Natural capital 10.7 7.73 44.2 0.76 9.47 c-0.96 
Autocracy 0.34 0.32 0.83 0.00 0.27 c0.95 
Democracy 0.42 0.36 1.00 0.00 0.35 c-1.31 
Civil liberties 0.51 0.46 1.00 0.08 0.24 c-1.58 
Political rights 0.52 0.48 1.00 0.08 0.29 c-1.45 
Regime instability 0.07 0.04 0.31 0.00 0.08 c0.31 
43 Observations with high weights in the SLTS procedur  
Economic growth 1.08 1.40 2.60 -2.50 1.23  
Enrollment rate 47.2 40.2 101.9 3.30 35.4  
Log initial income 8.02 8.06 9.76 6.03 1.14  
Investment ratio 19.1 19.8 31.7 7.47 4.60  
Natural capital 12.9 9.94 54.2 0.00 11.9  
Autocracy 0.28 0.23 0.81 0.00 0.28  
Democracy 0.53 0.58 1.00 0.00 0.40  
Civil liberties 0.61 0.58 1.00 0.12 0.31  
Political rights 0.62 0.65 1.00 0.03 0.34  
Regime instability 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.00 0.07  
Notes: The division of the sample 1965-1998 into the two subsamples is based on weights assigned with 
the SLTS procedure when regressing economic growth on a constant, log initial income, and natural 
capital and economic growth on a constant and natural capital only. The group of observations with low 
weights contains only those observations that were assigned low weights when estimating both equations. 
The group of observations with high weights contains oly those observations that were assigned high 
weights when estimating both equations. Low weights are those below the trimming point weight. 
The z-statistics show a significant difference of means in the two sub-samples at the 1% significance 
level. Exceptions: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
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Table 11: Statistics on variables used in the sample 1980-2000 divided into two sub-
samples that were assigned low and high weights with the SLTS procedure respectively. 
Sample 1980-2000     Standard z-statistic for 
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. deviation difference in means 
44 Observations with low weights in the SLTS procedure 
Economic growth 1.19 2.57 8.32 -7.05 3.47 c0.26 
Log initial income 7.32 7.44 10.5 5.12 1.28 -3.27 
Primary exports 10.4 3.93 60.3 0.08 14.4 c0.38 
Autocracy 0.39 0.40 1.00 0.00 0.30 3.65 
Democracy 0.35 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.34 -4.19 
Civil liberties 0.49 0.44 0.98 0.06 0.26 -3.33 
Political rights 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.08 0.30 -3.09 
Regime instability 0.08 0.06 0.40 0.00 0.10 b2.07 
45 Observations with high weights in the SLTS procedur  
Economic growth 1.05 1.01 2.38 -1.07 0.80  
Log initial income 8.25 8.34 10.3 5.75 1.41  
Primary exports 9.34 5.14 42.6 0.11 11.1  
Autocracy 0.17 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.25  
Democracy 0.67 0.87 1.00 0.00 0.38  
Civil liberties 0.68 0.71 1.00 0.02 0.27  
Political rights 0.71 0.77 1.00 0.06 0.30  
Regime instability 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.07  
Notes: The division of the sample 1980-2000 into the two subsamples is based on weights assigned with 
the SLTS procedure when regressing economic growth on a constant, log initial income, and primary 
exports and economic growth on a constant and primary exports only. The group of observations with 
low weights contains only those observations that were assigned low weights when estimating both 
equations. The group of observations with high weights contains only those observations that were 
assigned high weights when estimating both equations. Low weights are those below the trimming point 
weight. 
The z-statistics show a significant difference of means in the two sub-samples at the 1% significance 
level. Exceptions: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
 
 
     In the sample 1980-2000, the higher weighted countries have significantly higher 
levels of log initial income and quality of democracy when measured with all the four 
different indices (at the 1% significance level). They also seem to be more stable (at the 
5% significance level). A speculative reason for this can be that the macroeconomic 
indicators provided by these countries are more reliabl  and less noisy than those 
provided by unstable and authoritarian regimes. 
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3.5.2 The Curse in Different Groups of Countries 
 
     Here I attempt to test the hypothesis that the power of the curse of natural resources 
differs between democratic and authoritarian and betwe n stable and unstable countries. 
I employ only the sample 1965-1998, because here the evidence for the curse is much 
more robust. I sort the countries into different groups according to selected measures of 
the quality of democracy and with respect to the index of regime instability. Within 
these groups I estimate the basic curse regressions of economic growth on natural 
capital and log initial income. To save space, I use only two out of the four democracy 
measures, the autocracy index and the civil liberties index.21 With respect to the 
correlation between the four democracy measures, the two differ the most (see Table 
2). I will also include the results for the index of regime instability. 
     Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients for natural capital in different groups of 
countries as a function of the average value of the appropriate index in each group. In 
the case of the civil liberties and autocracy indices, countries were sorted with respect 
to the quartiles of these variables. In case of regime instability, due to the 
unsymmetrical distribution of this index it is not possible to sort the countries into four 
quartiles. Instead, the countries are sorted into three groups only. The first group 
includes countries with regime instability (probability of regime change) equal to zero. 
The remaining countries with regime instability greater than zero were sorted around 
their median value. 
     The plots in Figure 2 suggest that the resource curse coefficient as a function of the 
autocracy index is almost constant, but shows signs of a U-shape in the case of civil 
liberties and regime instability indices. Chow tests are significant in all three cases. 
However, they test for a structural change in all the regression coefficients, which 
include those of the constant, natural capital, and log initial income. The coefficient of 
my interest is only that of natural capital. Its differences are significant only in the case 
of the index of civil liberties. Here, this coefficient is significantly different (at 5 per 
cent) between the first and second quartile and between the second and fourth quartile. 
                                                
21 The results with the indices of democracy and politica  rights would be very close to those with the 

























Figure 2: The resource curse estimated coefficient as a function of democracy and 
stability measures. Sample 1965-1998. 
Notes: On the horizontal axis I plot the estimated coefficient of natural capital in the regression of 
economic growth on a constant, natural capital, and log initial income. Coefficients insignificant at the 
10% significance level are plotted with a dash. The error bars indicate estimated standard errors. The 
groups contain 21, 23, 20, and 21 country observations, when sorting with respect to the index of civil 
liberties, 25, 18, 21, and 21 country observations, when sorting with respect to the autocracy index, and 
27, 29, and 29 country observations, when sorting with respect to regime instability. 
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This gives some support for the claim that the curse of natural resources is not very 
dramatic in the group of countries with the highest level of civil liberties; then it 
becomes more severe as the index of civil liberties decreases but it again weakens 
among the group of countries with the lowest level of civil liberties. 
     The U-shape of the resource curse coefficient plot ed as a function of civil liberties 
and regime instability indices in Figure 2 leads me to consider possible non-linearities 
in the curse regressions. Table 12 reports the results of the basic curse regression of 
economic growth on natural capital and log initial income, when controlling for 
possible non-linear effects. Namely, I include natural capital squared, autocracy index 
squared, democracy index squared and regime instability index squared. Further, I 
control for the interaction between natural capital and the indices of the quality of 
democracy and regime instability by including a variable defined as natural capital 
times the respective index. Of course, I also control for the linear effects in the 
regressions. The results give little support for non-linearity in the civil liberties and 
autocracy indices. Only in the case of regime instability is some non-linear effect 
present as the coefficient for its squares is significant even at the 1 per cent level of 
significance. The interaction non-linear terms appear insignificant. They become 
partially significant (at the 10 per cent level) only when the linear effect of the quality of 
democracy is excluded in the case of autocracy and civil liberties indices. However, the 
results indicate non-linearity in atural capital as its squares are significant in all 
regressions at least at the 10 per cent level and when controlling for regime instability 
and the index of civil liberties even at the 5 per cent level of significance. Besid  this, 
there is little evidence for any missed non-linearity in the relationship between growth, 
natural capital dependence, and democracy. 
     As I have already pointed out when commenting o  the introductory Figure 1, the 
non-linearity in the resource curse in the sample 1965-1998 could be due to the eight 
most resource dependent countries. These are Central African Rep., Chad, Guinea-
Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. For all these countries 
their 1994 share of natural capital in total capital is greater than 28% with Niger slightly 
exceeding 54%. Table 13 reports the same result as Table 12 but with the eight most 
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resource dependent countries excluded. After this adjustment the non-linearity in 
natural capital clearly disappears. The only other important effect is that the coefficient 
for the interaction term between atural capital and autocracy, civil liberties, and 
regime instability indices becomes significant when not controlling for the linear effect 
of these indices. 
 
 
Table 12: OLS estimates of non-linear effects with the sample 1965-1998. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 85 
 Natural Log initial     
Constant capital income X Y Y = R² 
7.29(4.77) -0.12(6.74) -0.56(3.20)    0.36 
8.69(5.14) -0.21(4.02) -0.68(3.66)  b0.002(1.83) Nat. cap.² 0.38 
X = Autocracy 
13.4(7.05) -0.20(4.27) -1.17(5.69) -3.11(4.22) b0.002(2.13) Nat. cap.² 0.49 
12.2(6.81) -0.11(6.47) -1.07(5.34) -6.08(2.90) c4.27(1.54) X² 0.48 
12.7(6.76) -0.16(3.98) -1.11(5.42) -4.24(3.87) c0.11(1.47) Nat. cap.∗X 0.49 
8.03(5.15) b-0.06(1.86) -0.69(3.67)  b-0.10(1.84) Nat. cap.∗X 0.38 
X = Civil liberties 
13.7(8.14) -0.21(4.70) -1.69(7.12) 5.05(5.70) a0.002(2.52) Nat. cap.² 0.56 
13.0(7.34) -0.11(6.74) -1.57(6.62) c1.49(0.54) c2.90(1.31) X² 0.54 
12.0(7.69) a-0.06(2.29) -1.61(6.75) 6.05(5.31) c-0.11(1.64) Nat. cap.∗X 0.54 
8.26(5.14) -0.15(5.88) -0.72(3.67)  b0.11(1.74) Nat. cap.∗X 0.38 
X = Regime instability 
10.6(6.21) -0.21(4.32) -0.86(4.65) -7.08(3.21) a0.002(2.05) Nat. cap.² 0.45 
9.75(6.40) -0.11(6.77) -0.79(4.55) -22.1(3.78) 61.8(2.80) X² 0.48 
9.57(5.96) -0.14(5.41) -0.77(4.28) -10.7 (3.01) c0.28(1.29) Nat. cap.∗X 0.44 
7.55(4.93) -0.10(4.30) -0.61(3.39)  c-0.21(1.40) Nat. cap.∗X 0.37 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 1% significance level. Exception: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
 
 
     Finally, there is another problem related to the eight most resource dependent 
countries. In Figure 3, I plot the index of civil liberties against the natural capital share 
in the sample 1965-1998.22 It shows a relatively homogeneous distribution of natural 
capital for different levels of the index (at least when I imagine the countries to be 
sorted according to its four quartiles) except all the eight most resource dependent 
countries have a very low level of civil liberties. Therefore, when I sort the countries 
                                                
22 To save space only the index of civil liberties is chosen as an example; the distribution would be very 
similar if the indices of political rights, democracy, or autocracy were selected. 
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according to the quartiles of this index, all these xtremely resource dependent countries 
fall in the first quartile. The non-linearity in atural capital can then bias down the 
coefficient estimate for natural capital in this quartile. Therefore, I exclude the eight 
extremely resource dependent countries from the sample and reestimate the basic curse 
regressions for the different groups of countries sorted with respect to the indices of 
civil liberties, autocracy, and regime instability. 
     Figure 4 is plotted similarly as Figure 3, plotting the estimated coefficients for 
natural capital in the different groups of countries as a function of the average value of 
the appropriate democracy or instability index in each group. The countries are sorted in 
the same way as in the previous case; only the eight xtremely resource dependent 
countries are ex-ante excluded from the sample. 
 
 
Table 13: OLS estimates of non-linear effects for the sample 1965-1998 with the eight 
most resource-dependent countries excluded. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 77 
 Natural Log initial     
Constant capital income X Y Y = R² 
8.29(4.84) -0.16(4.57) -0.66(3.40)    0.24 
8.57(4.64) b-0.21(1.74) -0.67(3.40)  c0.002(0.43) Nat. cap.² 0.24 
X = Autocracy 
13.4(6.51) a-0.23(2.06) -1.17(5.39) -3.14(4.05) c0.003(0.70) Nat. cap.² 0.38 
13.5(6.91) -0.16(4.91) -1.18(5.55) -6.32(2.93) c4.56(1.59) X² 0.40 
13.1(6.59) -0.16(3.68) -1.15(5.34) -3.50(2.77) c0.04(0.39) Nat. cap.∗X 0.38 
10.3(5.76) a-0.10(2.52) -0.91(4.42)  -0.18(2.80) Nat. cap.∗X 0.31 
X = Civil liberties 
13.8(7.61) b-0.19(1.91) -1.72(6.88) 5.22(5.60) c0.002(0.39) Nat. cap.² 0.47 
14.4(7.60) -0.16(5.37) -1.74(6.98) c2.4(0.85) c2.34(1.03) X² 0.48 
13.7(7.59) -0.17(2.74) -1.72(6.87) 5.09(4.05) c0.01(0.16) Nat. cap.∗X 0.47 
12.2(6.29) -0.31(5.79) -1.14(5.04)  0.27(3.52) Nat. cap.∗X 0.35 
X = Regime instability 
10.6(5.74) c-0.17(1.51) -0.87(4.46) -7.96(3.27) c0.000(0.01) Nat. cap.² 0.34 
11.1(6.51) -0.17(5.14) -0.90(4.83) -22.0(3.58) a59.6(2.47) X² 0.39 
10.6(5.99) -0.17(4.25) -0.87(4.48) b-7.88(1.80) c-0.01(0.02) Nat. cap.∗X 0.34 
9.71(5.63) -0.13(3.81) -0.82(4.20)  -0.64(2.73) Nat. cap.∗X 0.31 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 
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Figure 3: Natural resource dependence and the index of civil liberties in the sample 
1965-1998.  
Note: Triangles represent the most resource-dependent cou tries, which are the Central African Republic, 
Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Zambia 
 
     Figure 4 suggests again U-shapes of the plotted functions, however, this time in the 
case of civil liberties and autocracy indices. The resource curse coefficient as a functio  
of regime instability increases slightly in absolute value as regime instability increases. 
However, the increase is not statistically significant. The estimated coefficients are in 
general more noisy than those reported in Figure 2. It is not surprising, as fewer 
observations are used. Nevertheless, the Chow tests remain significant in all three cases. 
The differences in the plotted coefficient for natural capital are again significant only in 
the case of the index of civil liberties. This time there are significant differences in this 
coefficient between the first and second quartile (at 10 per cent), between the third and 
fourth quartile (at 10 per cent), and between the second and fourth quartile (at 5 per 
cent). Interestingly, the power of the course seems to decrease steadily from the second 
to the fourth quartile. It is an optimistic result that suggests that once a minimal level of 
civil liberties is achieved, the curse of natural resources becomes weaker as the level of 

























Figure 4: The resource curse estimated coefficient as a function of democracy and 
stability measures. Sample 1965-1998 with the eight most resource-dependent countries 
excluded. 
Notes: On the horizontal axis I plot the estimated coefficient of natural capital in the regression of 
economic growth on a constant, natural capital, and log initial income. Coefficients insignificant at the 
10% significance level are plotted with a dash. The error bars indicate estimated standard errors. The 
groups contain 19, 20, 19, and 19 country observations, when sorting with respect to the index of civil 
liberties, 25, 14, 19, and 19 country observations, when sorting with respect to the autocracy index, and 




     In two different data samples I employ various measures of the quality of democracy 
and a measure of regime instability and test the robustness of the curse of natural 
resources with respect to these variables. I also asume that democratic versus 
authoritarian and stable versus unstable countries could have different chances to 
employ the policies needed to mitigate the curse. I t st this hypothesis by estimating the 
curse regressions in different groups of countries that differ in the indices of the quality 
of democracy and in the index of regime instability. Finally, I use smoothed least 
trimmed squares (SLTS) to test the robustness of the curse of natural resources. 
     The curse of natural resources is found to be ro ust when estimated with the SLTS 
procedure. The curse remains present also when I control for the democracy and 
instability measures in the first data sample, but it becomes insignificant in the second 
sample. However, this difference can be caused by the unreliability of the natural 
resource dependence measure used in the second sample. Additionally, I find limited 
evidence suggesting that the intensity of the curse depends on the level of civil liberties. 
The power of the curse seems to decrease steadily with the level of civil liberties once a 
minimal level is achieved.  
     To conclude, it must be noted that the evidence for the curse of natural resources in 
cross-country growth regressions is obtained when t effect of natural resources is 
estimated with the use of measures that approximate n tural resource dependence or 
intensity rather than abundance. A question remains, what would be the effect of 
exogenous natural resource wealth on economic growth? This issue certainly deserves 
special attention in future research. 
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Argentina 0.400 56.103 9.238 22.810 6.697 0.376 0.409 0.622 0.641 0.095 
Australia 1.700 85.758 9.433 23.727 11.889 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Austria 2.600 92.031 9.202 23.788 2.642 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Bangladesh 1.400 17.714 6.790 20.000 14.060 0.348 0.244 0.468 0.519 0.222 
Belgium 2.300 96.871 9.320 19.545 0.003 0.000 1.000 0.987 1.000 0.000 
Benin 0.100 12.000 6.720 15.176 7.678 0.506 0.152 0.282 0.231 0.147 
Botswana 7.700 25.688 6.217 26.853 6.302 0.000 0.870 0.705 0.853 0.030 
Brazil 2.200 33.097 8.055 20.690 7.894 0.424 0.385 0.583 0.654 0.088 
Burkina Faso 0.900 3.448 6.468 21.000 16.911 0.542 0.036 0.397 0.276 0.134 
Burundi 0.900 3.300 6.034 11.500 19.858 0.669 0.003 0.115 0.032 0.265 
Cameroon 1.300 17.467 6.814 21.458 21.077 0.712 0.021 0.263 0.141 0.026 
Canada 1.800 86.900 9.446 21.545 11.069 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Central African Rep. -1.200 9.556 7.400 10.409 30.160 0.571 0.106 0.212 0.167 0.084 
Chad -0.600 4.923 6.936 7.471 37.133 0.685 0.012 0.141 0.096 0.288 
Chile 1.900 54.806 8.428 19.000 9.782 0.303 0.382 0.526 0.391 0.074 
China 6.800 44.500 5.852 30.619 7.229 0.741 0.000 0.083 0.077 0.000 
Colombia 2.000 39.516 8.023 18.971 7.183 0.000 0.774 0.628 0.776 0.000 
Congo Rep. 1.400 50.065 6.282 31.720 14.466 0.639 0.091 0.244 0.173 0.087 
Costa Rica 1.200 40.242 8.274 20.618 8.205 0.000 1.000 0.968 1.000 0.000 
Cote D'Ivoire -0.800 16.424 7.568 17.324 18.009 0.832 0.000 0.333 0.186 0.000 
Denmark 1.900 101.419 9.459 22.939 3.753 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Dominican Rep. 2.300 35.333 7.625 20.794 12.407 0.145 0.430 0.718 0.776 0.118 
Ecuador 1.800 43.448 7.419 19.235 17.011 0.150 0.582 0.654 0.628 0.105 
Egypt 3.500 52.455 6.919 20.765 4.550 0.553 0.026 0.346 0.288 0.000 
El Salvador -0.400 24.419 8.428 15.500 2.846 0.166 0.445 0.564 0.641 0.206 
Finland 2.400 101.938 9.152 23.970 6.602 0.000 1.000 0.891 0.904 0.000 
France 2.100 86.031 9.277 21.758 2.735 0.012 0.815 0.846 1.000 0.013 
Gambia 0.400 13.097 7.132 19.500 11.844 0.088 0.656 0.647 0.660 0.059 
Ghana -0.800 31.333 7.724 11.875 7.221 0.500 0.117 0.359 0.250 0.281 
Greece 2.400 80.125 8.764 25.394 3.657 0.167 0.703 0.756 0.859 0.064 
Guatemala 0.700 16.379 7.923 14.324 3.309 0.252 0.291 0.462 0.538 0.123 
Guinea-Bissau -0.100 6.417 6.384 29.150 44.204 0.592 0.083 0.229 0.243 0.120 
Haiti -0.800 13.300 7.494 10.875 6.683 0.716 0.131 0.224 0.141 0.170 
Honduras 0.600 22.083 7.560 19.765 9.940 0.091 0.353 0.667 0.571 0.070 
India 2.700 33.969 6.751 18.559 19.788 0.000 0.835 0.615 0.782 0.000 
Indonesia 4.700 31.469 6.270 25.500 12.378 0.685 0.000 0.288 0.250 0.000 
Ireland 3.000 89.875 8.822 21.030 8.117 0.000 1.000 0.962 1.000 0.000 
Italy 2.500 72.313 9.107 21.606 1.320 0.000 1.000 0.891 0.974 0.000 
Jamaica -0.400 58.296 8.247 24.853 6.776 0.000 0.982 0.731 0.865 0.000 
Japan 3.500 92.387 8.933 30.818 0.758 0.000 1.000 0.955 0.936 0.000 
 73
Jordan -0.400 47.970 8.001 29.391 1.589 0.791 0.050 0.308 0.301 0.023 
Kenya 1.300 17.097 6.445 17.382 9.439 0.591 0.053 0.308 0.250 0.054 
Korea 6.600 71.625 7.385 29.353 1.750 0.364 0.321 0.449 0.558 0.085 
Madagaskar -1.800 14.833 7.207 10.500 41.871 0.391 0.233 0.378 0.423 0.080 
Malawi 0.500 5.871 6.147 17.385 11.782 0.765 0.103 0.179 0.212 0.059 
Malaysia 4.100 47.939 7.623 28.412 8.618 0.094 0.535 0.462 0.590 0.042 
Mali -0.100 7.121 6.545 17.500 41.041 0.552 0.142 0.276 0.212 0.055 
Mauritania -0.100 9.226 7.346 20.357 21.570 0.676 0.000 0.160 0.090 0.000 
Mauritius 3.800 44.813 7.786 21.824 1.245 0.000 0.955 0.788 0.853 0.032 
Mexico 1.500 43.032 8.425 19.588 5.885 0.376 0.138 0.551 0.545 0.155 
Morocco 1.800 25.875 7.478 20.441 4.075 0.812 0.000 0.385 0.429 0.029 
Mosambique 0.500 5.000 6.442 12.737 12.681 0.588 0.125 0.159 0.196 0.083 
Namibia 0.700 51.667 8.341 19.053 10.071 0.000 0.600 0.685 0.796 0.111 
Nepal 1.100 21.500 6.713 17.500 17.698 0.529 0.185 0.462 0.519 0.053 
Netherlands 1.900 99.375 9.392 21.848 1.524 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
New Zeland 0.700 86.515 9.455 22.242 18.473 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Nicaragua -3.300 33.515 8.655 19.971 13.878 0.434 0.213 0.436 0.397 0.128 
Niger -2.500 4.094 7.427 11.421 54.241 0.606 0.097 0.231 0.122 0.084 
Norway 3.000 93.813 9.198 26.697 10.016 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Pakistan 2.700 15.630 6.531 16.265 5.552 0.253 0.433 0.365 0.410 0.227 
Panama 0.700 54.903 8.272 19.579 6.473 0.415 0.294 0.468 0.359 0.038 
Papua New Guinea 0.500 10.903 7.534 23.382 19.324 0.000 1.000 0.732 0.826 0.042 
Paraguay 2.300 26.469 7.619 20.765 11.539 0.579 0.168 0.410 0.410 0.050 
Peru -0.300 52.750 8.437 20.971 7.784 0.281 0.388 0.519 0.500 0.150 
Philippines 0.900 61.667 7.927 21.647 6.174 0.376 0.400 0.500 0.538 0.243 
Portugal 3.200 59.000 8.547 27.000 2.313 0.253 0.700 0.814 0.859 0.066 
Rwanda 0.000 4.519 6.477 12.647 21.708 0.661 0.024 0.205 0.103 0.085 
Senegal -0.400 12.333 7.300 12.441 16.785 0.450 0.124 0.494 0.462 0.027 
Sierra Leone -1.600 13.154 6.630 7.357 28.009 0.566 0.081 0.301 0.237 0.162 
South Africa 0.100 62.231 8.991 22.206 5.043 0.247 0.731 0.365 0.468 0.069 
Spain 2.300 84.000 8.927 23.000 2.857 0.226 0.665 0.744 0.840 0.097 
Sri Lanca 3.000 57.032 7.012 22.103 7.421 0.047 0.662 0.519 0.692 0.000 
Sweden 1.400 90.906 9.437 19.939 5.608 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.994 0.000 
Switzerland 1.200 85.387 9.805 25.182 0.868 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Thailand 5.000 29.182 7.007 28.706 6.486 0.203 0.394 0.532 0.545 0.306 
Togo -0.600 19.813 7.408 17.316 15.184 0.619 0.019 0.224 0.083 0.084 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.600 62.333 8.036 21.265 9.487 0.000 0.850 0.872 0.936 0.000 
Tunisia 2.700 34.121 7.671 26.147 7.908 0.721 0.018 0.353 0.224 0.024 
Turkey 2.100 36.750 8.108 18.613 5.019 0.103 0.738 0.481 0.660 0.109 
United Kingdom 1.900 87.656 9.298 17.970 1.859 0.000 1.000 0.949 1.000 0.000 
United States 1.600 90.600 9.759 18.273 4.112 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Uruguay 1.200 66.742 8.659 14.441 11.645 0.278 0.575 0.583 0.609 0.099 
Venezuela -0.800 32.871 8.914 21.941 18.929 0.012 0.859 0.776 0.910 0.041 
Zambia -2.000 17.133 7.186 17.828 37.770 0.574 0.185 0.372 0.391 0.088 




• Economic growth: The average growth of per capita GDP over the period 1965-
1998; unit: percent; source: World Bank (2000). 
• Enrollment rate: The average secondary school enrollment rate (gross) ver the 
period 1965-1998; unit: percent; source: World Bank (2000). 
• Log initial income: Natural logarithm of 1965 per capita GNP computed from the 
1998 purchasing power parity adjusted per capita GNP by dividing with 
(1+Economic Growth/100)33 and by taking natural logarithm; unit: index; source: 
World Bank (2000). 
• Investment ratio: The average gross domestic investment as percentage of GDP over 
the period 1965-1998; unit: percent; source: World Bank (2000). 
• Natural capital: Share of natural capital in total capital (natural, human, and 
physical capital) in 1994; unit: percent; source: World Bank (1997). 
• Autocracy: Average of the Polity IV variable AUTOC over the p riod 1965-1998 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the low st level of autocracy; unit: 
index; source Polity IV Project (2001). 
• Democracy: Average of the Polity IV variable DEMOC over the p riod 1965-1998 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the low st level of democracy; unit: 
index; source Polity IV Project (2001). 
• Civil liberties: Average of the Freedom House index of civil liberties over the period 
1973-1998 (for each country only the years with avail ble data were used) rescaled 
to the range between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of civil 
liberties; unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
• Political rights: Average of the Freedom House index of political rights over the 
period 1973-1998 (for each country only the years with available data were used) 
rescaled to the range between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level 
of political rights; unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
• Regime instability: maximum likelihood estimator of regime change probability 
over the period 1965-1998 computed with the use of the Polity IV variable 
DURABLE that gives for each year and each country the duration of actual regime 
in power; maximizes the likelihood function (1-x)t∗xn, where t denotes the total 
duration of all regimes that were in power over the period 1965-1998 and n denotes 















liberties Democracy Autocracy 
Regime 
instability 
Algeria -0.226 7.427 27.283 0.183 0.222 0.043 0.643 0.113 
Antigua and Barbuda 4.099 8.308 3.725 0.684 0.684    
Argentina 0.081 8.960 1.127 0.714 0.675 0.638 0.119 0.027 
Australia 1.935 9.683 5.912 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Austria 1.983 10.009 2.584 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Bahrain 0.139 9.288 95.073 0.206 0.294 0.000 0.962 0.000 
Bangladesh 2.558 5.417 0.811 0.595 0.468 0.286 0.290 0.083 
Barbados 1.169 8.818 0.112 1.000 0.984    
Belgium 1.900 9.966 8.936 1.000 0.968 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Belize 2.166 7.619 4.618 0.991 0.947    
Benin 0.670 5.893 1.332 0.365 0.381 0.300 0.350 0.077 
Bolivia -0.317 6.924 26.192 0.770 0.627 0.800 0.067 0.095 
Brazil 0.417 8.356 1.827 0.722 0.643 0.643 0.129 0.026 
Brunei -2.801 10.290 89.036 0.103 0.286    
Burkina Faso 1.486 5.197 2.147 0.230 0.373 0.000 0.581 0.048 
Cameroon -0.351 6.585 9.528 0.127 0.206 0.043 0.667 0.019 
Canada 1.658 9.713 8.303 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Central African Rep. -1.036 6.033 3.604 0.270 0.310 0.229 0.424 0.114 
Chad 1.069 5.171 8.448 0.103 0.183 0.033 0.487 0.381 
Chile 3.502 7.888 12.646 0.500 0.595 0.471 0.257 0.076 
China 8.321 5.116 3.004 0.079 0.103 0.000 0.700 0.000 
Colombia 1.013 7.532 1.367 0.738 0.579 0.790 0.000 0.000 
Comoros -0.686 6.214 0.745 0.373 0.413 0.210 0.380 0.180 
Congo Dem. Rep. -5.431 5.634 9.570 0.087 0.127 0.000 0.883 0.404 
Congo Rep. 0.152 6.643 42.605 0.159 0.286 0.150 0.585 0.116 
Costa Rica 1.195 8.038 0.929 1.000 0.944 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Cote D'Ivoire -1.719 6.952 9.020 0.190 0.373 0.025 0.745 0.072 
Cyprus 4.067 8.757 2.638 0.968 0.897 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Denmark 1.730 10.215 2.893 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Dominica 3.624 7.429 0.425 0.873 0.921    
Dominican Rep. 2.207 7.191 0.325 0.841 0.683 0.638 0.000 0.045 
Ecuador -0.409 7.344 12.664 0.825 0.730 0.862 0.000 0.048 
Egypt 2.577 6.595 9.861 0.294 0.317 0.043 0.471 0.020 
El Salvador 0.491 7.375 3.131 0.627 0.548 0.659 0.000 0.238 
Fiji 0.799 7.746 0.640 0.571 0.683 0.620 0.095 0.118 
Finland 2.223 9.933 5.862 0.937 0.921 1.000 0.000 0.000 
France 1.715 9.972 1.748 1.000 0.833 0.871 0.000 0.000 
Gabon -0.810 8.547 55.481 0.270 0.341 0.000 0.650 0.065 
Gambia -0.080 5.931 1.307 0.540 0.556 0.490 0.190 0.025 
Germany 1.694 10.059 1.951 1.000 0.841 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Ghana 0.239 5.976 7.469 0.349 0.405 0.132 0.400 0.238 
Greece 1.043 9.278 2.216 0.952 0.778 0.943 0.000 0.000 
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Grenada 4.081 7.445 0.460 0.738 0.706    
Guatemala -0.112 7.376 2.462 0.524 0.405 0.400 0.200 0.121 
Guinea-Bissau 0.903 5.166 2.072 0.302 0.254 0.137 0.526 0.179 
Guyana 0.669 6.707 23.232 0.532 0.571 0.257 0.400 0.095 
Haiti -2.479 6.409 0.398 0.175 0.254 0.239 0.506 0.345 
Honduras -0.158 6.598 3.048 0.730 0.667 0.589 0.000 0.143 
Hungary 1.239 8.343 4.965 0.587 0.603 0.560 0.300 0.106 
India 3.571 5.429 0.849 0.770 0.619 0.829 0.000 0.000 
Indonesia 3.570 6.221 21.080 0.230 0.294 0.076 0.633 0.024 
Iran 0.922 7.230 13.377 0.222 0.159 0.084 0.495 0.190 
Ireland 4.853 9.296 2.288 1.000 0.984 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Israel 1.953 9.358 1.531 0.889 0.786 0.910 0.000 0.000 
Italy 1.805 9.588 1.476 0.992 0.889 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jamaica 0.477 7.578 6.501 0.833 0.730 0.962 0.000 0.000 
Japan 2.321 10.250 0.280 0.976 0.929 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Jordan -0.569 7.504 5.201 0.365 0.365 0.100 0.648 0.015 
Kenya -0.134 5.821 5.539 0.214 0.278 0.038 0.576 0.031 
Korea 6.271 8.271 1.086 0.651 0.556 0.470 0.240 0.073 
Kuwait -0.609 9.661 48.308 0.310 0.389 0.000 0.810 0.115 
Liberia -7.054 6.716 47.382 0.206 0.246 0.086 0.543 0.339 
Madagascar -1.661 5.839 1.197 0.500 0.373 0.370 0.330 0.083 
Malawi 0.249 5.078 0.364 0.325 0.230 0.233 0.595 0.071 
Malaysia 3.750 7.739 28.392 0.524 0.405 0.471 0.100 0.000 
Mali -0.187 5.722 5.977 0.325 0.381 0.295 0.385 0.066 
Malta 4.047 8.447 0.469 0.937 0.833    
Mauritania 0.096 6.185 22.437 0.063 0.175 0.000 0.652 0.000 
Mauritius 4.366 7.465 0.080 0.897 0.794 0.990 0.000 0.000 
Mexico 0.744 8.096 9.779 0.579 0.532 0.276 0.210 0.229 
Morocco 1.040 7.016 5.955 0.429 0.381 0.000 0.743 0.000 
Mozambique 0.887 5.076 1.096 0.270 0.214 0.200 0.481 0.038 
Nepal 2.495 4.997 0.354 0.651 0.508 0.367 0.224 0.052 
Netherlands 1.972 9.958 13.813 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
New Zeland 1.273 9.542 6.630 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Nicaragua -2.340 6.507 4.142 0.444 0.452 0.420 0.135 0.190 
Niger -2.424 5.788 9.581 0.151 0.262 0.200 0.475 0.161 
Nigeria -1.066 5.750 33.864 0.310 0.413 0.200 0.455 0.143 
Norway 2.405 10.069 19.034 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Oman 2.639 8.163 21.590 0.167 0.175 0.000 0.952 0.000 
Pakistan 2.446 5.762 1.810 0.381 0.365 0.410 0.281 0.131 
Panama 0.965 7.904 1.211 0.508 0.579 0.490 0.267 0.023 
Papua New Guinea 0.428 6.773 18.860 0.833 0.706 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Paraguay -0.497 7.538 2.733 0.437 0.484 0.338 0.357 0.061 
Peru -0.459 7.851 10.962 0.603 0.556 0.545 0.095 0.190 
Philippines -0.092 7.067 3.026 0.627 0.579 0.560 0.210 0.201 
Portugal 2.874 8.899 2.588 0.976 0.905 0.990 0.000 0.000 
Rwanda -1.400 5.772 0.994 0.119 0.175 0.000 0.655 0.115 
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Samoa 0.482 7.133 0.304 0.675 0.754    
Saudi Arabia -2.652 9.355 60.264 0.079 0.056 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Senegal 0.495 6.313 6.890 0.540 0.516 0.229 0.290 0.045 
Seychelles 1.486 8.493 13.609 0.333 0.341    
Sierra Leone -4.017 5.850 4.283 0.278 0.294 0.029 0.659 0.223 
Singapore 4.867 9.306 49.831 0.437 0.357 0.200 0.400 0.000 
South Africa -0.693 8.438 4.146 0.508 0.421 0.774 0.179 0.103 
Spain 2.381 9.293 1.554 0.976 0.849 0.990 0.000 0.000 
Sri Lanka 3.480 6.120 6.153 0.643 0.468 0.600 0.086 0.000 
St. Kitts and Nevis 4.840 7.846 0.126 0.980 0.912    
St. Lucia 3.271 7.638 0.306 0.960 0.817    
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3.776 7.187 0.617 0.889 0.889    
Sudan 1.619 5.426 2.915 0.167 0.135 0.120 0.610 0.116 
Suriname 0.001 6.892 33.941 0.429 0.508    
Sweden 1.640 10.027 4.928 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Switzerland 0.806 10.593 1.238 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Syrian Arab Rep. 0.493 6.578 10.403 0.111 0.024 0.000 0.890 0.000 
Thailand 4.750 7.018 3.176 0.667 0.563 0.562 0.062 0.092 
Togo -1.825 6.145 14.329 0.127 0.238 0.042 0.532 0.114 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.719 8.437 35.913 0.976 0.889 0.900 0.000 0.000 
Tunisia 2.066 7.403 12.362 0.238 0.357 0.038 0.567 0.014 
Turkey 2.407 7.579 1.418 0.595 0.421 0.724 0.138 0.095 
United Arab Emirates -4.453 10.541 34.761 0.238 0.333 0.000 0.800 0.000 
United Kingdom 2.272 9.560 5.139 1.000 0.921 1.000 0.000 0.000 
United States 2.103 9.952 0.827 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Uruguay 0.800 8.557 3.279 0.746 0.706 0.743 0.167 0.024 
Venezuela -0.945 8.292 22.696 0.889 0.738 0.848 0.000 0.000 
Zambia -1.953 6.370 25.496 0.405 0.389 0.214 0.519 0.078 
Zimbabwe 0.080 6.414 5.192 0.389 0.349 0.143 0.448 0.051 
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Definitions: 
• Economic growth: The average growth of per capita GDP over the period 1980-
2000; unit: percent; source: World Bank (2003). 
• Primary exports: The average ratio of primary products exports to GDP over the 
years 1980-1985 (Primary products exports comprise ores and metals, fuel, and 
agricultural raw materials exports.); unit: percent; source: World Bank (2003). 
• Log initial income: Natural logarithm of 1980 per capita GDP in consta t 1995 U.S. 
dollars; unit: index; source: World Bank (2003). 
• Autocracy: Average of the Polity IV variable AUTOC over the p riod 1980-2000 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the low st level of autocracy; unit: 
index; source Polity IV Project (2001). 
• Democracy: Average of the Polity IV variable DEMOC over the p riod 1980-2000 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the low st level of democracy; unit: 
index; source Polity IV Project (2001). 
• Civil liberties: Average of the Freedom House index of civil liberties over the period 
1980-2000 (for each country only the years with avail ble data were used) rescaled 
to the range between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of civil 
liberties; unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
• Political rights: Average of the Freedom House index of political rights over the 
period 1980-2000 (for each country only the years with available data were used) 
rescaled to the range between 0 and 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level 
of political rights; unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
• Regime instability: maximum likelihood estimator of regime change probability 
over the period 1980-2000 computed with the use of the Polity IV variable 
DURABLE that gives for each year and each country the duration of actual regime 
in power; maximizes the likelihood function (1-x)t∗xn, where t denotes the total 
duration of all regimes that were in power over the period 1980-2000 and n denotes 
the number of regime changes over this period; unit: index; source Polity IV Project 
(2001). 
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The curse of natural resources detected in numerous cr s -country growth regressions is 
questioned. Although natural resource dependence is associated with slow economic 
growth, there is no evidence that natural resource abundance per se is negatively related 
to growth. Thus, the supposed link between resource dep ndence and growth arises not 
from the numerator of the dependence measures (i.e. resources themselves) but rather, 
because of the inherent relationship between slow growth and a small non-resource 
sector caused by other undetermined characteristics of the economy. 
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4.1  Introduction 
 
     Economists have long believed that natural resources (NR) constitute a fundamental 
requirement for economic development, but recently, i  has become conventional 
wisdom that NR are also a curse to development. Twodiverse departure points provide 
empirical evidence: one relies on case studies (e.g., Gelb, 1998); the other uses cross-
country growth regressions (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995b, 1997, and 2001, or 
Gylfason, 2001a, 2001b, and Gylfason and Zoega, 2002). I question the causality nature 
of the curse relationship arguing that the link between high NR dependence and slow 
economic growth results from increases in measured dependence caused by a small non-
resource sector in slow growing economies. 
     Figure 1 shows the relationship between economic growth and NR dependence as it 
is presented in the literature. It plots the averag per capita GDP growth over the period 
1965-1998 for 85 countries as a function of the 1994 share of natural capital in total 
capital (as used by Gylfason, 2001a,b and Gylfason and Zoega, 2002) and the average 
growth of per capita GDP over the period 1970-1990 for 86 countries as a function of 
the share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970 (as used by Sachs and Warner, 
1997 and also Sachs and Warner, 1995a and 2001). In both cases a surprisingly strong 
negative relationship between growth and NR dependence is apparent. If the measure of 
NR dependence is increased by one standard deviation, the average per capita growth 
decreases by 1.0 per cent in the first sample and by almost 0.85 per cent in the second 
sample. This is a serious issue, with growth averaging 1.36 per cent and 1.21 per cent, 
respectively in the two samples. 
     The existing literature offers several possible explanations for the curse rather than a 
general theory.23 Sachs and Warner (2001) point out that most of the explanations are 
based on a logic where NR crowd out a growth-inducing activity such as the tradable 
                                                
23 The issue of cross-country growth differences is so complex that we can hardly expect any general 
economic theory to fully explain it. This is also the reason why cross-country growth regressions can 
provide useful insights, in spite of the problems, e.g. sensitivity to sample coverage, time period, 
specification, and the data sources used to compute right-hand side variables and growth rates. Also, 
without a generally accepted growth theory, the growth regressions typically suffer from unclear causality 
links and related troubles with possible endogeneity of explanatory variables. Finally, the data are often 
very noisy and unreliable. 
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manufacturing sector and physical capital ("Dutch disease"), human capital, or 
institutional capital. Most plausible explanations al o stress the role of institutions. In 
order to inhibit economic growth, NR must be combined with bad government policies 
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Figure 1: Economic growth and NR dependence in the Natural Capital Sample and 
Primary Exports Sample. 
Note: Triangles represent the most NR dependent countries, which are the Central African Republic, 
Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Zambia in the Natural Capital Sample 
and the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Uganda, and Zambia in the Primary Exports Sample. 
Source: Gylfason (2001a,b) or Gylfason and Zoega (2002) for the Natural Capital Sample and Sachs and 
Warner (1997) for the Primary Exports Sample. 
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     When estimating resource curse cross-country growth regressions, most authors use 
variables that measure NR dependence or intensity rather than abundance or wealth. By 
replicating the regressions with the data samples us d originally by Sachs and Warner 
and by Gylfason and Gylfason with Zoega, I confirm the robustness of the negative 
association between growth and NR dependence. However, I challenge the prevailing 
interpretation of this result. When I substitute per capita NR wealth, the results change 
substantially. In order to address the oft-stressed role of institutions, I also control for 
four different indices of the quality of democracy.      
     The results presented here do not provide any evidence that NR themselves are 
associated with slow economic growth. Apparently, the resource curse regressions 
capture a different statistical relationship between the structure of the economy and 
economic growth: the relatively small size of the non-resource sector leads to a high 
measure of NR dependence, and is associated with slow economic growth.  
      Therefore, a question of causality and particularly of a subtle “developmental bias” 
mentioned by Sachs and Warner (1995b, 1997, and 2001) becomes relevant. Is the 
small size of the non-resource sector measured by NR dependence a cause of slow 
growth, or is it only a result of slow growth? In other words, permanently slow-growing 
countries would, after a while, appear as NR dependent countries compared to 
permanently fast-growing countries. NR dependence measured at any time within the 






     Data used in this paper, detailed definitions f all variables, and basic statistics and 
correlations are in Appendix A. The first data sample, which I will henceforth refer to as 
the Natural Capital Sample, includes 85 countries and contains average economic 
indicators and indicators of the quality of democracy over the period 1965-1998.24 The 
                                                
24 The core variables of the Natural Capital sample were kindly provided by Thorvaldur Gylfason, who 
previously used them in his research; see Gylfason (2001a,b) and Gylfason and Zoega (2002). The data 
are also available in Gylfason and Zoega (2002). Themain original source of the data is the World 
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second sample, henceforth the Primary Exports Sample, covers 86 countries and the 
period 1970-1990.25 
     The core variables of the Natural Capital Sample include the average annual growth 
of real per capita GDP over the period 1965-1998 (economic growth), the indicator of 
NR dependence measured by the share of natural capital in total capital (natural, human, 
and physical capital) in 1994 (natural capital share), natural logarithm of 1965 per 
capita GNP (log initial income), the average gross domestic investment as percentag  of 
GDP over the period 1965-1998 (investment ratio), and the average secondary school 
enrollment rate computed over the same period (enrollment rate). 
     The core variables of the Primary Exports Sample include the average annual growth 
of real GDP divided by the economically active population over the period 1970-1990 
(economic growth), the indicator of NR dependence measured by the share of exports of 
primary products in GNP in 1970 (primary exports share), natural logarithm of real 
GDP divided by the economically active population in 1970 (log initial income), the 
fraction of years during the period 1970-1990 in which the country is rated as an open 
economy as defined in Sachs and Warner (1995b) (openness), and the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP, averaged over the period 
1970-1989 (log investment ratio). 
     Additionally, I construct the measures of NR abundance in both samples. These are 
defined as the per capita exports of primary products in 1970 (primary exports per 
capita) in the Primary Exports Sample and as per capita value of natural capital in 1994 
(natural capital per capita) in the Natural Capital Sample. These variables ar described 
in the following section. 
                                                                                                                                    
Development Indicators 2000 CD. Only the estimates of natural capital are taken from World Bank 
(1997).  
25 The core variables of the Primary Exports Sample are tak n from the dataset used in Sachs and Warner 
(1997). The data are available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/. Sachs and Warner also used them with 
minor modifications in their subsequent papers (1995a and 2001). The main original source of the data 
are Penn World Tables, mark 5.6. Only primary exports share and log initial income are computed with 
the use of the World Bank World Data 1995 CD. With some variables and for some particular country 
observations, Sachs and Warner use additional data sources and eventually also different years of 
measurement than those given in the basic definitions. For a detailed description and definitions of all 
variables see Appendix A of this paper and the description of variables in Sachs and Warner (1997). 
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     Both samples are further extended by measures of the quality of democracy 
(autocracy, democracy, civil liberties, and political rights) taken from two distinct 
sources. The indices of autocracy and democracy are from the Polity IV 2001 data set.26 
These indices correspond to the variables AUTOC and DEMOC in the original data set. 
They sort countries into eleven groups for each year. The 0 value corresponds to the 
lowest level of autocracy and democracy, respectively. The value 10 indicates the 
toughest autocratic regime for the autocracy index, and the highest level of democracy 
for the democracy index. In this paper the indices are divided by 10, which transform 
them into a range between 0 and 1. In both samples, democracy and autocracy indices 
stand for averages of the individual yearly values over the respective time periods. 
Some yearly observations are missing for a few countries, in which case only the 
available observations are used. 
     The indices of civil liberties and political rights come from the Freedom House 
country ratings.27 Every year Freedom House ranks countries into seven categories with 
“one” corresponding to the highest and “seven” to the lowest level of civil liberties or 
political rights. For the purposes of this paper, both indices are converted to a scale from 
0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to the lowest and 1 to the highest level. Since the Freedom 
House indices are only available starting in 1973, for the Natural Capital Sample, which 
runs from 1965 to 1998, I take for each country the av rage of available observations 
from 1973 to 1998. In the Primary Exports Sample, which runs from 1970 to 1990, I use 
the average of available observations over the period 1973-1990. 
     Not surprisingly, the four measures of the quality of democracy are highly correlated 
in both samples. The two indices that differ the most are autocracy and civil liberties, 
but their correlation coefficient is still very hig (-0.88 in the Natural Capital Sample 
and -0.90 in the Primary Exports Sample.) 
 
 
                                                
26 A detailed methodology used to assign these indices is described in Polity IV Project (2001) and 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
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Table 1: Correlations of selected variables between th  Natural Capital Sample and 
Primary Exports Sample. 










Economic growth 0.88    
Primary exports share  0.38 -0.01  
Primary exports p. cap.  -0.19 0.59  
Log initial income    0.93 
Note: Only 74 overlapping country observations can be used in both samples. 
 
 
     With both samples, I employ the same set of countries as Gylfason, and Sachs and 
Warner, except for excluding Hong Kong from the Primary Exports Sample, because 
measures of the quality of democracy are not available. This exclusion changes the 
results only negligibly. In addition, primary exports per capita are missing from 
Primary Exports Sample for Germany, Iran, and Taiwan. When comparing the results of 
different regressions in the Primary Exports Sample or across the two samples, various 
country observations can be missing. Therefore, I always refer also to results using only 
identical country observations. This issue is important given that numerous cross-
country growth regressions have been found to be sensitive to sample coverage (e.g., 
Levine and Renelt, 1992). Surprisingly, many researchers who study the curse of natural 
resources neglect this issue and compare regressions’ results that employ samples of 
notably different coverage (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1997). 
     In addition to the sample coverage, results of cr ss-country growth regressions can 
be sensitive to time period, specification, and the data source used to compute both 
right-hand-side variables and growth rates (see, for example, Hanousek et al., 2004). 
Thus, many potentially important differences exist be ween the two samples employed 
here. Nevertheless, the major difference between th Natural Capital and Primary 
Exports Samples seems to rest in the use of different measures of NR dependence and 
abundance. Table 1 shows correlations of selected corresponding economic variables 
between the two samples when reduced to 74 overlapping countries. The lowest are the 
correlations between atural capital per capita and primary exports per capita, which is 
                                                                                                                                    
27 For a detailed description of the methodology used to assign each index, see Freedom House (2002). 
Freedom House indices are quite popular in empirical e onomic research and were previously used, for 
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only 0.59, and between atural capital share and primary exports share, which is only 
0.38. In spite of this, the nature of all major results presented below is almost the same, 
independent of which sample is used. 
 
 
4.3 Measures of NR Dependence and Abundance 
 
     When studying the resource curse most authors28 use the share of primary product 
exports or mineral production in either GNP or total exports in order to measure the 
effect of NR. Typically, this variable is computed for the initial year of the period over 
which growth rates are computed. To my knowledge, Gylfason (2001a,b) and Gylfason 
and Zoega (2002) are the only researchers who use the share of natural capital in total 
capital. This measure is taken from a World Bank (1997) study that attempts to estimate 
the value of natural capital for 92 countries. The value of natural capital comprises the 
value of pastureland, cropland, timber resources, non-timber forest resources, protected 
areas, and subsoil assets. Since 1994 is the only year for which this estimate is 
available, it is impossible to employ the share of natural capital in total capital in the 
sample’s initial year, 1965. 
     Both measures, indicate NR dependence rather than abundance, because they are 
expressed as ratios of NR abundance to the total performance of the economy. To 
investigate if natural resources are really associated with slow growth, I focus on truely 
exogenous NR abundance, in each of the two samples. Th  resulting pairs of variables 
estimating NR dependence versus abundance are natural capital share versus natural 
capital per capita in the Natural Capital Sample and primary exports share versus 
primary exports per capita in the Primary Exports Sample.  
     Natural capital per capita is taken directly from World Bank (1997) and includes the 
per capita value of pastureland, cropland, timber resources, non-timber forest resources, 
and subsoil assets in 1994. The estimated value of protected areas is excluded, because 
protected areas in part represent an achievement of developed industrial countries and, 
                                                                                                                                    
example, by Helliwell (1992), Barro (1999), or Easterly (2001). 
28 E.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995b, 1997, and 2001, Mehlum et al. (2002), or Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004). 
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as such, do not approximate exogenous natural wealth properly.29 To make the 
coefficient estimates directly comparable to earlier work, natural capital per capita is 
further multiplied by an appropriate constant so that the sample maximum of natural 
capital per capita equals the sample maximum of natural capital share. 
     Primary exports per capita re computed by multiplying primary exports share by 
the 1970 per capita GNP measured in constant 1995 U.S dollars as reported by the 
World Bank (2000).30 Primary exports per capita re also multiplied by a constant such 
that the maxima of primary exports per capita nd primary exports share are equal. 
 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 
4.4.1 NR Dependence and Economic Growth 
 
     First, I replicate earlier work by using NR dependence in cross-country growth 
regressions. I also investigate whether the estimates of resource effects remain negative 
and significant when controlling for the four democracy indicators. 
    Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of the curse in the Natural Capital Sample. For 
comparison purposes, I reestimate two regressions pre ented in Gylfason (2001), 
regressing economic growth on natural capital share, log initial income, investment 
ratio, and enrollment rate, and the same regression excluding the enrollment rate. 
Additionally, I also include regression of economic growth on natural capital share and 
log initial income and the simplest regression of economic growth on natural capital 
share alone. The coefficient estimates in the first two equations are very close to those 
reported in Gylfason (2001).31 The coefficient for natural capital share is significant 
and negative in all four estimated equations. It remains almost unchanged when four 
different measures of the quality of democracy are included. These results are in line 
                                                
29 The results presented in this paper do not change when the value of protected areas is included. The 
results also remain nearly the same if only the per capita value of subsoil assets is taken into account. 
30 In some cases Sachs and Warner use years other than 1970 to compute the variable named primary 
exports share here. I follow these exceptions and use the same years for GNP per capita when 
transforming primary exports share to primary exports per capita. 
31 A negligible difference is present due to the fact that Gylfason estimated the equations in a seemingly 
unrelated regressions system. 
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with the reported robustness of the curse of natural resources. The four different indices 
of the quality of democracy appear significant in most of the estimated equations, with 
the expected sign supporting the idea that democracy and growth are correlated. Of 





Table 2: OLS estimates of the natural resource curse for the Natural Capital Sample 
using the share of natural capital in total capital the measure of NR dependence. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 85 
 Natural  Log initial Investment Enrollment   
Constant capital share income ratio rate X R² 
10.1(5.79) -0.07(4.60) -1.54(7.05) 0.10(3.43) 0.05(5.36)  0.67 
a3.51(2.45) -0.08(5.30) -0.60(3.97) 0.18(5.92)   0.55 
7.29(4.77) -0.12(6.74) -0.58(3.20)    0.36 
2.47(9.29) -0.09(5.63)     0.28 
X = Autocracy 
12.5(7.01) -0.06(4.66) -1.73(8.13) 0.10(3.57) 0.04(4.89) -1.98(3.43) 0.71 
7.59(4.55) -0.08(5.26) -0.99(5.83) 0.16(5.84)  -2.56(3.99) 0.63 
11.8(6.61) -0.11(6.52) -1.05(5.20)   -3.07(4.07) 0.47 
2.62(8.87) -0.09(4.66)    c-0.82(1.16) 0.29 
X = Democracy 
11.5(6.69) -0.07(4.85) -1.74(8.03) 0.10(3.42) 0.04(4.40) 1.56(3.15) 0.71 
7.14(4.59) -0.08(5.49) -1.14(6.11) 0.14(5.37)  2.24(4.28) 0.63 
11.2(7.13) -0.11(6.68) -1.27(5.95)   2.88(4.88) 0.50 
2.12(4.88) -0.09(4.64)    c0.54(1.03) 0.29 
X = Civil liberties 
11.9(6.92) -0.06(4.85) -1.88(8.27) 0.09(3.33) 0.04(4.33) 2.72(3.46) 0.71 
7.78(4.91) -0.08(5.45) -1.34(6.38) 0.14(5.18)  3.79(4.60) 0.65 
11.9(7.56) -0.10(6.58) -1.54(6.49)   4.91(5.38) 0.53 
2.16(3.73) -0.09(4.68)    c0.44(0.60) 0.28 
X = Political rights 
11.8(7.06) -0.06(4.67) -1.85(8.52) 0.09(3.20) 0.04(4.60) 2.38(3.86) 0.72 
7.26(4.82) -0.08(5.22) -1.23(6.46) 0.14(5.12)  3.11(4.69) 0.65 
11.2(7.51) -0.10(6.25) -1.40(6.51)   4.04(5.52) 0.53 
1.93(3.54) -0.08(4.39)    c0.72(1.13) 0.29 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 








Table 3: OLS estimates of the natural resource curse for the Primary Exports Sample 
using the share of exports of primary products in GNP as the measure of NR 
dependence. Dependent variable is conomic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 86 
 Primary  Log initial  Log investment   
Constant exports share income Openness ratio X R² 
8.94(7.05) -0.07(5.55) -1.34(7.89) 2.34(6.90) 1.26(5.79)  0.68 
8.78(5.85) -0.07(4.48) -0.95(5.16) 2.99(7.89)   0.55 
b3.35(1.91) -0.09(4.63) c-0.13(0.64)    0.21 
2.24(8.01) -0.09(4.67)     0.21 
X = Autocracy 
8.93(5.51) -0.07(5.51) -1.33(6.78) 2.34(6.67) 1.26(5.75) c0.005(0.01) 0.68 
8.43(4.41) -0.07(4.44) -0.92(4.24) 3.01(7.70)  c0.17(0.29) 0.55 
5.31(2.17) -0.09(4.62) c-0.33(1.24)   c-0.84(1.15) 0.22 
2.31(7.22) -0.09(4.45)    c-0.25(0.45) 0.21 
X = Democracy 
9.03(5.74) -0.07(5.48) -1.35(6.40) 2.33(6.53) 1.25(5.75) c0.04(0.10) 0.68 
9.06(4.87) -0.07(4.45) -0.99(4.15) 2.95(7.36)  c0.14(0.26) 0.55 
6.76(2.88) -0.09(4.85) a-0.60(2.03)   a1.35(2.12) 0.25 
2.04(5.65) -0.08(4.41)    c0.38(0.89) 0.21 
X = Civil liberties 
9.17(5.97) -0.07(5.51) -1.37(6.21) 2.31(6.39) 1.26(5.77) c0.18(0.27) 0.68 
8.74(4.82) -0.07(4.43) -0.94(3.82) 2.99(7.41)  c-0.03(0.03) 0.55 
6.36(2.77) -0.09(4.77) b-0.61(1.94)   b1.84(1.98) 0.25 
1.97(4.22) -0.08(4.39)    c0.44(0.73) 0.21 
X = Political rights 
9.63(6.15) -0.07(5.57) -1.44(6.55) 2.27(6.45) 1.25(5.75) c0.44(0.76) 0.68 
9.61(5.20) -0.07(4.51) -1.08(4.32) 2.90(7.33)  c0.53(0.77) 0.55 
6.99(3.00) -0.09(4.77) a-0.69(2.21)   a1.93(2.31) 0.26 
1.93(4.34) -0.08(4.33)    c0.48(0.91) 0.21 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 1% significance level. Exceptions: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
 
 
     In Table 3, I present the results of the OLS estimates for the Primary Exports 
Sample, replicating the three basic regressions in Sachs and Warner (1995a and 1997). I 
also include the simplest regression of economic growth on primary exports share. The 
coefficient estimates in the first three equations are very close to those reported in Sachs 
and Warner (1995a and 1997).32 The robustness of the resource curse result is again 
confirmed. The coefficient for primary exports share is significant and negative in all 
four estimated equations and it survives, with only minor changes, the inclusion of the 
four different measures of the quality of democracy. The coefficient estimates for the 
                                                
32 A negligible difference is present due to the fact that, unlike Sachs and Warner, I exclude Hong Kong 
from the sample. 
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indices of the quality of democracy have the expected signs, supporting the idea that 
democracy is associated with economic growth. However, unlike the results in the 
Natural Capital Sample, the autocracy index is insignificant in all four equations, while 
the indices of democracy, civil liberties, and political rights are significant only at the 5 
per cent or 10 per cent level and only in the regression of economic growth on primary 
exports share and log initial income. These differences can be partly explained by the 
inclusion of a measure of openness in the Primary Exports Sample. Openness can be 
also interpreted as a measure of the institutional e vironment. 
 
 
4.4.2 NR Abundance and Economic Growth 
 
     To see the effect of pure NR wealth on growth, I estimate regressions identical to 
those in the previous section, but replace natural capital share in the Natural Capital 
Sample with natural capital per capita, and primary exports share in the Primary 
Exports Sample with primary exports per capita. That is, measures of NR dependence 
are replaced by measures of NR abundance. Simple corr lations suggest that we can 
expect radically different results. Natural capital per capita with natural capital share 
and primary exports per capita with primary exports share are almost uncorrelated. 
(The correlation coefficients are only 0.12 and 0.03 respectively.) Also, in contrast to 
the strong negative correlation of natural capital share and primary exports share with 
economic growth, very low positive correlations are detected betwen economic growth 
and natural capital per capita or primary exports per capita. (Both correlation 
coefficients are only 0.05.) 
     Regression results using the Natural Capital Sample are reported in Table 4, results 
for the Primary Exports Sample in Table 5.33 The coefficient for natural capital per 
capita and primary exports per capita is close to zero and insignificant in all the 
estimated equations. To further confirm this result, I reduce both samples to the 74 
overlapping country-observations and estimate the four basic equations in each sample 
by using different measures of NR dependence and abundance. The results presented in 
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Tables 6 and 7 are clear. While natural capital share and primary exports share are 
significantly negatively related to growth in all equations, natural capital per capita and 
primary exports per capita re insignificant, with coefficient values close to zero in all 




Table 4: OLS estimates of the natural resource curse for the Natural Capital Sample 
using natural capital per capita as the measure of NR abundance. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 85 
 Natural  Log initial Investment Enrollment   
Constant capital p. cap. income ratio rate X R² 
8.10(4.19) c-0.00(0.06) -1.50(5.97) 0.13(3.89) 0.06(5.98)  0.58 
c-1.10(0.78) c0.01(0.25) c-0.30(1.64) 0.23(7.24)   0.40 
c1.99(1.17) c0.02(0.62) c-0.10(0.43)    0.00 
1.27(4.39) c0.01(0.47)     0.00 
X = Autocracy 
10.67(5.40) c-0.01(0.35) -1.69(6.93) 0.12(4.01) 0.05(5.45) -2.17(3.33) 0.63 
a3.90(2.17) c-0.00(0.11) -0.75(3.73) 0.21(7.01)  -2.96(3.99) 0.50 
8.20(3.86) c0.00(0.21) -0.72(2.86)   -3.92(4.25) 0.19 
2.24(5.32) c-0.02(0.70)    -2.39(3.05) 0.10 
X = Democracy 
9.35(4.90) c-0.01(0.38) -1.69(6.73) 0.12(3.88) 0.05(5.03) 1.58(2.78) 0.62 
b3.00(1.83) c-0.00(0.24) -0.87(3.99) 0.20(6.54)  2.48(4.03) 0.50 
7.22(3.90) c-0.00(0.01) -0.96(3.58)   3.55(4.85) 0.23 
a0.68(2.06) c-0.02(0.88)    1.81(3.09) 0.11 
X = Civil liberties 
9.78(5.13) c-0.01(0.61) -1.83(7.04) 0.12(3.80) 0.05(4.95) 2.87(3.17) 0.63 
a3.80(2.27) c-0.01(0.54) -1.10(4.52) 0.19(6.30)  4.32(4.42) 0.51 
8.22(4.44) c-0.01(0.38) -1.31(4.44)   6.19(5.48) 0.28 
c0.21(0.47) c-0.02(0.98)    2.43(2.94) 0.10 
X = Political rights 
9.97(5.37) c-0.01(0.42) -1.83(7.35) 0.11(3.63) 0.05(5.13) 2.62(3.77) 0.65 
a3.67(2.30) c-0.00(0.23) -1.03(4.63) 0.19(6.12)  3.63(4.74) 0.53 
7.89(4.54) c-0.00(0.03) -1.21(4.53)   5.17(5.94) 0.31 
c0.20(0.49) c-0.02(1.05)    2.41(3.49) 0.13 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 







                                                                                                                                    
33 The sample 1970-1990 is reduced to 83 observations becaus  the data on Primary exports per capita are 
missing for Germany, Iran, and Taiwan. 
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Table 5: OLS estimates of the natural resource curse for the Primary Exports Sample 
using exports of primary products per capita as the measure of NR abundance. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 83 
 Primary Log initial  Log investment   
Constant exports p. cap. income Openness ratio X R² 
5.27(3.16) c-0.02(1.18) -0.97(4.27) 2.53(6.33) 1.20(4.82)  0.55 
5.27(2.80) c-0.02(1.00) a-0.62(2.53) 3.13(7.31)   0.41 
c-0.59(0.27) c-0.00(0.16) c0.22(0.79)    0.01 
1.13(5.00) c0.01(0.48)     0.00 
X = Autocracy 
a5.15(2.52) c-0.02(1.16) -0.96(3.76) 2.54(6.18) 1.20(4.78) c0.06(0.10) 0.55 
a4.96(2.15) c-0.02(0.96) a-0.59(2.13) 3.15(7.16)  c0.16(0.24) 0.41 
c1.23(0.43) c-0.01(0.25) c0.03(0.10)   c-0.82(0.98) 0.02 
1.53(3.90) c-0.00(0.23)    c-0.86(1.26) 0.02 
X = Democracy 
5.07(2.65) c-0.02(1.11) -0.94(3.61) 2.55(6.15) 1.20(4.79) c-0.12(0.21) 0.55 
a5.40(2.49) c-0.02(0.99) a-0.63(2.21) 3.12(6.94)  c0.07(0.12) 0.41 
c2.07(0.77) c-0.01(0.54) c-0.16(0.46)   b1.28(1.71) 0.05 
0.84(3.12) c-0.02(0.76)    b1.06(1.84) 0.04 
X = Civil liberties 
5.14(2.71) c-0.02(1.12) -0.95(3.44) 2.54(6.08) 1.20(4.78) c-0.12(0.15) 0.55 
a5.03(2.34) c-0.02(0.92) b-0.57(1.92) 3.17(7.04)  c-0.22(0.25) 0.41 
c1.58(0.60) c-0.01(0.48) c-0.14(0.38)   c1.58(1.44) 0.04 
c0.58(1.42) c-0.01(0.63)    c1.30(1.60) 0.03 
X = Political rights 
5.81(2.97) c-0.02(1.23) -1.06(3.80) 2.48(6.02) 1.19(4.76) c0.38(0.54) 0.55 
6.09(2.76) c-0.02(1.07) a-0.75(2.45) 3.05(6.87)  c0.57(0.72) 0.41 
c2.72(1.00) c-0.01(0.44) c-0.30(0.81)   a1.94(2.01) 0.06 
c0.54(1.50) c-0.02(0.81)    a1.40(2.01) 0.05 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parenthsis. All the estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 1% significance level. Exceptions: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
 
 
In short, while NR dependence, measured either by natural capital share or primary 
exports share, is clearly associated with slower economic growth, no relationship exists 
between economic growth and NR abundance per se, whther measured by natural 
capital per capita or by primary exports per capita. The insignificant coefficient for 
natural capital per capita becomes positive and significant at the 1 per centlevel if both 
natural capital share and natural capital per capita are included in all the estimated 
equations in the Natural Capital Sample (A result already noted by Gylfason and Zoega, 
2002). At the same time, the estimated coefficients for other variables remain almost 
untouched by this specification change and their values remain very close to those 
reported in Table 2, except for the coefficient for natural capital share, which increases 
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even more in absolute value.34 Thus, for a given level of NR dependence, an increase in 
NR abundance is associated with an increase in economic growth. Surprisingly, this 
result was not detected in the Primary Exports Sample. If both primary exports share 
and primary exports per capita re included in all the estimated equations, the estimated 
coefficients for all variables remain almost the same as those reported in Table 3 and the 




Table 6: OLS estimates of the natural resource curse for the Natural Capital Sample 
using several measures of NR dependence/abundance. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 74 
  Log initial Investment Enrollment  
Constant X income ratio rate R² 
X = Natural capital share 
9.96(5.37) -0.07(4.17) -1.47(6.66) a0.08(2.47) 0.05(5.34) 0.65 
b3.11(1.97) -0.09(4.27) -0.53(3.37) 0.17(4.87)  0.51 
6.92(4.39) -0.13(6.10) -0.52(2.85)   0.34 
2.50(9.01) -0.10(5.14)    0.27 
X = Natural capital per capita 
7.12(3.66) c0.00(0.00) -1.35(5.40) 0.12(3.46) 0.05(5.38) 0.57 
c-1.10(0.77) c0.01(0.49) c-0.29(1.61) 0.23(6.56)  0.38 
c1.77(1.03) c0.01(0.57) c-0.06(0.27)   0.00 
1.31(4.63) c0.01(0.51)    0.00 
X = Primary exports share 
6.75(3.71) -0.05(2.97) -1.19(5.00) 0.13(3.82) 0.04(4.29) 0.62 
c0.63(0.50) -0.07(4.33) a-0.33(2.30) 0.21(6.50)  0.51 
a3.55(2.38) -0.09(4.44) c-0.14(0.76)   0.22 
2.44(8.14) -0.09(4.39)    0.21 
X = Primary exports per capita 
6.67(3.45) c-0.02(1.37) -1.28(5.18) 0.12(3.28) 0.06(5.63) 0.58 
c-0.97(0.59) c0.01(0.39) c-0.31(1.45) 0.23(6.55)  0.38 
c2.14(1.07) c0.01(0.61) c-0.11(0.40)   0.01 
1.34(5.30) c0.01(0.47)    0.00 
Notes: Only those country observations are used for which all the three measures of natural-resource 
abundance are available. As a result, 74 out of the total 86 observations are employed. Absolute values of 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the estimated coeffici nts are significant at the 1% significance level. 






                                                
34 To save space the results are not reported here. 
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Table 7: OLS estimates of the natural resource curse for the Primary Exports Sample 
using several measures of NR dependence/abundance. 
Dependent variable is economic growth. 
OLS method; Obs. 74 
  Log initial  Log investment  
Constant X income Openness ratio R² 
X = Primary exports share 
8.77(6.88) -0.06(5.09) -1.29(7.62) 2.36(6.60) 1.13(5.10) 0.68 
8.88(5.98) -0.06(3.94) -0.98(5.33) 2.99(7.64)  0.56 
b3.06(1.78) -0.08(4.07) c-0.12(0.62)   0.19 
2.01(7.17) -0.08(4.06)    0.19 
X = Primary exports per capita 
6.71(3.99) c-0.01(0.73) -1.11(4.93) 2.77(6.75) 1.02(3.97) 0.56 
7.12(3.86) c-0.01(0.47) -0.86(3.62) 3.30(7.74)  0.46 
c0.75(0.33) c0.01(0.25) c0.04(0.14)   0.00 
1.06(4.54) c0.01(0.46)    0.00 
X = Natural capital share 
9.25(6.14) -0.05(3.04) -1.27(6.78) 2.52(6.44) 0.77(3.04) 0.61 
10.0(6.36) -0.07(3.95) -1.11(5.84) 2.83(7.05)  0.56 
5.59(2.98) -0.10(4.80) b-0.41(1.93)   0.25 
2.00(7.51) -0.08(4.33)    0.21 
X = Natural capital per capita 
7.83(4.79) c0.01(0.68) -1.26(5.68) 2.79(6.73) 0.99(3.84) 0.56 
8.37(4.70) c0.02(1.01) -1.04(4.44) 3.34(7.84)  0.47 
c0.31(0.16) c-0.00(0.10) c0.10(0.40)   0.00 
1.10(4.19) c0.00(0.13)    0.00 
Notes: Only those country observations are used for which all the three measures of natural-resource 
abundance are available. As a result, 74 out of the total 86 observations are employed. Absolute values of 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the estimated coeffici nts are significant at the 1% significance level. 
Exceptions: a significant at 5%; b significant at 10%; c insignificant at 10%. 
 
 
     To summarize, I have so far shown that in the cross-country growth regressions, 
natural resources themselves do not prove to be a thre t to economic growth. Only NR 
dependence is associated with slow growth. Additionally, the correlation between the 
measures of NR abundance and dependence is very low in both data samples. It is the 
structure of the economy, namely the relatively small size of the non-resource sector, 
that results in increased NR dependence and is associ ted with slow economic growth. 
Therefore, it seems that cross-country growth regressions were previously 
misinterpreted when used as evidence for the curse of natural resources. Instead, NR 
dependence, indeed, serves as a proxy for a more fundamental structural problem that 
causes slow economic growth. 
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4.4.3 The Link between NR Effects and Institutional Development 
 
     Many authors, including Auty, Gelb, Gylfason, a d Sachs and Warner, stress the role 
of policies and institutions in the curse of natural resources. Robinson, et al. (2002) and 
Mehlum, et al. (2002) develop models combining political incentives with NR 
endowments to generate the curse result. Mehlum even shows statistical evidence of the 
interaction between institutions and NR dependence in cross-country growth 
regressions. As seen above, when we include various democracy indicators to measure 
the effect of the institutional environment, the negative relationship between NR 
dependence and economic growth remains unchanged. To further address the supposed 
interaction between institutions and NR dependence, I sort the countries in each sample 
into quartiles using the democracy indicators, and estimate the basic regressions of 
economic growth on the log initial income and the appropriate measure of NR 
dependence. 
     In Figure 2, I plot the index of civil liberties against natural capital share in the 
Natural Capital Sample, and against primary exports share in the Primary Exports 
Sample.35 It shows a relatively homogeneous distribution of natural capital dependence 
in both samples for different levels of civil liberties, with one exception. All eight of the 
most NR dependent countries in the Natural Capital Sample and four out of the six most 
NR dependent countries in the Primary Exports Sample have a very low level of civil 
liberties. Therefore, when I sort the countries according to quartiles, almost all the 
extremely NR dependent countries fall in the first quartile. This might bias down the 
coefficient estimate for NR dependence in this quartile, particularly if non-linearity in 
the relationship between economic growth and NR dependence is present. Indeed, when 
regressing economic growth on log initial income, natural capital share, and natural 
capital share squared in the Natural Capital Sample, the coefficint for natural capital 
share squared is significant at the 10 per cent level. Once the eight extremely NR 
dependent countries are excluded from the sample, th  coefficient becomes 
insignificant. With the Primary Exports Sample, the coefficient for primary exports 
                                                
35 To save space only the index of civil liberties is chosen as an example; the distribution would be very 
similar if the indices of political rights, democracy, or autocracy were selected. 
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share squared is insignificant. Once the six extremely NRdependent countries are 
excluded, however, the t-statistic drops from 1.38 to 0.18. This result indicates the 
presence of a non-linearity that disappears when th most NR dependent countries are 
excluded. In further analysis, therefore, I also employ reduced samples with the eight 
(for the Natural Capital Sample) and six (for the Primary Exports Sample) extremely 
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Figure 2: NR dependence and the index of civil libert es in the Natural Capital Sample 
and Primary Exports Sample.  
Note: Triangles represent the most NR dependent countries, which are the Central African Republic, 
Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Zambia in the Natural Capital Sample 
and the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Uganda, and Zambia in the Primary Exports Sample. 
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     Figures 3 and 4 plot the estimated coefficients for natural capital share (Natural 
Capital Sample) and primary exports share (Primary Exports Sample) in groups of 
countries sorted with respect to the civil liberties and autocracy indices.36 The estimated 
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Figure 3: The resource curse estimated coefficient as a function of democracy measures 
in the Natural Capital Sample. The graphs on the left show results for the full sample; 
on the right, results for a reduced sample with the eight most NR dependent countries 
excluded. 
Notes: On the horizontal axis I plot the estimated coefficient of natural capital share in the regression of 
economic growth on a constant, natural capital share, and log initial income. The error bars stand for 
estimated standard errors. Coefficients that are insignificant at the 10 per cent level are plotted with a 
dash. The four groups contain 21 (19), 23 (20), 20 (19), and 21 (19) country observations, when sorting 
with respect to the index of civil liberties and 25 (25), 18 (14), 21 (19), and 21 (19) country observations, 
when sorting with respect to the autocracy index. The figures in parentheses give the number of country 
observations when the reduced sample excluding the eig t most NR dependent countries is employed. 
 
 
                                                
36 The results with the indices of democracy and politica  rights would be very close to those with the 
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Figure 4: The resource curse estimated coefficient as a function of democracy measures 
in the Primary Exports Sample. The graphs on the left show results for the full sample; 
on the right, results for a reduced sample with the six most NR dependent countries 
excluded. 
Notes: On the horizontal axis I plot the estimated coefficient of primary exports share in the regression of 
economic growth on a constant, primary exports share, and log initial income. The error bars stand for 
estimated standard errors. Coefficients that are insignificant at the 10 per cent level are plotted with a 
dash. The four groups contain 21 (22), 22 (18), 22 (20), and 21 (20) country observations, when sorting 
with respect to the index of civil liberties and 28 (26), 15 (14), 23 (20), and 20 (20) country observations, 
when sorting with respect to the autocracy index. The figures in parentheses give the number of country 
observations when the reduced sample excluding the six most NR dependent countries is employed. 
 
 
     The largest differences in the value of estimated coefficients for NR dependence are 
detected for countries sorted by quartiles on the index of civil liberties for the Natural 
Capital Sample and into the quartiles of the autocracy index for the Primary Exports 
Sample. These are also the only cases where some of th  differences in the values of 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant. With the Natural Capital Sample, 
statistically significant differences are detected between the first and second and 
between the second and fourth quartile at the 5 per cent level. When the eight most NR 
                                                                                                                                    
index of civil liberties. 
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dependent countries are excluded, statistically significant differences at the 10 per cent 
level are present between the first and second quartile nd between the third and fourth 
quartile, and at the 1 per cent level between the second and third quartile. With the 
Primary Exports Sample, statistically significant differences are detected between the 
first and second quartile and between the second and fourth quartile at the 1 percent 
level, and between the first and third quartile at the 10 per cent level. When the six most 
NR dependent countries are excluded, statistically significant differences are present 
between the first and second, second and fourth, and third and fourth quartile at the 5 
per cent level, and between the first and third quartile at the 10 per cent. 
     Figures 3 and 4 show a prevailing U-shape of the coefficient for NR dependence as a 
function of the civil liberties index with the Natural Capital Sample, and of the 
autocracy index with the Primary Exports Sample. The U-shape becoms more 
pronounced once the most NR dependent countries are excluded from both samples. 
The functions’ U-shape suggests that further possible non-linearity in the resource curse 
regressions should be tested. To explore this issue, I t sted for possible non-linear 
effects in the basic resource curse regressions of economic growth on log initial income, 
and the appropriate measure of NR dependence. Specifically, I included the indices of 
civil liberties and autocracy squared and the interaction term of the appropriate measure 
of NR dependence with the indices of civil liberties and autocracy, defined as NR 
dependence times the respective index. I also controlled for the linear effects of both 
indices in the regressions. The results provided limited support for non-linearity. With 
the Natural Capital, the interaction terms are significant at the 10 per cent level and with 
the eight most NR dependent countries excluded, even at the 1 per cent level, although 
only if the linear effects of the indices of civil liberties and autocracy are not 
considered. The significance of the interaction terms is in line with the observed 
functions’ U-shapes. With the Primary Exports Sample, only the autocracy index 
squared is significant at the 1 per cent level with the full, and significant at the 5 per 
cent level with the six most NR dependent countries excluded. Admittedly, this result is 
somehow confusing, and it is not clear how it is related to the observed U-shapes of the 
functions in Figure 4. 
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     Gylfason (2001) states, "It needs to be emphasized that it is not the existence of 
natural resources as such that seems to be the problem, ut rather the failure of public 
authorities to avert the dangers that accompany the gifts of nature." Indeed, the 
prevailing interpretation suggests that healthy institutions and wise economic policies 
can mitigate the dangers of NR wealth. In this paper, however, I present evidence that it 
is not natural resources per se, but neglect of the non-resource sector that is the real 
cause for slow growth. Poor institutions seem to be the underlying cause of both slow 
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Figure 5: Correlation between natural capital share and natural capital per capita in 
the Natural Capital Sample and between primary exports share and primary exports per 
capita in the Primary Exports Sample plotted as a functio of democracy measures. The 
graphs show results for reduced samples of 77 and 80 observations, where the eight 
most NR dependent countries are excluded from the Natural Capital Sample and the six 




     In Figure 5, I plot the correlation between NR dependence and abundance measures 
for the two samples as a function of civil liberties and autocracy indices. Reduced 
samples with the most NR dependent countries excluded are used, and the correlation 
coefficient is computed for the same country groups as the coefficient for NR 
dependence in Figures 3 and 4. Let us focus on the cas s where statistically significant 
differences were detected between the values of the estimated coefficients. Remember 
that these are the cases where the countries are sorted with respect to the civil liberties 
index in the Natural Capital Sample and with respect to the autocracy index in the 
Primary Exports Sample. Indeed, the differences in the correlation coefficients are also 
the greatest here. Moreover, the correlation between th  measures of NR dependence 
and abundance is low where the estimated coefficient for NR dependence was large, and 
vice-versa. In the remaining cases, the differences in the correlation coefficients are not 
that distinct. Nevertheless, the overall pattern remains: for groups of countries with a 
stronger resource curse result, the correlation between the measures of NR dependence 
and abundance tends to be lower and vice-versa. 
     The results in Figure 5 suggest that the capacity of NR dependence to measure the 
neglect of the non-resource sector can differ in different subsets of countries and that it 
is not NR dependence, but neglect of the non-resource sector that is the real cause of 
slow growth. If the correlation between NR abundance and dependence is high for a 
given subset of countries, then NR dependence is largely driven by real resource wealth 
and cannot serve as a good measure of non-resource sector neglect. Therefore, the curse 
of natural resources estimated in this subset of countries is not very strong. Conversely, 
the resource curse result is much stronger in those subsets of countries where the 
correlation between NR dependence and abundance is low. In such cases NR 
dependence does not vary with real NR wealth and serve  as a good measure of non-
resource sector neglect. 
     The argument presented above can also partly explain the prevailing U-shape of the 
coefficient for NR dependence plotted as a function of the civil liberties and autocracy 
indices in Figures 3 and 4. It is quite likely that the variation in economic institutions 
and policies and consequently in the neglect of the non-resource sector are much higher 
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among countries that are moving toward democracy than among fully democratic or 
authoritarian countries. In other words, the imaginry mapping from the level of 
democracy to the quality of economic institutions and policies has the shape of a 
sigmoid. Additionally, if NR wealth is distributed more or less randomly and 
homogeneously, then variation in the neglect of the non-resource sector relative to 
variation in the NR wealth would be much higher in the second and third quartiles than 
in the first and fourth quartiles, when the countries are sorted with respect to the civil 
liberties and autocracy indices. Thus, the capacity of NR dependence to measure non-
resource sector neglect should be much higher in the second and third quartiles, which 
would result in the observed U-shape of the resource curse coefficient plotted as a 





     The results of cross-country growth regressions presented here provide no statistical 
evidence that natural resources themselves are associ ted with slow economic growth. 
Previous cross-country growth regressions re-estimated were misinterpreted when used 
as evidence for the curse of natural resources. These r gressions clearly capture a 
different statistical relationship between the structure of the economy and economic 
growth. Countries with small non-resource sectors exhibit both a high degree of NR 
dependence and slow growth. Misinterpreting the previous results has led researchers 
and policy makers to focus overly on the resource sector. In fact, the link between 
measured resource dependence and growth is an artifact arising from factors that cause 
slow growth and underdeveloped economies in general. Our focus should be these 
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4.6 Appendix A – Data and Definitions 
 





















Argentina 0.400 6.697 12.855 9.238 22.810 56.103 0.376 0.409 0.622 0.641
Australia 1.700 11.889 44.419 9.433 23.727 85.758 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Austria 2.600 2.642 7.898 9.202 23.788 92.031 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Bangladesh 1.400 14.060 4.087 6.790 20.000 17.714 0.348 0.244 0.468 0.519
Belgium 2.300 0.003 2.241 9.320 19.545 96.871 0.000 1.000 0.987 1.000
Benin 0.100 7.678 2.386 6.720 15.176 12.000 0.506 0.152 0.282 0.231
Botswana 7.700 6.302 6.764 6.217 26.853 25.688 0.000 0.870 0.705 0.853
Brazil 2.200 7.894 9.058 8.055 20.690 33.097 0.424 0.385 0.583 0.654
Burkina Faso 0.900 16.911 3.046 6.468 21.000 3.448 0.542 0.036 0.397 0.276
Burundi 0.900 19.858 2.545 6.034 11.500 3.300 0.669 0.003 0.115 0.032
Cameroon 1.300 21.077 8.609 6.814 21.458 17.467 0.712 0.021 0.263 0.141
Canada 1.800 11.069 39.237 9.446 21.545 86.900 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Central 
African 
Republic -1.200 30.160 7.344 7.400 10.409 9.556 0.571 0.106 0.212 0.167
Chad -0.600 37.133 7.159 6.936 7.471 4.923 0.685 0.012 0.141 0.096
Chile 1.900 9.782 17.575 8.428 19.000 54.806 0.303 0.382 0.526 0.391
China 6.800 7.229 3.507 5.852 30.619 44.500 0.741 0.000 0.083 0.077
Colombia 2.000 7.183 7.687 8.023 18.971 39.516 0.000 0.774 0.628 0.776
Congo 1.400 14.466 5.828 6.282 31.720 50.065 0.639 0.091 0.244 0.173
Costa Rica 1.200 8.205 9.822 8.274 20.618 40.242 0.000 1.000 0.968 1.000
Ivory Coast -0.800 18.009 4.984 7.568 17.324 16.424 0.832 0.000 0.333 0.186
Denmark 1.900 3.753 12.051 9.459 22.939 101.419 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Dominican 
Republic 2.300 12.407 10.679 7.625 20.794 35.333 0.145 0.430 0.718 0.776
Ecuador 1.800 17.011 11.497 7.419 19.235 43.448 0.150 0.582 0.654 0.628
Egypt 3.500 4.550 3.019 6.919 20.765 52.455 0.553 0.026 0.346 0.288
El Salvador -0.400 2.846 1.516 8.428 15.500 24.419 0.166 0.445 0.564 0.641
Finland 2.400 6.602 17.812 9.152 23.970 101.938 0.000 1.000 0.891 0.904
France 2.100 2.735 9.783 9.277 21.758 86.031 0.012 0.815 0.846 1.000
Gambia 0.400 11.844 2.729 7.132 19.500 13.097 0.088 0.656 0.647 0.660
Ghana -0.800 7.221 2.518 7.724 11.875 31.333 0.500 0.117 0.359 0.250
Greece 2.400 3.657 6.790 8.764 25.394 80.125 0.167 0.703 0.756 0.859
Guatemala 0.700 3.309 2.070 7.923 14.324 16.379 0.252 0.291 0.462 0.538
Guinea-
Bissau -0.100 44.204 10.508 6.384 29.150 6.417 0.592 0.083 0.229 0.243
Haiti -0.800 6.683 1.108 7.494 10.875 13.300 0.716 0.131 0.224 0.141
Honduras 0.600 9.940 4.153 7.560 19.765 22.083 0.091 0.353 0.667 0.571
India 2.700 19.788 5.010 6.751 18.559 33.969 0.000 0.835 0.615 0.782
Indonesia 4.700 12.378 9.730 6.270 25.500 31.469 0.685 0.000 0.288 0.250
Ireland 3.000 8.117 23.284 8.822 21.030 89.875 0.000 1.000 0.962 1.000
Italy 2.500 1.320 4.179 9.107 21.606 72.313 0.000 1.000 0.891 0.974
Jamaica -0.400 6.776 4.061 8.247 24.853 58.296 0.000 0.982 0.731 0.865
Japan 3.500 0.758 2.386 8.933 30.818 92.387 0.000 1.000 0.955 0.936
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Jordan -0.400 1.589 1.213 8.001 29.391 47.970 0.791 0.050 0.308 0.301
Kenya 1.300 9.439 2.123 6.445 17.382 17.097 0.591 0.053 0.308 0.250
Korea 6.600 1.750 3.362 7.385 29.353 71.625 0.364 0.321 0.449 0.558
Madagascar -1.800 41.871 8.557 7.207 10.500 14.833 0.391 0.233 0.378 0.423
Malawi 0.500 11.782 1.108 6.147 17.385 5.871 0.765 0.103 0.179 0.212
Malaysia 4.100 8.618 14.477 7.623 28.412 47.939 0.094 0.535 0.462 0.590
Mali -0.100 41.041 6.289 6.545 17.500 7.121 0.552 0.142 0.276 0.212
Mauritania -0.100 21.570 6.658 7.346 20.357 9.226 0.676 0.000 0.160 0.090
Mauritius 3.800 1.245 1.622 7.786 21.824 44.813 0.000 0.955 0.788 0.853
Mexico 1.500 5.885 8.596 8.425 19.588 43.032 0.376 0.138 0.551 0.545
Morocco 1.800 4.075 2.901 7.478 20.441 25.875 0.812 0.000 0.385 0.429
Mozambique 0.500 12.681 1.490 6.442 12.737 5.000 0.588 0.125 0.159 0.196
Namibia 0.700 10.071 8.965 8.341 19.053 51.667 0.000 0.600 0.685 0.796
Nepal 1.100 17.698 3.547 6.713 17.500 21.500 0.529 0.185 0.462 0.519
Netherlands 1.900 1.524 5.155 9.392 21.848 99.375 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.00
New Zealand 0.700 18.473 54.241 9.455 22.242 86.515 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Nicaragua -3.300 13.878 4.746 8.655 19.971 33.515 0.434 0.213 0.436 0.397
Niger -2.500 54.241 15.874 7.427 11.421 4.094 0.606 0.097 0.231 0.122
Norway 3.000 10.016 33.106 9.198 26.697 93.813 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Pakistan 2.700 5.552 2.347 6.531 16.265 15.630 0.253 0.433 0.365 0.410
Panama 0.700 6.473 7.212 8.272 19.579 54.903 0.415 0.294 0.468 0.359
Papua New 
Guinea 0.500 19.324 9.849 7.534 23.382 10.903 0.000 1.000 0.732 0.826
Paraguay 2.300 11.539 9.084 7.619 20.765 26.469 0.579 0.168 0.410 0.410
Peru -0.300 7.784 6.039 8.437 20.971 52.750 0.281 0.388 0.519 0.500
Philippines 0.900 6.174 3.560 7.927 21.647 61.667 0.376 0.400 0.500 0.538
Portugal 3.200 2.313 5.076 8.547 27.000 59.000 0.253 0.700 0.814 0.859
Rwanda 0.000 21.708 1.371 6.477 12.647 4.519 0.661 0.024 0.205 0.103
Senegal -0.400 16.785 6.711 7.300 12.441 12.333 0.450 0.124 0.494 0.462
Sierra Leone -1.600 28.009 4.008 6.630 7.357 13.154 0.566 0.081 0.301 0.237
South Africa 0.100 5.043 5.432 8.991 22.206 62.231 0.247 0.731 0.365 0.468
Spain 2.300 2.857 7.054 8.927 23.000 84.000 0.226 0.665 0.744 0.840
Sri Lanka 3.000 7.421 4.259 7.012 22.103 57.032 0.047 0.662 0.519 0.692
Sweden 1.400 5.608 16.204 9.437 19.939 90.906 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.994
Switzerland 1.200 0.868 3.204 9.805 25.182 85.387 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Thailand 5.000 6.486 8.728 7.007 28.706 29.182 0.203 0.394 0.532 0.545
Togo -0.600 15.184 3.296 7.408 17.316 19.813 0.619 0.019 0.224 0.083
Trinidad and 
Tobago 2.600 9.487 15.835 8.036 21.265 62.333 0.000 0.850 0.872 0.936
Tunisia 2.700 7.908 8.385 7.671 26.147 34.121 0.721 0.018 0.353 0.224
Turkey 2.100 5.019 5.142 8.108 18.613 36.750 0.103 0.738 0.481 0.660
United 
Kingdom 1.900 1.859 5.577 9.298 17.970 87.656 0.000 1.000 0.949 1.000
United States 1.600 4.112 19.909 9.759 18.273 90.600 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Uruguay 1.200 11.645 19.513 8.659 14.441 66.742 0.278 0.575 0.583 0.609
Venezuela -0.800 18.929 25.776 8.914 21.941 32.871 0.012 0.859 0.776 0.910
Zambia -2.000 37.770 7.199 7.186 17.828 17.133 0.574 0.185 0.372 0.391
Zimbabwe 0.500 8.483 2.953 7.655 17.029 25.697 0.393 0.332 0.346 0.346
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Definitions: 
• Economic growth: The average annual growth of real per capita GDP over the 
period 1965-1998; unit: percent; source: World Bank (2000). 
Note: Data are available in Gylfason and Zoega (2002). 
• Natural capital share: The share of natural capital in total capital (natur l, human, 
and physical capital) in 1994; the value of natural c pital comprises the value of 
pastureland, cropland, timber resources, non-timber forest resources, protected 
areas, and subsoil assets; unit: percent; source: World Bank (1997). 
Note: Data are available in Gylfason and Zoega (2002). 
• Natural capital per capita: The per capita value of pastureland, cropland, timber 
resources, non-timber forest resources, and subsoil a sets in 1994 multiplied by an 
appropriate constant so that the sample maximum of Natural capital per capita 
equals the sample maximum of Natural capital share; unit: 1994 U.S. dollars (times 
758.5); source: World Bank (1997). 
• Log initial income: Natural logarithm of 1965 per capita GNP computed from the 
1998 purchasing power parity adjusted per capita GNP by dividing with 
(1+Economic growth/100)33 and by taking the natural logarithm; unit: index; source: 
World Bank (2000). 
Note: Data are available in Gylfason and Zoega (2002). 
• Investment ratio: The average gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP 
over the period 1965-1998; unit: percent; source: World Bank (2000). 
Note: Data are available in Gylfason and Zoega (2002). 
• Enrollment rate: The average secondary school enrollment rate (gross) ver the 
period 1965-1998; unit: percent; source: World Bank (2000). 
Note: Data are available in Gylfason and Zoega (2002). 
• Autocracy: Average of the Polity IV variable AUTOC over the p riod 1965-1998 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of autocracy; unit: index; source 
Polity IV Project (2001). 
• Democracy: Average of the Polity IV variable DEMOC over the p riod 1965-1998 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of democracy; unit: index; 
source Polity IV Project (2001). 
• Civil liberties: Average of the Freedom House index of civil liberties over the period 
1973-1998 (for each country only the years with avail ble data were used) rescaled 
to the range 0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of civil liberties; 
unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
• Political rights: Average of the Freedom House index of political rights over the 
period 1973-1998 (for each country only the years with available data were used) 
rescaled to the range 0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of political 
rights; unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
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Table A.1: Statistics on variables used in the Natural Capital Sample. 
     Standard  
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. deviation Obs. 
Economic growth 1.36 1.30 7.70 -3.30 1.92 85 
Nat. capital share 11.8 8.21 54.2 0.00 10.8 85 
Nat. capital p. cap. 8.82 6.29 54.2 1.11 9.35 85 
Log initial income 7.85 7.67 9.81 5.85 1.06 85 
Invest. ratio 20.2 20.6 31.7 7.36 5.27 85 
Enrollment rate 43.8 36.8 101.9 3.30 30.2 85 
Autocracy 0.31 0.28 0.83 0.00 0.28 85 
Democracy 0.47 0.39 1.00 0.00 0.38 85 
Civil liberties 0.56 0.52 1.00 0.08 0.28 85 






Table A.2: Correlations of variables used in the Natural Capital Sample. 
 Economic Nat. capital Nat. capital Log initial Invest. 
Variable growth share p. cap. income ratio 
Economic growth 1.00     
Nat. capital share -0.53 1.00    
Nat. capital p. cap. 0.05 0.12 1.00   
Log initial income -0.02 -0.45 0.47 1.00  
Invest. ratio 0.61 -0.41 0.16 0.21 1.00 
Enrollment rate 0.39 -0.57 0.43 0.82 0.48 
Autocracy -0.32 0.41 -0.32 -0.65 -0.28 
Democracy 0.31 -0.43 0.43 0.73 0.33 
Civil liberties 0.29 -0.47 0.48 0.81 0.35 
Political rights 0.35 -0.48 0.43 0.76 0.37 
 Enrollment   Civil  Political  
 rate Autocracy Democracy liberties rights 
Economic growth      
Nat. capital share      
Nat. capital p. cap.      
Log initial income      
Invest. ratio      
Enrollment rate 1.00     
Autocracy -0.66 1.00    
Democracy 0.76 -0.94 1.00   
Civil liberties 0.81 -0.88 0.92 1.00  
Political rights 0.78 -0.92 0.95 0.97 1.00 
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Algeria 1.478 19.237 5.205 8.255 0.000 3.301 0.843 0.010 0.185 0.167
Argentina -0.688 5.262 7.619 9.088 0.000 2.826 0.419 0.381 0.602 0.537
Australia 1.152 9.983 28.232 9.748 1.000 3.312 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Austria 2.161 3.891 13.199 9.411 1.000 3.254 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Bangladesh 0.141 0.978 0.043 7.827 0.000 1.139 0.495 0.095 0.444 0.417
Belgium 2.016 10.775 37.385 9.489 1.000 3.103 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Benin -0.802 8.385 0.649 7.677 0.038 1.493 0.660 0.010 0.093 0.000
Bolivia -0.006 18.452 3.294 8.037 0.731 2.730 0.362 0.371 0.556 0.500
Brazil 1.992 5.487 3.013 8.408 0.000 2.981 0.471 0.319 0.593 0.593
Burkina 
Faso 1.722 4.348 0.181 6.544 0.000 2.251 0.535 0.060 0.380 0.269
Burundi 2.796 10.079 0.346 6.425 0.000 1.817 0.700 0.000 0.130 0.019
Cameroon 2.556 18.146 1.911 7.286 0.000 2.360 0.786 0.000 0.250 0.157
Canada 2.189 9.588 25.410 9.702 1.000 3.189 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Central 
African 
Republic -1.112 8.826 0.864 7.198 0.000 1.670 0.700 0.000 0.130 0.028
Chile 0.263 14.879 7.640 8.773 0.577 2.901 0.490 0.171 0.389 0.194
China 2.252 1.950 0.070 7.126 0.000 3.019 0.729 0.000 0.120 0.111
Colombia 1.433 9.417 2.815 8.329 0.192 2.751 0.000 0.781 0.685 0.824
Congo 1.737 7.630 0.880 8.026 0.000 2.224 0.757 0.000 0.139 0.074
Costa Rica 0.131 19.346 7.798 8.652 0.154 2.848 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Ivory Coast -1.289 29.321 5.626 8.072 0.000 2.308 0.890 0.000 0.296 0.194
Cyprus 3.604 14.406 11.320 8.761 1.000 3.283 0.000 0.943 0.704 0.833
Denmark 1.585 9.858 45.426 9.616 1.000 3.196 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Dominican 
Republic 0.851 13.459 2.506 8.036 0.000 2.877 0.152 0.410 0.741 0.815
Ecuador 1.639 10.561 1.980 8.164 0.731 3.132 0.205 0.533 0.648 0.546
Egypt 2.226 7.320 0.707 7.669 0.000 1.635 0.576 0.005 0.398 0.315
El Salvador -0.125 15.674 5.443 8.180 0.038 2.103 0.206 0.363 0.537 0.620
Finland 2.661 7.018 22.095 9.412 1.000 3.521 0.000 1.000 0.843 0.861
France 1.775 2.998 10.633 9.599 1.000 3.285 0.000 0.824 0.852 1.000
Gambia 0.614 36.125 2.510 7.174 0.192 1.800 0.000 0.757 0.713 0.759
Germany 1.678 2.181 9.602 1.000 3.247 0.000 1.000 0.898 1.000
Ghana -0.727 21.091 2.167 7.623 0.192 1.620 0.574 0.116 0.324 0.185
Greece 2.139 4.087 5.907 8.795 1.000 3.201 0.140 0.690 0.769 0.796
Guatemala 0.234 11.399 2.885 8.283 0.077 2.218 0.345 0.180 0.491 0.519
Honduras 0.363 23.196 2.828 7.809 0.000 2.595 0.100 0.316 0.667 0.491
India 1.987 1.648 0.077 7.268 0.000 2.653 0.000 0.814 0.657 0.833
Indonesia 4.557 11.239 0.721 7.176 0.769 3.071 0.700 0.000 0.296 0.333
Iran -1.908 11.946 9.155 0.000 3.022 0.800 0.000 0.204 0.259
Ireland 2.728 15.430 24.487 9.071 0.962 3.256 0.000 1.000 0.963 1.000
Israel 2.219 3.985 7.249 9.207 0.192 3.199 0.000 0.900 0.778 0.833
Italy 2.186 2.081 4.851 9.370 1.000 3.254 0.000 1.000 0.907 0.963
Jamaica -1.350 13.681 5.200 8.626 0.385 2.937 0.000 1.000 0.731 0.880
Japan 3.314 0.640 2.753 9.269 1.000 3.537 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.926
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Jordan 2.934 8.976 3.536 7.933 1.000 2.821 0.910 0.010 0.222 0.213
Kenya 2.241 18.082 0.846 7.111 0.115 2.676 0.686 0.000 0.361 0.278
Korea 5.706 2.242 1.049 8.031 0.846 3.295 0.540 0.145 0.306 0.435
Madagascar -2.372 11.874 0.987 7.665 0.000 0.333 0.543 0.033 0.324 0.296
Malawi 0.872 20.730 0.606 6.760 0.000 2.424 0.900 0.000 0.074 0.102
Mali 1.418 8.383 0.444 6.677 0.077 1.772 0.700 0.000 0.130 0.019
Mauritania -0.319 41.095 4.353 7.383 0.000 2.838 0.700 0.000 0.167 0.102
Mauritius 3.388 29.484 7.662 8.405 1.000 2.340 0.000 0.943 0.769 0.806
Mexico 1.063 2.413 1.494 8.990 0.154 2.839 0.438 0.081 0.556 0.556
Morocco 1.589 11.000 2.008 7.930 0.231 2.417 0.833 0.000 0.398 0.472
Netherlands 1.246 15.127 54.311 9.596 1.000 3.149 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
New 
Zealand 0.513 17.748 47.359 9.662 0.154 3.169 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Nicaragua -3.094 19.390 3.281 8.473 0.000 2.501 0.521 0.063 0.380 0.315
Nigeria 1.296 13.821 0.699 7.323 0.154 2.712 0.700 0.000 0.491 0.352
Norway 2.924 10.317 34.541 9.459 1.000 3.481 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Pakistan 1.153 2.937 0.168 7.619 0.000 2.259 0.378 0.311 0.370 0.343
Paraguay 1.580 9.705 2.178 7.930 0.038 2.742 0.733 0.029 0.296 0.343
Peru -1.628 15.285 8.032 8.558 0.115 2.861 0.295 0.411 0.546 0.537
Philippines 0.681 12.598 2.250 7.903 0.077 2.803 0.590 0.200 0.454 0.454
Portugal 3.751 4.781 5.072 8.581 1.000 3.135 0.189 0.758 0.741 0.796
Rwanda 0.864 11.368 0.625 7.158 0.000 1.548 0.686 0.014 0.213 0.111
Senegal 0.248 13.522 1.792 7.667 0.000 1.630 0.448 0.124 0.491 0.444
Sierra 
Leone -2.089 9.056 0.592 7.865 0.000 0.311 0.643 0.014 0.333 0.296
Singapore 5.770 2.619 3.504 8.559 1.000 3.584 0.400 0.200 0.343 0.417
South 
Africa -0.231 17.200 14.615 8.683 0.000 2.920 0.295 0.700 0.241 0.389
Spain 2.115 2.988 5.215 9.150 1.000 3.221 0.194 0.700 0.676 0.769
Sri Lanka 1.924 14.804 1.086 7.734 0.231 2.391 0.038 0.676 0.593 0.759
Sudan -0.322 15.529 0.759 7.342 0.000 1.876 0.605 0.126 0.241 0.269
Sweden 1.661 5.037 20.583 9.707 1.000 3.108 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.991
Switzerland 0.993 2.467 19.450 9.894 1.000 3.363 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Syria 2.405 8.076 1.056 8.499 0.038 2.729 0.900 0.000 0.056 0.194
Taiwan 5.771 2.226 8.246 1.000 3.196 0.648 0.038 0.389 0.306
Thailand 3.145 8.559 1.406 8.008 1.000 2.865 0.200 0.284 0.537 0.509
Togo 0.473 19.072 1.551 7.057 0.000 2.910 0.700 0.000 0.185 0.056
Trinidad 
and Tobago -0.006 8.306 3.549 9.450 0.000 2.573 0.000 0.833 0.852 0.907
Tunisia 2.759 10.302 2.134 7.967 0.038 2.677 0.790 0.000 0.352 0.231
Turkey 2.086 3.798 1.367 8.305 0.038 3.115 0.138 0.671 0.509 0.694
Uganda -0.802 26.551 1.317 7.157 0.077 0.924 0.542 0.105 0.231 0.204
United 
Kingdom 1.985 2.632 6.757 9.517 1.000 2.897 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
United 
States 1.342 1.263 4.954 9.949 1.000 3.128 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Uruguay 0.594 9.100 7.604 8.782 0.000 2.663 0.468 0.337 0.472 0.463
Venezuela -1.847 23.696 21.249 9.620 0.038 3.098 0.000 0.900 0.824 0.963
Zambia -2.184 54.311 7.267 7.683 0.000 2.771 0.843 0.029 0.306 0.315
Zimbabwe 0.016 16.607 2.301 7.717 0.000 2.699 0.310 0.465 0.324 0.361
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Definitions: 
• Economic growth: The average annual growth of real GDP divided by the
economically active population over the period 1970-1990; unit: percent; source: 
Penn World Tables, mark 5.6. 
Note: Data are available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/. A more detailed description of the data and 
some exceptions from the basic definition can be found in Sachs and Warner (1997), where this 
variable is called GEA7090.  
• Primary exports share: The share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970; 
primary products exports are exports of fuels and non-fuel primary products; both 
numerator and denominator are measured in nominal U.S. dollars; local currency 
GNP is converted to dollars using a smoothed exchange rate; unit: percent; source: 
World Bank (1995). 
Note: Data are available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/. A more detailed description of the data and 
some exceptions from the basic definition can be found in Sachs and Warner (1997), where this 
variable is called SXP. 
• Primary exports per capita: Exports of primary products per capita in 1970; 
computed by multiplying Primary exports share with GNP per capita in 1970 
measured in constant 1995 U.S. dollars and by multiplying the result with an 
appropriate constant so that the sample maximum of Primary exports per capita 
equals the sample maximum of Primary exports share; unit: 1995 U.S. dollars 
(times 46.4); source: World Bank (2000) for the 1970 GNP per capita. 
Note: In some cases a different year than 1970 is chosen f r the GNP per capita. The exceptions are 
in accord with the exceptions from the basic definitio  of Primary exports share as described in 
Sachs and Warner (1997). 
• Log initial income: Natural logarithm of real GDP divided by the economically 
active population in 1970; unit: index; source: Penn World Tables, mark 5.6 for the 
real GDP and World Bank (1995) for the economically ctive population. 
Note: Data are available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/. A more detailed description of the data and 
some exceptions from the basic definition can be found in Sachs and Warner (1997), where this 
variable is called LGDPEA70. 
• Openness: The fraction of years during the period 1970-1990 in which the country is 
rated as an open economy; unit: index; source: Sachs nd Warner (1995b). 
Note: Data are available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/. In Sachs and Warner (1997), this variable is 
called SOPEN. 
• Log Investment ratio: Natural logarithm of the ratio of real gross domestic 
investment (public plus private) to real GDP, averag d over the period 1970-1989; 
unit: index; source: Penn World Tables, mark 5.6. 
Note: Data are available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/. In Sachs and Warner (1997), this variable is 
called LINV7089. 
• Autocracy: Average of the Polity IV variable AUTOC over the p riod 1970-1990 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of autocracy; unit: index; source 
Polity IV Project (2001). 
• Democracy: Average of the Polity IV variable DEMOC over the p riod 1970-1990 
(for each country only the years with available data were used) rescaled to the range 
0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of democracy; unit: index; 
source Polity IV Project (2001). 
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• Civil liberties: Average of the Freedom House index of civil liberties over the period 
1973-1990 (for each country only the years with avail ble data were used) rescaled 
to the range 0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of civil liberties; 
unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
• Political rights: Average of the Freedom House index of political rights over the 
period 1973-1990 (for each country only the years with available data were used) 
rescaled to the range 0 to 1; 1 indicates the highest and 0 the lowest level of political 
rights; unit: index; source Freedom House (2002). 
 
 
Table A.3: Statistics on variables used in the Prima y Exports Sample. 
     Standard  
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. deviation Obs. 
Economic growth 1.21 1.43 5.77 -3.09 1.77 86 
Primary exports share 11.9 10.2 54.3 0.64 9.23 86 
Primary exports p. cap. 7.54 2.88 54.3 0.04 11.3 83 
Log initial income 8.32 8.25 9.95 6.43 0.91 86 
Openness 0.38 0.12 1.00 0.00 0.44 86 
Log invest. ratio 2.66 2.84 3.58 0.31 0.68 86 
Autocracy 0.36 0.37 0.91 0.00 0.32 86 
Democracy 0.43 0.32 1.00 0.00 0.41 86 
Civil liberties 0.54 0.50 1.00 0.06 0.30 86 
Political rights 0.55 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.33 86 
 
 
Table A.4: Correlations of variables used in the Prima y Exports Sample. 
 Economic Prim. exports Prim. exports Log initial  
Variable growth share p. cap. income Openness 
Economic growth 1.00     
Primary exports share -0.45 1.00    
Primary exports p. cap. 0.05 0.03 1.00   
Log initial income 0.08 -0.30 0.66 1.00  
Openness 0.57 -0.33 0.47 0.61 1.00 
Log invest. ratio 0.48 -0.20 0.42 0.60 0.57 
Autocracy -0.14 0.21 -0.51 -0.68 -0.54 
Democracy 0.17 -0.19 0.62 0.76 0.62 
Civil liberties 0.17 -0.22 0.63 0.79 0.63 
Political rights 0.19 -0.23 0.60 0.80 0.62 
 Log  invest.    Civil  Political  
 ratio Autocracy Democracy liberties rights 
Economic growth      
Prim. exports share      
Prim. exports p. cap.      
Log initial income      
Openness      
Log invest. ratio 1.00     
Autocracy -0.42 1.00    
Democracy 0.53 -0.94 1.00   
Civil liberties 0.51 -0.90 0.92 1.00  
Political rights 0.54 -0.92 0.94 0.97 1.00 
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